


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# ***JPRS Report***



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# **Soviet Union**

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**KOMMUNIST**  
No 1, January 1990

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**Soviet Union  
KOMMUNIST**  
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*2 March 1990*

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## KOMMUNIST

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### Labor and Power

905B0014A Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 3-10

[Interview with Tadeush Karlovich Pupkevich, USSR people's deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet member, operator of a "Narvskiy" walking excavator at "Estonslants" Production Association, by V. Nekhotin]

[Text] [Nekhotin] Tadeush Karlovich, many who saw the televised broadcast of the meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers chairman with representatives of the country's mining collectives, held on 17 November last year, also remember your speech, although, to put it bluntly, you talked about things that were unpleasant for many. At that time, the miners' strikes had reached a critical point and the auditorium was very tense. Did you speak because you believed precisely those words had to be said at that time?

[Pupkevich] You know, my work has always stood up for me and, therefore, I always say what I think, what is bothering me, not on paper, and not at someone's suggestion or request. So it was then. The main thing that worries and troubles me is society's attitude toward labor. This is not the concern of workers alone. Labor has been belittled, as though shoved into the background. In half a year in the Supreme Soviet, I have managed to find out and hear a great deal. Everyone asks, demands, divides. On this soil, we deputies can quarrel and bash each other's heads, but, after all, there is no longer anything to divide: hence, our conflicts and inner tension. We have the lowest labor productivity. If we do not raise it, if we do not set things to rights, can we really promise increased wages, for instance, for doctors and teachers? From what funds, from where will it come?

It struck me: at the First Congress of People's Deputies, only two speakers talked seriously about labor. They were Academician Likhachev, a philologist, and the artist Rolan Bykov, both humanitarians. Their concern is important to me. It seems to me, they have both lived life and understand that our problems lie not only in material scarcity, but also in elementary human relations, in our moral code, which is not written anywhere and could hardly be formulated simply, but without which we cannot live normally.

Our society is at a point, beyond which people will stop believing in everything, even in the family, even in each other, not to mention local and central authorities. Without reviving trust, it is very hard to correct anything, and no economic reforms whatsoever will help or even work. The constant promises have started to cause

a sort of allergy in people, even if the promises are not only good, but also real. The attitude of many is approximately as follows: let this "calf" eat, and we will watch. This is very serious.

Incidentally, this was also displayed during the miners' strikes. Before, when they simply wanted to calm everyone down, they had only to say something, promise them something. That time has ended. Now, it is important to speak the truth, no matter how unpleasant it may be, without any embellishments: what situation we are in, how we intend to get out of it. Although this will be received with bitterness today, it will take positive effect tomorrow.

You may not agree with me: this is my personal opinion. I think government has shown excessive zeal in promising to meet all the striking miners' demands. I, a cadre worker, can see that it is simply impossible to fulfill even half of them. I am a technician by education, and I always look and set things out: income, expenditures, human possibilities, skills. I do not see how it will get better so rapidly, and for everyone immediately. We do not need extraordinary promises and, I think, the working class would understand this. If we do not raise the level of our economic management, labor, and its organization, then for the time being things will not get better. One should keep one's word.

I was in complete moral and spiritual solidarity with those who advanced their demands at the summer strike. A worker will not go to extremes, so long as he has not been definitively belittled or insulted. Imagine the psychology of a person in whom, on the one hand, all his life we have instilled the idea that "you are master of your country, of your fate." Yet, on the other, he was put in such a position, that he is unable to work even as much as he can and wants to and, consequently, unable to earn. So to speak, a common philosophy was born: Must the "bureaus" receive as much profit, as you can give? We need not do this—stop; what is it to you, if there is more for everybody? It is precisely this terrible contradiction between ideology and reality, most of all, that makes people indignant. The natural questions of any thinking worker are: What is going on, what are the administrative apparatus and sectorial sciences working on, that they must take 80 percent of our profit? Where does all the money go? And work has not become easier: just as one's back was sweat-drenched 30 years ago, so it remains today. Glasnost has raised the level of information, but life has remained as before. Finally, the moral, human grievances of the miners, the indifference to their very difficult labor, took the most painful forms for society.

Before the summer strikes, there was no communication between the broad strata of working people and the government. Otherwise, we would not hurl ourselves about thus, slap-dash, from one extreme to another. The worker realized: he has such a powerful weapon in his hands, as a strike. However, I think he must use it accurately. He should think: how not to turn it against

society and, in the final account, against himself. It is very easy to stir things up with meetings, but they have the following property: from meetings, we can either go forward, or stop in the destruction stage and compromise everything good that existed in this movement. Very well, let us go outside and destroy everything. However, to speak seriously, this is terrible. There has been enough destroying, perhaps? We must think of ways to switch to real work. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the second wave of strikes has stopped in the meeting stage. A certain stubborn resistance has been noted...

[Nekhotin] However, after all, people need not just soap and sugar, but also an opportunity to work as they wish, the granting of full independence.

[Pupkevich] Of course, I am for independence. We fought for it for 15-20 years in my own brigade. It is not so easily achieved. Why is it that many believe cost-accounting is just money and just profit, that you just need to become independent, and everything will rain down on you from somewhere above... Really, you have to work quite differently under this condition, the responsibilities are quite different, and you need skills. In the first place, it is important to think of where we might fail, how we will behave if there is a failure, how we will reduce losses to a minimum, and at the expense of what will we compensate for them. It is always good practice, after going through all the variants—here I win, there I lose, will there be a yield some day—to count not on the best variant, and not on the average one, but on the worst. Thus, one will not be disillusioned later. It is best never to start out in all directions right away. Independence begins with the recognition of this.

To do this at the brigade level, so as to ensure stable growth, and not various kinds of "record jumps," is, I know, a job for a professional. We need time here: our brigade required 3 years of the most difficult work, while people were not joined on the basis of their best qualities, on a definite "philosophy," if you wish...

[Nekhotin] What do you mean?

[Pupkevich] Half of the brigade were the same age, young people, fairly ambitious, each with a family. Naturally, they wanted to earn. They looked at how things were for their neighbors and estimated what was keeping us from breaking through, what precisely had to be corrected. It turned out, 90 percent of the time we had to correct ourselves. After all, society excellently trains us to blame each other for everything. I have seen many meetings in my life, from the very bottom up to the ministries, and one thing was striking about all of them: even though good, practical people would meet, they would inevitably start disclosing who is guilt before whom, who is stopping whom. In the brigade, we always tried to proceed from the fact that we ourselves, above all, were to blame for our misfortunes. We got our way, although sometimes we would feel as though we were hitting a pillow, that there was no point. It took 20 years to get our independence.

[Nekhotin] So, you agree that professional ambition, readiness to work for pleasure, unfortunately, is not so widespread a quality here, that we should set our hopes on it on a country-wide scale. As you yourself say, people are tired of appeals and persuasion to "work better." As a Supreme Soviet member, you know there is simply nothing with which we can increase material incentive. On what can we rely today, with what "philosophy" can we unite people?

[Pupkevich] To use "loud" words—and such things cannot be explained with others, there are no other such words—on common human values. On respect for man's existence, for each other, for every member of the collective. This is how I think. There were different people in our brigade: some drank, and some had committed deeds such that, so to speak, we could rid ourselves of them and find better workers with a "clean conscience." However, we did not take this path. The world is built so that some are stronger in one way, and others, in another. Yet, if we know how to join together, each with his own strengths and weaknesses, the job will get done. Society, like a forest, has different trees, big and small, that make it strong. If only big trees were to remain, the forest would not survive.

Four of us operate the walking excavator per shift, four shifts a day, and one shift passes to the next: yet the equipment is such that you cannot recheck and review everything yourself; you have to trust another as you would yourself. For the sake of the work, and safety. At the current level of production, it is impossible to control everything. Much lies entirely on the specialist's conscience, and if he is a professional, he does not allow himself to work poorly. However, our system often makes this necessary, forces a person to start dodging and turning out defective products, especially if the leader is one for whom one need only get the indicators by the 31st. Pursuing defective work, in order not to look bad, is a most natural motive. May God forgive us for putting people in circumstances, such that it is hard for them to stay decent. It was, after all, very easy and convenient for me to work, when I received a command, I conveyed it: sit down, control your performance. A stupid command or reasonable one, it does not matter to you. Yet, when you are really independent, you yourself have to break your brain deciding how to act, consulting with people. Hence democracy: like it or not, you listen to sensible, practical people, otherwise you will not last long. Naturally, people will also object. If no one in my brigade raises an objection, I feel worried. I need people who think differently. Then, by comparing and arguing, we can find solutions. If everyone says "OK," it means I already made a mistake somewhere. In my opinion, this is so everywhere, at any level of decision making.

Of course, there is no independence unless the collective itself has the right to decide what the value of any specialist is, how many and what specialists it needs, and how much to pay them. Only thus can genuine professionalism be formed in work. Democracy should give

rise to such things, and if it does not, then, pardon me, it is already something different.

[Nekhotin] Strictly speaking, what keeps us from taking such a path?

[Pupkevich] In my opinion, the role of any leader, from brigade leader to minister, has been strongly distorted in social consciousness. We were trained to think: once you make it to chief, you get an office and a good life. However, this is not so at all. It is colossal, constant, daily labor, even with a jacket and tie. If, of course, one's work is honest and truly responsible. We have utterly confused these things. It is not for nothing that the capitalists pay outrageous salaries, by our standards, to their managers. Even 10 years ago, I said: if our gorkom first secretary is really the most needed and heavily worked person, give him 100 rubles, or 1000, and not less than I get by a factor of 2 or 3. Getting up at a meeting, on a wave of emotions, which we deputies often do, is relatively easy. The hardest thing is to do one's job on workdays, everyday, for years. Nature does not give us many such people, yet we silently trampled them, because they would not let the people around them live easily, they prevented idling and even annoyed us. Now, we must specially train and seek out such people. We need democracy so that everyone can do his job.

During the strikes, a very large group of people who know how to lead the masses came forward. They included people, themselves easily aroused and arousing others, but entirely unaccustomed to the drudgery of a leader's everyday work. They can be supported by the meeting wave, they played their role in the outburst, and they are aware of their power. However, if we strain only for power, without responsibility, I fear, we will return to the previous system of functionaries, because far from everyone is prepared for steady, hard work. Yet, it is so easy to wave sabers...

Many natural leaders have also appeared. As far as I know, many of them are already joining labor collective councils and trade union committees today. Election is very good for renewing local soviets. If he is open-minded, hard-working, with good instincts, not just a good person, but also fair, the collective will begin quite a different life.

[Nekhotin] Are you separating these concepts from each other?

[Pupkevich] Actually, I separate the concepts of "good" and "nice." Goodness is when you give yourself, not someone else. Therefore, it is internally related to labor. Suppose a worker asks to get off early: a nice foreman lets him leave. Yet, someone has to make up for his time or the technology breaks down. Do you want to be good? Then stand in the place of the one you let leave and do his work. This is not so easy. We often rush to "do good" at the expense of others, having not even informed them of this. When you look closely at how this is done, including on a society-wide scale, you see that in the end,

such kindness is bad for everybody, including those for whom you wanted to make things pleasant.

A fair, good person is not always pleasant, especially when he is an official. If a collective is used to dependence, it is inclined to look for a leader who will bring them benefits again and again. Nice guys know how to do this: as a rule, they have good connections and the ability to "carve a way." Our system enables one to arrange things in one's favor only at the expense of other enterprises, sectors, and all society. This is becoming more difficult now, and conflicts are already appearing. The readiness to ask and demand does not take much. Often, there is insufficient understanding and vision of the problem on the whole. I think this, in general, is a very profound illness of our entire society.

[Nekhotin] What do you see as its causes?

[Pupkevich] Really, even our children are getting an education in how to live easily. After all, everything—school, philosophy—has persuaded us that we are in a world, where everything will be given to us if we just push a button. In our schools, are we really saying that it is hard to live, that life is serious and we must always achieve something through our labor, that we must learn and re-learn something? Many enter adult life feeling as though everything is owed to them, primarily by the state. A person entered into it with a guarantee that everything will inevitably be in order: he is certain that, since he was born in our country, he already has an advantage for obtaining all the best. He was not taught to value either labor itself, or reward for it: it suffices to ask, to demand, to take by the throat.

This dependency reproduces itself in life. There are a number of places in our system, where you can get by without pushing the pedals, just waving your hands and singing.

People will never envy the person who genuinely works hard and makes a good living. The most terrible thing is when money is handed out simply for nothing. There is nothing worse, it corrupts in an instant. A young technician came to our brigade. Matters in his section had gone badly and I did not look into them especially thoroughly. After a while, he approached me: Why is my wage so small this month? I looked: it turned out, he had in fact done nothing previously. So I asked: Why did you not complain that there was no work? He looked at me in surprise. I realized that he could not be blamed: My system had overlooked this. Is this not the pattern for entire enterprises and sectors? After all, people often receive money for nothing or for meaningless work and sincerely consider this normal, natural. However, they have either become used to working this way, or they perceive work only as a violence on themselves. Of course, disrespect toward the working person and the creation of false front-ranking workers have also heated everything up. I think, we will not get out of this situation, which we have grown used to living in for years, without a struggle. From this system in which, on

the one hand, it is acceptable to be nice, but on the other, we do not refuse pay increases. We do not need illusions here. In the end, skilled labor, not physically and morally exhausting, is the natural, vital need of any normal person. Even if his head is completely clouded, he cannot help but realize at the bottom of his heart that nothing can be solved without work. Even now, we have many people hungry for work, both in the older generation and among the young.

Having destroyed trust and morality, we now see that the laws almost always do not work. We are trying to patch the holes with laws, like a fence. It is impossible to do this in life. Here, the role of the intellect, the moral mind, is the most important. It is hard to talk about this, words are not enough. We need great humanitarians to speak of the values capable of uniting us, capable of reviving trust within society.

[Nekhotin] Today, one often hears, including from people's deputies, that only a worker can defend the interests of the "man with the shovel." Judging by what you just said, is your position different?

[Pupkevich] I dislike how the expression "defend the interests" causes a kind of war. A difference of interests is natural. One would have to be a great, canting hypocrite, to convince people that the interests, for instance, of lawyers coincide, on the whole, with the interests of miners. When I was nominated for people's deputy at our association, I said: we need different knowledge, different levels of competence. True, I think that my life experience may be suitable. I myself would prefer the interests of the workers whom I represent, the excavators, to be voiced by a strong, first-rate lawyer, if I were certain that, as a voter, I could constantly and very effectively influence him, if he were really accountable to those who elected him. Under these conditions, this is normal democracy, when professionals do their own jobs.

[Nekhotin] The interests of different social and professional groups are more often opposed today, than in agreement on the basis of mutual understanding...

[Pupkevich] I oppose pitting these interests against each other. It is extremely senseless and dangerous, when every group starts "fighting" for benefits for itself, apart from others. Yet, they are "stealing the blanket" from the workers, who are striking and burying society's last hopes. Any normal person, who has created things through his own labor all his life, realizes how terrible and foolish this is. It seems to me, only one thing can be a basis for consolidation now—trust in a realistic program, confidence in the fact that group and departmental interests are not hidden behind it. After all, this has happened more than once. I don't see malicious intent in this. Rather, it is the price of our economy. However, as a practical person I know: there is no outright bungling without one thing, i.e., without an interest for someone, making it profitable or convenient to work this way.

When you start investigating, you mandatorily understand: for someone. Of course, this does not mean that we should see "enemies" everywhere. We are tired of that. It is time to part with constant "vigilance" and wariness toward each other. However, we must think of ways to bring common sense into economic management.

Today, the scientist can do nothing without the worker, nor the worker without the scientist. There have been times in my life, when I realized what a true intellectual was. I had just finished technical school and had started working on the excavator, when I had an idea for changing something in the engine. At the time, some engineers and technicians from Moscow were working nearby. I approached one of them with my idea. He was very busy, sitting behind some drawings, and answered: no, it is impossible. Later, I saw this engineer returning to me at the end of the shift through the snow and broken rocks, from some distance off, to say: "Forgive me, lad, I answered you wrongly. Mechanically, it is possible and even necessary to change..." You realize, this person was unable, by principle, to brush people aside, to deceive, to overstep his professional conscience. After all, in any work, be it of a scientist, peasant or worker, it is most valuable when you do for another, as you would have done for yourself. The world depends on such people.

I am in favor of letting them live well, wealthily. We have lost tens, hundreds of talented people because we do not know how or did not want to value people, through whose labor and ideas others also grow and all society develops. A person should be supported, if he is of great use, if he is talented and hard-working. Society must come to a state in which this will be so. Only together, after restoring the ties among labor, intellect and power, will we be able to move from a standstill.

[Nekhotin] Tadeush Karlovich, as a Supreme Soviet member, you, apparently, are faced primarily with the question: What can and should our power do in order to restore these ties, in order to revive trust, above all, in power itself? How do you see your own role in this?

[Pupkevich] My predecessor in our electoral okrug told me: not long ago, it was frightening to applaud, until an approving clap was given by the presidium. Today this is hard to even imagine, although we saw this for ourselves on television only 5 years ago and everything seemed to be in order. Now we argue in committees, one could say, until we are blue in the face, and thus we seek ways, and seek very seriously. There have been and will be arguments among the deputies. However, as opposed to the prelection campaign, when it sufficed to make promises and criticize former leaders and the Politburo, and you would be a hero, carried away by the wave, today I note a transition to everyday work, to assessing one's steps and seeking solutions that are acceptable for everyone.

You would agree, not a single normal collective, where there are reasonable people who know their jobs, simply rushes to "eat up" money. It thinks about reproduction,

about how it will live and work in the future. Collectives often "eat up" due to uncertainty. If uncertainty is sensed, it is more peaceful to divide the earnings and leave while the opportunity exists. They are waiting, of course, for some kind of guarantee from the authorities. Over this half-year, we deputies have received a mass of information about how hard, how complicated it is to solve many problems right now. For those who had order, it is hard to convert to full independence. Yet, for those who have chaos...?

As you know, many laws have already been drafted and passed. However, understandably, we need well-considered, workable laws that will not start being broken from the very first day. Life will ruin the others. Right now, I believe, this thorough consideration and connection to real practice, to the real state of affairs, is the main thing in a deputy's work.

It is naive to think that we can seriously benefit from reducing the administrative apparatus. These functions will remain. However, I see not the apparatus in our usual understanding, but powerful scientific and technical forecasting agencies which tell industry what awaits it in the future. Precisely in industry, one does not often feel this. Although they are called ministries, syndicates, the essence lies not in the name. The main thing is that they be supported from below, by the enterprises themselves, and not dictate to them, as they do now. If the enterprises see that useful work is being done, you will not have to force them to allocate funds for the purpose of management or conclude contracts: They themselves will strive for this.

After my term in the Supreme Soviet, I am thinking of returning to my brigade. We will try to purchase equipment, an idea we had long ago, before restructuring. At that time, we were besieged: What is wrong with you, do you want capitalism? We were afraid to discuss the subject seriously. Now the opportunity is appearing. I can imagine how the system will look from our level. It is hard to say how it will work in other places, how it will take root. Let life show us: maybe, it will be more profitable for us to amalgamate, because it is so much more effective, rapid, and cheaper for us to work, as the calculations indicate. In places where it is best for one person or a family to manage, I think property will be divided.

Let us talk directly about how we will handle the small number of people who are doing work unneeded by society right now. They often work very hard and honestly. Essentially, it is an awful thing to realize that your labor is unnecessary. The labor of Sisyphus can kill everything in a person. However, we are accustomed to seeing this role assigned to someone, often against his will, and we really do not notice or want to realize that many problems stem from this. Many will have to make fairly painful decisions. We need a serious state program. We will have to cut back such enterprises and sectors,

re-profile them, offer new jobs, and create new conditions for retraining people. We must think about this, seriously and right now.

Work lies ahead for many years to come, in order to basically get our country up on its feet, create a normal sphere of services, and give families time to raise their children. Conditions exist for this, if we put our mind to it. So many such concerns! Travel around the country, even in Pskov Oblast, and look at the village elders, who cannot even saw their own firewood. Somehow they live. We have discarded and abandoned people. We, able-bodied adult people, who should support the country through our labor, ought to burn with shame for all this. After all, we know how to work. Not far from the city we have garden plots. Some of the best in the republic, they say. I often take guests there and show them: see, what cottages! All around them, it is obvious how people are entirely different when they are personally interested in their labor. After all, there is bare scale under the 10-15 centimeters of soil there, and nonetheless blossoming gardens grow in it...

Visit a good enterprise, a strong farm, and you can see what open faces people have, how open the talk is there. But where there is one "boss" at the top, it is as though as all the others do not exist, everyone is under pressure. After all, the harder you squeeze a person, the less you get back. In the brigade, as we moved step-by-step toward independence, we always felt an inner push, a desire to work... In my opinion, the colossal possibilities of our system lie in this feeling.

[Nekhotin] Last year, essentially, the USSR Supreme Soviet session and the Second Congress of People's Deputies were completed. What impetus, Tadeush Karlovich, did they give you for the next year?

[Pupkevich] To put it bluntly, I have no such enthusiasm, so to speak, to take it and run. This is natural. If there is a fight at home, work is also harder. There is great strife in our country. Understandably, there will always be disagreement, but one cannot help but worry when confrontations do not die down. In the Supreme Soviet, we have already managed to establish fairly stable work and better understand different viewpoints and, it seems, we have also learned to listen to each other better. Yet, during the 2nd Congress, the misunderstanding among the republics and regions blocked me again. In this respect, the tension at the Congress has even grown, in my opinion,. We have too many painful problems and this, of course, cannot help but have its effect.

I place my hopes, above all, on the four cornerstone laws: on land, on ownership, on socialist enterprise, and on local self-management. If they are passed in the form in which they are already being considered, they will play a stimulating role. The psychological situation today is such that people treat any idea very cautiously and distrustfully. It is important to give people certainty, to successfully convince them. People should understand in

which direction we are going, in order to work well and peacefully for their own good and that of society. It seems to me, we can develop and discuss these four laws very seriously by March-April. After all, we have no experience with referenda, and these laws are very important for the country.

I said that I do not feel great optimism. However, maybe it should be replaced by the ordinary, natural pragmatism of decisions, which is capable of giving strength and certainty. I have always supported practical, well-considered policy. Today, we should have no other policy.

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### **RENOVATION OF SOCIETY, RENOVATION OF THE PARTY**

#### **What Should the Party Be: Two Points of View**

*905B0014B Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 11-18*

[Continued publication of materials contributed to the discussion (KOMMUNIST, 1989, Nos 12-18): "On Problems of Democratization. Continued Discussion"]

**[Text] V. Amelin:** "...The formation and use of political methods of work are possible in converting the party from a formalized hierarchical organization, based on rigid, mechanical discipline, into a self-managing organization based on intra-party democracy, enlisting broad progressive social forces and fulfilling the role of the spiritual and, therefore, political leader of society."

**V. Kornev, A. Ryabov:** "The need for centralized principles in the party's life at the contemporary stage is determined, above all, by the need for a unified understanding of the goals and tasks of revolutionary restructuring, of the way to its successful implementation."

**(KOMMUNIST, 1989, No 15)**

#### **Wisdom of the Minority**

[Article by N. Dorokhina, engineer, CPSU member since 1987, Tula]

My views are basically similar to V. Amelin's opinion, although there are differences, above all, concerning the present status of the CPSU and its role in the country's political life. It has already been recognized at the highest level that the processes of democratization of the party lag behind the democratization of society. That is, the part of society which calls itself a vanguard lags behind the rest of society. It is a paradoxical situation which may lead to very serious consequences. True, the 18 July CPSU Central Committee meeting noted that there is a crisis, not of the party, but of its previous functions and obsolete style and methods of work. First, however, if we recognize that there is a crisis of functions and methods, then, essentially, this is also a recognition

of trouble with the organization on the whole. Second, if there is a crisis of society and the command-administrative system, couldn't society's "leading and guiding force" be in a state of crisis?

In my opinion, the crisis state of the CPSU should be examined in three areas: political, ideological and organizational.

The CPSU was led to political crisis by converting from a political party into a state structure. This did not happen today, but, apparently, back in the late 1920s. Probably, it could not have otherwise existed under the conditions of totalitarian order with a one-party system. All power in local areas really belongs to CPSU obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. I fully agree with V. Amelin that there is a clear division in the party of "first" and "second" type communists into leading bodies together with the apparatus, and into rank-and-file communists, virtually undistinguished from non-party members either in terms of political activeness, or in terms of their opportunity to influence political and economic decision making.

In addition, we must acknowledge that, despite our critical attitude toward the party apparatus, at the present day this apparatus is the only real structure of civil power or consolidated political organization, and any forcible alienation of it would lead either to chaos with the subsequent "iron hand," or directly to military dictatorship. Transferring power to the soviets is not the work of a single day or year, particularly due to the newly-elected soviets' lack of experience in leadership of economic activity, and since the process of transferring power itself will be precisely in the hands of the party apparatus. However, in its present form and given the lack of inter-party democracy, the apparatus is hardly capable of effectively carrying out economic and political transformations.

We must replace the formal-nomenclature principle of cadre placement. People should be selected for the party-state apparatus only according to their professional and practical qualities, preferably on a competitive basis. Those who have not coped with the job should not be moved to another administrative post. Certain "special" privileges for members of elected party bodies and the apparatus are also intolerable. Elections of members and secretaries of raykoms and higher bodies, right up to the Central Committee, should be direct and alternative.

There is a burning debate surrounding the issue of a multi-party system, and people often formulate the question point-blank: "Are you for or against it?" They receive the answer in the same spirit. In and of itself, such a formulation is absurd. Parties arise and exist not at the will of another party, but in order to reflect the interests of different social groups and to represent them in state institutions. Society's social differentiation will occur to the extent of the conversion to a multi-structure economy, and it is entirely possible that new parties will

arise on this objective basis. This process will take place regardless of a positive or a negative attitude toward it on the part of CPSU members, and only an overthrow of democracy will stop it.

V. Amelin believes the inequality between the rights and possibilities of the nomenclature and those of rank-and-file communists to be the main sign of crisis phenomena in the CPSU. In my opinion, a no less important sign of crisis in the CPSU is the absence of ideological unity within it and, moreover, its own non-existent organizational formalization. Virtually the same range of opinions and moods existing in society is also represented in the party. People with very different opinions are in the same rank—from “leftist radicals” to frank adherents to the Stalinist model. Moreover, a significant segment of communists is simply politically passive.

The CPSU's organizational crisis lies in the absence of a real mechanism for inter-party democracy, which would make it possible to fearlessly compare different positions for seeking optimum solutions to the accumulated problems. The need has been repeatedly stated, from the highest rostrums and in the party press, to make changes and amendments to the principle of democratic centralism, in particular, to guarantee the rights of the minority. In my view, the minority should have the rights to stand up for its views, as well as, after making decisions, to their unobstructed expression in the party press, to adequate representation in higher party bodies, and to the creation of platforms. With pleasant surprise, I learned for issue No 13 of KOMMUNIST that the party Statutes of 1919 permitted the existence of factions with similar such rights.

G. Ibsen very successfully expressed the minority's role in society in his play “*Enemy of the People*,” written more than 100 years ago: “The most dangerous enemies of truth and freedom among us are the unbroken majority... The minority is always right... I am speaking of the few individuals, who learn everything new that is coming into the light of truth. As though on the outpost of mankind, these people stand so far ahead that the unbroken majority has not yet dragged itself there! They fight for truths which came into the world too recently, to have successfully rallied some sort of majority around themselves.” This is categorical, but, in my opinion, true on the whole. It is precisely the minority that generates new ideas, although this role of the minority has been ignored or underestimated in our society for decades. Today, a stereotype is firmly seated in the minds of many communists, including rank-and-file: democracy is an unquestioning subordination to the majority will.

They ask: How do we ensure unanimity of action, if the minority keeps its opinion? I answer: While criticizing a decision, the minority is still obliged to implement it, and we cannot allow ourselves a different variant under the current situation. However, the mechanism for changing incorrect decisions made by the majority lies precisely in this. The minority, in explaining and arguing its own point of view in the process of implementing a

decision, would have an opportunity to convince the majority of its rightness, to achieve the revocation or change of a decision. Given such a mechanism, it probably would have been possible to avoid a great many dramatic and tragic consequences of faulty decisions in our past.

Whether or not society will drive the CPSU toward a level of democratization depends in many ways on who and how we elect delegates to the 28th Congress. The elections of delegates should be direct, alternative, according to platforms, and with secret voting. In the pre-election campaign, candidate delegates should have to draft their own political platforms, so that the campaign itself, like the elections of USSR deputies, would contribute to a growth in political activeness among thousands of communists.

#### Discipline Is Not a Goal in Itself

[Article by A. Shchelkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, Leningrad]

It is obvious that the time remaining until the opening of the 28th CPSU Congress should not pass in a serene expectation of miraculous solutions, prepared by the central party apparatus. In surveying the hot points in our society's political geography, we should not shut out of view the simple axiom of any revolutionary break. A plan of action should exist for a relatively brief restructuring period. At the same time, it is equally important to start clearly seeing future goals, the outlines of society's post-restructuring state. This program-maximum, proven not only by domestic, but also by world experience, will give us a proper feeling for the rhythm for our own historical movement: Do not rush ahead, but also do not tarry with tasks formulated in the form of the program-maximum.

The issue of the party, of its political and legal status, is a central question. Naturally, restructuring the party inevitably involves its Statutes and Program.

Our party Statutes breath an iron discipline. Even in terms of quantity, there are more responsibilities than rights by a factor of 2, and the formula “rights of a party member” itself appeared later in the history of the CPSU Statutes, than the point on responsibilities. Precisely centralism was set as the “keystone” for the entire organizational structure of democratic centralism. However, whereas at the dawn of the CPSU's birth, its conspiratorial and unlawful nature justified this statutory asceticism and severity, today we can question this mixing of axioms. Everyone knows, for example, that immediately after the October Revolution the following opinion was held by communists: since the country does not have democracy, but the dictatorship of one class, we ought to preserve democracy, albeit within the framework of the party. At that time, this idea did not get a chance for implementation. Now, under entirely different historical conditions, this question, unresolved to this day, has appeared again. Let us remember that restructuring in the party is not a tactical, but a strategic

line. In its course, structures and principles may be created, which will reliably work for the party, as for a political institution of an already-renovated society.

What problems does the domination of the "disciplinary regime" in the CPSU Statutes give rise to today? There are many of them. Above all, the alienation of rank-and-file party members from the entire party organism and its central bodies has sunk deep roots. The feeling of being master in one's own home has withered. The right "to address questions, statements and suggestions to any party authority, right up to the CPSU Central Committee, and to demand an answer, essentially, of one's questions" is poor compensation for a party member, against the background of his uncalled-for self-activeness. Clearly, this activeness should be interpreted not only and not so much as conscientious work at one's job, as much as ideological initiative and the defense of one or another opinion on society's social and economic problems.

The party is a union of like-minded thinkers. In the words "like-minded thought," stress is put on the first part. However, "like-mindedness" is the end result. The starting point is "thought." A party member should think! If he does not do this, then he in fact places himself outside party ranks. The executive, nominal structure of the party is a sign of its crisis. Unanimity in an ideological platform can appear only out of diversity. People claim that the party is not a discussion club. We answer: A party that gets by without the help of broad and constant discussions on main, fundamental issues is leading a rather ritual existence. However, there is not a word in the CPSU Statutes today about publishing a permanent discussion organ in the party press system.

Given the party's nature as a voluntary union of like-minded thinkers, the incommensurately great concern about measures on the disciplinary punishments, to which rank-and-file members may be subject, is strongly dissonant. Here is a list of possible sanctions from the Statutes: comradely criticism, issuing a party reprimand, a warning, an instruction, an admonition, or a reprimand. A severe reprimand is also possible. All the enumerated punishments are oral in form, and the "heavy artillery" comes later, with the notation of a misdemeanor on one's registration card. The Statutes also speak of a "higher step"—expulsion from the party. A voluntary union, it would seem. One joins in good will. Just the same, by oneself, unurged, one quits. Today, the party ethos is not like that: admission is ritualized, and leaving the party occurs, most often, as a sentence by a tribunal. And this is after how many years of the party's legal existence?

As of 1905, the Statutes strictly formulate who can be a party member. The key requirement is "working in one of the party organizations." When a debate arose on this point at the II RSDRP Congress, a question came up resoundingly: Can the party be reduced only to an organization? In fact, what is organization in the party:

the means or the goal? It seems, the answer is self-evident. In the institution of the party, in its live organism, there is that which could be called instruments, organs, or organizations. However, the full-fledged existence of any party does not reduce entirely to the latter. If such "organizational reductionism" was justified during the party's difficult establishment and we again have a right to allude to the then "accursed" Russian conditions, today there are simply no grounds for such arguments. Today's practice has a number of methods for involving and mobilizing people without immuring them in the bastions of organizational structures. In other words, a voluntary union of like-minded thinkers acquires real political weight and authority not only, and sometimes not even so much by consolidating each member in one or another collective, but by the freedom of choice of this collective, equally as much by autonomy from the latter. In world political practice, there are few cases in which the above statutory condition is considered mandatory for acquiring the right to party membership.

Then why is the domination of the production principle in the party's organizational structure mandatory? It is understandable when trade unions are formed thus. This conforms to their nature. However, organizationally structuring a party on the basis of production collectives means locking it into a production theme from the very start. However, a party is an organization pursuing political goals. Its nature conforms, rather, to a territorial principle. Incidentally, a number of political parties in the world are structured precisely according to a territorial-administrative principle.

There is yet another reason impelling one to raise the question thus. Today, when, it would seem, a course has been irreversibly taken toward decisive disassociation with the Stalinist past, we scarcely suspect how alive, not revealing themselves suddenly, many leitmotifs of this era have turned out to be. To a lesser extent, we realize that the course toward "collectivization" in the party had no less serious consequences than in agriculture. Stalin rapidly realized that the organizational consolidation of every communist in a strictly defined party cell carries a mass of advantages for a totalitarian regime and is a reliable means of control over the individual. This method of influence on the behavior and thinking of rank-and-file members was convenient. The repressive "upbringing" function began to take on independent significance. As a result, other motives—conformity, fear of punishment—began to replace the principle of free and voluntary membership.

Why is, as written in Paragraph 4, "acceptance of a party member done exclusively on an individual basis?" Of course, the individual basis is not bad: It involves a trial period, three recommendations, discussion at a general meeting of the primary organization, filling out forms, and discussion in the raykom. However, in a novice's

consciousness the organizational and disciplinary procedure somehow starts pushing the ideological and political aspects into the background. For some, this atmosphere of severity and order remains a leading attribute of membership. Yet, after all, discipline as such, let us repeat this truism, is not a goal in itself. In the best case, it is a tool which one must use wisely, like any strong tool. Besides individual membership, world political practice also has collective membership. For example, two-thirds of the membership of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Switzerland are collective members, joined to the party mainly through trade unions. Furthermore, hard though it may be to imagine, in general, there are parties without permanent membership.

Today there are more than 19 million of us. Is this too many or is it normal? Does the problem lie here, in general? Any party, it would seem, should rejoice in the growth of its ranks and supporters. In world practice, the political weight of a party is judged precisely by the number of its members and size of its electorate, i.e., the population that votes for it in elections to parliament and supports its political actions. For the CPSU, however, the number of members could be cause for satisfactory self-evaluation under only one condition. This condition is a multi-party system. The phenomenon of the party's "demographic explosion" sprang up in a directly opposite atmosphere, under the state monopoly of the CPSU and, in particular, its special right to influence cadre policy at virtually all levels of society.

The question of a multi-party system can and should be examined in a broader context. The introductory section of the existing CPSU Statutes reflects yesterday's vision. It suffices merely to recall the ceremonial theses on strengthening the "sociopolitical and ideological unity of the multi-ethnic Soviet society," on the country's entry "into the stage of developed socialism," and on the incompatibility of any appearance of factions and groups, etc., with the party's Marxist-Leninist nature. Today a multi-party system is a quite non-mandatory polarization of political interests and the bitterness of the class struggle. In our time, there are no longer profound objective reasons for this in developed countries. The presence of competitors for national leadership (one-man or in coalition) is the usual norm of civilized politics. There has always been vital wisdom not in annihilating one's opponent but, conversely, in seeking out and preserving him. Moving in the vicinity of opponents is troublesome, but precisely through such competition any party grows stronger and keeps proper "sporting form" ("blessed are obstacles, for from them we grow!). The starting capital of almost any party arises precisely under conditions of opposition. Here, it takes on its own structure and its programs prove their right to exist. Monopoly is destructive for a party, and stagnation, like a shadow, walks behind the autocratic regime. The new CPSU Statutes ought to have a paragraph stating the principles by which the CPSU structures its relations with other political organizations, clubs, associations, etc.

It is also appropriate to emphasize that political pluralism and party dissension are associated only by yesterday's dogmatists with the allegedly inevitable escalation of chaos and excesses of disorder. However, the paradox is that our present society also, in fact, does not need different programs, but opposite programs. Our future is related to technological civilization, ennobled and controlled by culture. The whole world is moving in this direction. Both communists, conservatives, social democrats, liberals, and "greens" fully understand this. Does this mean "down with party diversity?" No, the game of party ambitions and interests is the same eternal "guile of world reason," of which Hegel spoke. The illusion of an "absolute subject" and of an "absolute all-knowing," capable of handling the endless diversity of the modern world, is a delusion of 19th century idealists. We have one foot on the threshold of the 21st century. The possibility of electing a political leader in the form of one party or another, regardless of the single direction, in many ways inevitable, of their programs, helps not only maintain the inter-party democratic ethic, but also stimulates an ever greater professional honing of program instruments.

The process of democratizing political life, naturally, should be further continued in the sphere of intra-party democracy of the CPSU. Many problems have accumulated here over the party's history.

Our party congresses meet once every 5 years. They are timed to coincide, or rather, are drawn to the 5-year periods. It seems, the party has already survived the era of economic centralism. Moreover, how many times have we sworn not to replace economic functions! In principle, parties should be introduced into the economy once, at the moment of a revolutionary break in economic relations, and later all pathos should be focused on social policy. Our cyclicity in economics attests to only one thing: our economy does not work and really needs energetic reform. Therefore, if we have in mind the normal, and not extraordinary mode of operation of the CPSU, congresses should be related not to 5-year periods, but to the different social rhythms of the country. Three- or 4-year breaks between congresses is an entirely adequate interval, so as not to neglect impending problems and to successfully develop a strategy for their solution. The strength of a congress lies not in making declarations, but more in oaths of political loyalty. A congress is a "brainstorm," it is an open discussion, resulting in the definition of priorities "right now," as well as models for desirable future prospects. The value of a congress is always the value of a laboratory for thinking about, testing, and processing one social concept or another. Party congresses which pass programs should hold a special place. The spirit of these programs lies not in the naive aspiration to "naturalize" and "time" social goals, but in serious and responsible discussion of how to achieve conditions for genuinely human existence.

The management of any social organism is a special science and art, full of far from trivial axioms. A party as

an organization is no exception. Management specialists know that the middle link plays a special role in the management pyramid. From the viewpoint of management, it is most often superfluous. When all links of a party share a unity of purpose, are voluntarily guided by party ethics, etc., the leading bodies easily find contact with the entire party, passing by the middle layer. This middle layer flourishes and begins to tempestuously function precisely under conditions of domination of an administrative regime in the party, when pressure, control, and censorship are needed. The raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms are the level at which, under certain conditions, more power can be concentrated than anywhere else. At the same time, they can block a reform impulse from higher party links. In our memory, there have already been precedents for this. That is why, in developing a new model for the party's organizational structure, we must examine all possible variants in the draft Statutes, starting with the question of to what extent we need raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, okrug committees, and ending with the question of their optimum correlation with all the remaining party organisms.

One of the questions now under discussion relates to a party's organizational structure in a multi-ethnic and federal formation, such as our Union. The party arose and functioned as a unified organization throughout the territory: first, the Russian Empire, and later a union federation, the USSR. Such a structure has its advantages and historical justifications. Lenin opposed the federal principle of party structure. However, life often is more complex than many principles. A compromise already existed in the cradle of a unified RSDRP itself: the Bund existed with rights to autonomy, along with central party bodies. Before World War I, besides the Bund, the social democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and the social democracy of Latvia had joined the RSDRP. That is, there are different periods when, depending on conditions, either the "unitary" or the more complex "federated" mechanism of union may be preferable. To reject compromise at such moments means to reject unity in general, to support it nominally or, even worse, forcibly. Being guided by practical, not scholastic logic, the 4th RSDWP Congress decided: the indicated social democracies are joining the RSDWP with the rights of autonomous territorial organizations.

Decentralization as a reality always exists along with its opposite—centrally aspiring tendencies. This relates to the status, as well as to the nature of the Statutes itself. Our party life is too complex, for us to be able to reassure ourselves with the idea that some kind of unified canon can absolutely reliably regulate the present and, even more so, the future diversity of constantly changing situations. The task of the Statutes is not to destroy this living wealth, but to be at least equal to it. Only by recognizing the value of local experience, i.e., by a definite decentralization of statutory regulations, is it possible to keep up with life. Right now, few remember that before 1922, besides the party Statutes, the statutes of local party organizations were also endowed with

"rights of citizenship." The apparatus-bureaucratic view sees this phenomenon, rather, as an obstacle on the path to a unified standard. However, how does one then answer the question: Could the tempestuous life of the party, in general, be sustained if these local statutes had not existed, and some sort of monolithic code had attempted to take their function upon itself?

Of course, all these thoughts are not categorical or faultless in nature. Moreover, they will not achieve their goal if we interpret them as requirements for drafting new Statutes. Possibly, we should not make radical changes during the current transition period. Modifications should touch on obsolete and offensive spots (for example, the introductory section of the Statutes). Moreover, changes could be introduced (open discussion will show which, precisely), which would make it possible to control the political situation of restructuring within the framework of a legal conversion to a new state, bypassing the stage of indecision and, thus, also the probability of returning to the starting point, which we are striving so to tear away from in our present-day movement toward a democratic society.

#### Elections Without an Election?

[N. Baranov, engineer, "Elektropribor" NPO, CPSU member since 1979, party bureau secretary, Kharkov]

**K. Smirnova:** "...Appointment by election has disappeared in our elections. Practically everyone entered on the ballot collects the necessary minimum number of votes." (KOM-MUNIST, No 12, 1989).

#### Toward the Congress, Through Referendum

The thoughts expressed in the letter from K. Smirnova of Lipetsk are in many ways similar to mine. However, I did not make haste to respond, because I decided to consult with comrades in the party organization. They supported me, although not unconditionally.

K. Smirnova's main point, it seems to me, is the proposal formulated at the end of her letter: "...We must elect delegates to party congresses by direct secret vote... It would be good to hold the election of delegates to the next party congress in a new way." On the whole, I share the idea of direct election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, but it contradicts the 44th paragraph of the CPSU Statutes.

The third point in this paragraph states: "The congress of the Communist Party of a Union republic, a kray, or oblast conference... elects... delegates to the CPSU congress." That is, the Statutes sufficiently clearly state the procedure for electing delegates and it is impossible to hold direct elections without violating the Statutes. A proposal has already been made in the press to legalize direct elections pending a subsequent decision by the congress. Yet, what if the congress nonetheless does not legalize such a change? Who will take responsibility for usurping the authorities of the congress? Will we be creating a precedent, entailing numerous arbitrary

changes of the Statutes long after the congress, in expectation of the next one? In my view, we must not change the party Statutes in this manner.

Two ways to solve this problem are possible. Above all, we must see what the Statutes themselves say about this. Paragraph 33 lists the authorities of the congress, which include the right to pass or change the Statutes. Other methods for changing the Statutes are not stipulated, although it does not state anywhere that only the congress can change the Statutes. Therefore, it may be a question of changing the Statutes through a party-wide referendum. In the event that a referendum is held, the Central Committee is no longer responsible for this change, but the entire party. A referendum is not stipulated by the Statutes, but it is not forbidden by them either. According to the logic of democratic traditions, such a referendum, under conditions of preceding active and free discussions, may be fully equivalent to a congress in its right to change the Statutes.

Three questions should be raised at the referendum, having ensured the possibility of clear "yes" or "no" answers to each of them:

1. Do you believe it possible to change the Statutes through the method of party-wide referendum?

This question is needed because a referendum is not called for by the Statutes and has never been held in our party. If more than 50 percent of the communists answer in the negative, it means the referendum itself does not receive legal force, and answers to the other questions are of interest only as a reflection of public opinion.

2. Do you believe it necessary to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress by a direct secret vote of all party members according to territorial-production electoral districts?

This question is basic and actually calls for an amendment to the Statutes.

The third question has meaning only if the referendum participants answer the first two positively and, essentially, means holding elections of the first group of delegates to the 28th Congress, a group of communists who should receive a mandate from the entire party, not from a certain, specific territorial-production district.

3. Do you consider it possible to grant mandates to delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress, on the decision of this referendum, to members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate members, and to CPSU Central Committee secretaries, who hold these offices at the time this referendum is held?

In the event of a negative answer, members of the higher party leadership should be nominated on common grounds in the territorial-production districts. It seems, however, that this small group of leaders, invested in accordance with the existing Statutes with the highest trust of the party and accountable to the congress, should

mandatorily receive delegate mandates. Even if some of them have lost the party's trust, the congress should speak of this, not one of the electoral districts, the more so since the opinion of communists in a specific district may not coincide with the opinion of the majority of party members.

Taking into account that the congress is planned for October 1990, the referendum, if a decision to hold one is made, should be held no later than this April. There will be many organizational difficulties in preparing the first referendum in the party's history, and there is already little time for a preliminary discussion: "To hold a referendum or not?"

The second variant requires only changing the instructions for the elections. It is not necessary to change the Statutes. The elections of delegates to the congress is held in accordance with Paragraph 44 of the CPSU Statutes on congresses of the communist parties of Union republics and kray and oblast conferences. However, elections are held from among a number of candidate delegates, chosen by direct vote in territorial-production districts. The number of candidate delegates should exceed the number of mandates by 20-40 percent. Of course, these are no longer direct, but two-stage elections. Nonetheless, future delegates should try to vindicate to rank-and-file party members their right to represent their interests at the congress, and the possibility of rank-and-file communists to influence the make-up of delegates not simply increases, but becomes genuinely real.

On the other hand, the delegates of regional fora fully preserve the right to choose how to vote for them. The participants of regional fora will have the right to nominate candidate delegates to the congress on common grounds with all party members, at the starting stage of the pre-election campaign. At a regional forum itself, new candidates should not be nominated. This contradicts the existing instructions of the CPSU Central Committee on elections, but does not contradict the Statutes. The instructions can and should change, but the Statutes do not provide for the right of conference delegates to nominate candidates. Therefore, the suggested system for nominating candidates and for electing delegates to the congress does not contradict either democratic traditions, or the letter of the Statutes.

There may be a suggestion: Are territorial-production districts necessary? Let each party organization nominate its candidates directly at the regional forum, which will also choose delegates to the congress from among these candidates. This is simpler, but the price of this simplicity is a manifold increase in the list of candidates, a significant reduction in competitiveness, especially in small party organizations, and a significant increase in the difficulty for delegates of the regional forum to acquaint themselves with the candidates and make the correct choice.

In holding the preliminary selection of candidates in territorial-production districts, a list of candidate delegates to the CPSU Congress, presented to the delegates of the regional forum, should not be quite unacceptable for them. A similarity of views and positions is especially likely, if the delegates to regional fora are chosen by a similar method—in rayon party conferences from among candidates, who underwent selection by direct vote of party members. It seems, in 1990 the elections of delegates to all party conferences and congresses should be held according to this scheme (excepting those cases, in which delegates are chosen directly in party meetings). This does not lead to extraordinary prolongation of the campaign in the elections—all direct elections of candidates of different levels can be held at one pass, just as we elect deputies of local soviets on different levels at one pass. The proposed system for election of delegates will exist only until the 28th CPSU Congress, and its temporary nature is stipulated by the need not to act in contradiction to the existing Statutes. The congress will decide how to elect delegates after 1990.

Another element also seems important. Territorial-production districts should be multi-mandate: from three to five mandates. The point is that in single-mandate districts, including a small number of relatively small party organizations, the candidate from a large organization has an obvious advantage. The desire to advance "one's own" representative may easily have an effect here. This circumstance may also work against many party leaders from higher party bodies, which are not "one's own" for any party organization. A multi-mandate district gives communists an opportunity to express support for several candidates who enjoy their trust and vote for "one's own" candidate, as well as for "another's" whom one likes. The right to put candidates on the ballot should be granted to all primary party organizations in the district and, possibly, to shop party organizations. A decision by the corresponding party meeting should be sufficient for registering a contender (we will thus designate communists, included on the district ballot, as opposed to he who has already received support as a result of voting by rank-and-file communists and is presented as a candidate to the delegates of the regional forum). The contender should have the right to agitate for himself in the party organizations of his district. A specific communist can be registered as a contender in only one district.

In my opinion, we also need a new approach to defining the winners according to the results of voting in multi-mandate districts. I disagree with K. Smirnova's opinion that it suffices to choose, among those who collected more than 50 percent of the votes, those who have the relative majority. As elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet graphically showed, at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the election of people's deputies from the party to the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, such a system of voting works

against the most well-known candidates. If the surplus of candidates at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was all of 20 percent, many Politburo members, who had received more than 90 percent of the votes, would not have been chosen. The same occurred in elections to the Supreme Soviet: the principle of alternatives worked precisely against the most well-known candidates, although significantly more than half of the voters supported them. In fact, in such a system people vote not "for," but "against."

It seems possible to suggest a system in which a vote precisely "for" will be apparent and, at the same time, a sufficient quantity of candidates (contenders) will have a real opportunity to exceed the "50 percent" boundary. For this, for each candidacy there should be not two options in voting, as there is now, but three: "for, I insist on election;" "for, I trust the candidate;" and "against." The determination of voting results begins with a count of votes "against." Those, against whom no less than 50 percent of the voters voted, are removed from further consideration. Among those for whom the sum of "for, I insist," and "for, I trust" is greater than 50 percent, selection must be done by the relative majority of "for, I insist."

The proposed system for electing delegates is uncustomary and, therefore, may seem complex. However, candidate delegates are elected by direct vote in territorial-production districts. This is also familiar to us in elections to the soviets. The novelty lies in separating the votes into three variants, but, after all, to this day every voter makes decisions according to this principle, although he now does this only in thought.

In my opinion, precisely such a system for elections to the 28th CPSU Congress will make it possible to choose sufficiently bold-thinking, active, decisive, and responsible delegates and to do this without violating the existing Statutes.

Yet another thing. Despite the importance of the process of electing delegates to the congress, these elections are not the goal itself. The main point is what decisions they will make, in what direction and how they will guide the process of restructuring the party. In holding direct elections under conditions in which the candidate delegates must turn for support of their proposals or ways to develop the party and society to rank-and-file communists, different election platforms should mandatorily appear. From this point of view, the second (two-stage) variant is no different from direct elections. It is necessary so that the process of forming platforms is not taken unawares. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum should officially permit their formation and, at the same time, clearly state what positions in the platforms are intolerable.

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### In Memory of A.D. Sakharov

905B0014C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1,  
Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 19-20

[Text] Here, under the rubric "Notes in the Margins," we had planned to publish critical material prepared by the editors on the subject of incorrect, insulting attacks against A.D. Sakharov which had recently appeared in the periodical. The untimely demise of Andrey Dmitriyevich has made it impossible for us to mention the authors of these writings along with his name.

Words of farewell have already been said. As though awoken from a nightmarish state of distraction, we recalled the outstanding services of this man to his Homeland and his people. His inflexibility, his courage, and his honesty were striking. We were finally ashamed by our deafness, our misunderstanding, our hostility and ingratitude. It is as though his death itself sobered us, made us cleaner, more honest, more human. Over and over, millions of people are asking themselves: "Really, truly were there no prophets in our Fatherland? Really and truly, will we give our best citizen his due only on his epitaph?"

A nation consists of people. When one person leaves, the country, nation, and party becomes poorer, each of us becomes poorer. We can no longer sense the living pulse of his ideas, the pangs of his conscience, we cannot join his spiritual searches and acquisitions.

"I am not a professional politician," said A.D. Sakharov. "Perhaps, I am always tormented by questions of the expediency and end result of my actions. I am inclined to think that only moral criteria, in combination with unprejudiced thought, can be a sort of compass in these complex and contradictory problems. I restrain myself from specific forecasts, but today, as always, I believe in the strength of human reason and spirit."

Having recognized the unprejudiced nature of the thoughts of an outstanding scientist, absorbed in comprehending the properties of matter, we, to our shame and misfortune, declared his thoughts which analyzed our social existence to be prejudiced. We did not discern the agony with which he subjected his own actions to doubt, trying to predict their real, long-term results. His morals turned out to be higher and purer than ours. Nonetheless, living among us, he believed in the strength of human reason and spirit!

Restructuring put A.D. Sakharov in the center of social life. Having returned from 7 years of exile in December 1986, he rapidly took the path from senior scientific associate (an academician since 1953!) to member of the Academy of Sciences Presidium, from dissident and declassé man to a USSR people's deputy. The 68-year old man's heart did not endure this thorny path. He died in the struggle for the ideals of restructuring, which he himself called revolutionary, for the acquisition by us of life, worthy of the title of man at the turn of the millennia.

Indeed, restructuring is a revolution: It requires radical changes in economics, politics, the state system, and the spiritual order of our society. However, it requires the highest intellect and highest morals, it requires a caring, respectful, concerned attitude toward the individual, toward the person—not the future person, but the one living now, toward he for whose sake restructuring began in April 1985. Restructuring is a revolution in a civilized society that has learned and desires to learn the lessons of history and the higher achievements of human thinking.

It is wrong to say that restructuring is a revolution from above. It has matured in the minds and hearts of millions of Soviet people, and its roots go deep through the decades, into the strata of popular life, nourishing today's crown with the best and most valuable that was created and one way or another became public property even in the darkest times. In 1968, A.D. Sakharov wrote the article "*Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*." Published abroad, it became famous throughout the world. In particular, it stated: "The disunity of man threatens him with destruction.... In the face of danger any action, which increases the disunity of man, any advocacy of incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness, a crime. Only universal cooperation under conditions of intellectual freedom, the highest moral ideals of socialism, and labor, with the elimination of dogmatic factors and the pressure of the ruling classes' hidden interests, meets the interests of preserving civilization..."

"The capitalist world cannot but give rise to socialist, but the socialist world should not destroy, through armed violence, the soil that gives rise to it: this would be the suicide of mankind under the specific conditions that have taken shape. Socialism should enoble this soil through its own example."

Today we stubbornly seek answers to the questions: Where are we going, what are we restructuring, what kind of society are we building? Here is how, even in the time of stagnation, A.D. Sakharov answered them, addressing a memorandum to Brezhnev: "I am voicing the opinion that it would be correct to characterize society in the following manner, toward the realization of which urgent state reforms and the efforts of citizens to develop social consciousness should be aimed:

"A) The state sets the protection of and provision for the basic rights of its citizens as its basic goal. The defense of the individual's rights is above other goals.

"B) All actions by state institutions, on the whole, are based on laws (stable and known to the citizens). The observance of laws is mandatory for all citizens, institutions, and organizations.

"C) The happiness of people, in particular, is ensured by their freedom of work, consumption, personal life, education, cultural and social displays, freedom of conviction and conscience, freedom of information exchange, and freedom of movement.

"D) Glasnost contributes to controlling society through the legality, fairness, and expediency of all decisions made, promotes the effectiveness of the entire system, stipulates a scientific and democratic nature of the administrative system, and contributes to the progress, well-being, and security of the country.

"E) Competition, glasnost, and the absence of privileges ensure the expediency and fair encouragement of the labor, capabilities, and initiative of all citizens."

Our country listened to him too late. Far from everyone understood him. Most likely, he was not without mistakes, but he was open to debate, to dialogue, to the search for truth. Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov was an outstanding son of his people. He would have liked to see a collection of his sociopolitical articles, interviews, notes, and speeches published in his Homeland as a memorial. He will work for restructuring. After his death, these will help do that which he did not manage in his life: holding a discussion with his contemporaries, with his fellow countrymen.

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## DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

### On The Air

905B0014D Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 21-32

[Dialogue between Yu. Denisov, Leningrad CPSU Obkom Secretary, and A. Sobchak, USSR people's deputy, by KOMMUNIST correspondents V. Dymarskiy and O. Kuprin]

[Text] The television broadcast should have started at 19:00 hours. It did not go on the air at precisely the designated time. The delay, true, was small—only 2-3 minutes. However, the chief was worried: What will the viewers think? They will probably decide that someone did not show up and there will be nothing today... However, both broadcast participants had already been sitting in front of the camera for 4 hours, had virtually not spoken to each other, and one of them was reading a newspaper with great concentration...

Perhaps, it would be no exaggeration to say that millions of those who can receive Leningrad Television were waiting for this televised meeting. Although the broadcast was overlapped for 35 minutes by a showing on Central Television of a well-known film by A. Tarkovskiy, "Solaris," many preferred the Leningrad show, "Man on Earth."

The discussion did not have direct relation to this show: It was chosen, since the meeting was to be held on "neutral territory," and the "Man on Earth" program did not represent any of the "interested parties." During the broadcast, we were in the studio and were able to verify that its organizers had done everything to create a

most favorable atmosphere, so that the television debates would be a serious, practical discussion between people with very different points of view.

The debates promised to be keen and uncompromising. In Leningrad and Moscow, a previous broadcast had most often been called a "duel" or "single combat." However, strictly speaking, what was the essence of the current Leningrad conflict? It lay in events that occurred in the city in November-December, well-known to many, having splashed out of the meeting hall of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Let us recall of only a few landmarks in the Leningrad collision.

On 7 November, the city's informal organizations passed by in a single column under informal banners in Palace Square.

On 15 November LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA published a large article by Yu. Denisov, candidate of juridical sciences, "*For Whom is the Crisis Profitable?*" For Leningraders, it was no secret that the author of the article is the party obkom secretary for ideology, who had decided to speak unofficially in the press.

On 21 November, a joint plenum of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom was held, which passed the "Platform of the Leningrad Party Organization Under Contemporary Conditions." We will not bring up the problems of analyzing and evaluating this document. Judging by responses, it was received positively and did not evoke dissension among the participants in the television debates. Let us note only three elements.

Firstly, many positions of Yu. Denisov's article were reflected and developed at the plenum, particularly in the report by B. Gidaspov, leader of the Leningrad Party Organization.

Secondly, a goal-oriented, although also fairly cautious in form, criticism of the "higher echelon of party leadership" was noted in a report at the plenum and in certain speeches.

Thirdly, and this has direct relation to everything which followed, including the television debates: A. Sobchak, a USSR people's deputy from Leningrad, now well-known in our country, was repeatedly mentioned at the plenum both negatively, as well as positively.

The next day (or rather, evening), on 22 November, on the initiative of a number of party organizations, a party-wide city meeting was held. It became a sort of continuation of the plenum, but in a different, far more frank form. The criticism of the party leadership at the meeting already sounded alarming to many.

The reaction to this event was sharp, and the press reported it. Let us quote a letter from a Leningrad reader, Yu. Golosov: "It is hard to say what caused the offensive by party conservative forces, and the obkom's position in this is simply incomprehensible. In a certain sense, the obkom took to the cause of those who were ready to accuse the Central Committee of everything, and not

their own cause. As a communist and as a citizen, I am ashamed by a meeting that questions the party nature of people's deputies and attacks television and the press. However, the apotheosis of the meeting is the identification of the shadow economy with the Popular Front, the press, and television. This is sheer folly."

People's deputy A. Sobchak was the first to make a sharp assessment of the meeting. He spoke on a sharply journalistic broadcast by Leningrad Television, "Fifth Wheel." His attention did overlook the article by Yu. Denisov, and he challenged the author to a debate at any auditorium.

On 6 December a meeting, organized by a number of the city's social formations, again occurred in Leningrad. Practically all of it was a response to the last meeting, in which people had seen an active offensive by conservatism, and some—also a sign of a conspiracy to vanquish M.S. Gorbachev from his post.

Three days later, on 9 December, we were at the Leningrad television studio. Three cameras were aimed at the table, behind which, to either side of the mediator, sat Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, USSR people's deputy, doctor of juridical sciences, and Yuriy Aleksandrovich Denisov, Leningrad CPSU Obkom secretary, candidate of juridical sciences, who had accepted the challenge to a "television duel."

#### So, The Television Debates...

What were the initial positions of the discussion participants?

Yu. Denisov believes that a number of scientists and journalists are foisting a return to "exploitative private property" as a prescription for overcoming today's crisis phenomena. Moreover, precisely this path has acquired, in his opinion, lines of reality in the draft Law on Ownership in the USSR, submitted for universal discussion. Although, the Leningrad Obkom secretary stipulates, he does not at all reject the compatibility, at a certain stage, of socialism and private property: the historical experience of the USSR and other states offers examples of such a combination. However, under existing specific conditions in our country, the development of private property relations, Yu. Denisov is convinced, inevitably means shifting a significant part of the means of production to dealers in the shadow economy, who have concentrated in their hands approximately half a trillion rubles.

Hence, other consequences, especially the appearance of politicized organizations which take up the defense of the interests of newly-appeared private property owners.

Another one of Yu. Denisov's theses, advanced by him in the above-mentioned article in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, as well as during the televised debate: a crisis always plays into the hands not of the ruling party, interested in stabilizing the situation, but of opposition

forces, striving for power. Today, these forces are represented by a number of informal movements which, in the opinion of the obkom secretary, see restructuring not as a renovation of socialism, but as a restoration of capitalist ways.

Of course, in speaking of the necessary changes in the party itself, in its relations with different independent associations, Yu. Denisov formulates his point of view in the brief slogan: "He who is not against socialism is for us."

In short, this is the essence of the position of one of the dialogue participants. There is not enough air time or journalistic space in our story about the television debates for a more detailed substantiation of it. Therefore, we refer those who wish to familiarize themselves with the full volume of Yu. Denisov's position to LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA of 15 November 1989. We are giving readers, although in abbreviation, the most interesting and significant fragments, in our opinion, of the transcript from the conversation held at the Leningrad television studio:

**Sobchak.** Yuriy Aleksandrovich, the beginning of your article, where you wrote of the hasty over-assessment of historical facts and values, the destruction of the image of the Homeland, and rejection of spiritual values, struck me by its similarity to the well-known letter by Nina Andreyeva and to the statements of several conservative groups from the party. The thesis that proclaiming ownership by labor collectives signifies a return to anarcho-syndicalism, a revival of capitalist-type enterprises and the capitalist joint stock form of ownership evokes no less surprise. Really, can such a form only be capitalist? Is this contraindicated for socialism?

Another question: You say that dealers in the shadow economy, some of the cooperative workers, and even bourgeois capitalists, thanks to the creation of mixed enterprises, will be able to use the introduction of private property, both economically and politically. However, first, where did you get the figure of 500 billion rubles, concentrated in the hands of dealers in the shadow economy? Secondly, who do you consider these dealers to be? Are you referring to Adylov or Rashidov and other highly-placed functionaries who, as everyone knows, were actively involved in the shadow economy itself? Moreover, it could appear only with their help.

Another of your theses is surprising: "We must develop and improve that which we have." Yet, you then add: "Really, we do not have so little." However, after all, we know what we have today: an administrative-command system that is entirely bankrupt. I am comparing your statement to M.S. Gorbachev's words in his recent article in PRAVDA, where he notes that whereas in the first stage it was question of improving a system which had formed over the previous decades, now it is a question of a need for a radical make-over for our entire social building—from its economic foundation to the

superstructure. A question arises: Do you consider yourself an opposition member in the party, and do you oppose the party leadership?

**Denisov.** Above all, I deny the similarity of my position to that of Nina Andreyeva. Yes, I spoke of the rejection of the spiritual ideals of socialism, but, after all, the ideals of socialism, to recall Marx, are the elimination of the exploitation of man by man, social justice, comprehensive development of the personality, and many other features not implemented in our country, due to well-known historical reasons and conditions. So it is that I am not at all referring to those distortions which occurred here in the course of 70 years both in economics, in politics, as well as in spiritual life. Now, as to how I treat the possible development of collective ownership...

**Sobchak.** ...and the inevitability of converting it into capitalist ownership.

**Denisov.** The draft Law stipulated a variant of collective ownership in the form of joint stock companies. If we interpret stocks not simply as securities, which do not leave the bounds of the enterprise, but as one of the objects of ownership by citizens, then, apparently, it is possible to presume a free trade of stocks in the future. However, after all, the laws of development of a market economy sooner or later lead to concentrating stocks or their controlling share in the hands of those who have money.

**Sobchak.** I immediately object. Your arguments would be in keeping with traditional concepts of a joint-stock company of, for instance, the end of last century. It is developing quite differently today. Moreover, what prevents the same controlling share of stock from remaining with the labor collective on the whole, in whose name the labor collective council acts, and the remaining stocks from being distributed among workers at the enterprise? However, to speak, as you do, of the inevitability of turning such enterprises into the joint stock companies of a capitalist state is theoretically incorrect.

**Denisov.** On the whole, I agree with you, if this is to be developed in legislation.

**Sobchak.** There is more. Are we to understand that group, collective ownership turns workers into a group, collective capitalist? Precisely thus, it can be proven that a socialist state is also capitalist, but collective capitalist, in the framework of an entire state economy. Incidentally, Lenin wrote that at the initial stage of building socialism we are not so different from state capitalism.

**Denisov.** I think, you and I are setting the task of "winning" any position, any variant at first in the discussion. Such a serious document as the Law on Ownership should be drafted precisely thus, through scientific debates, through broad discussion. Only then will we find the balance that will enable us to give

impetus to developing the economy and, at the same time, avoiding a crawl toward restoring certain capitalist relations.

**Sobchak.** In my opinion, the published draft Law on Ownership does not give grounds for such criticism or the suspicion that it may lead to restoring capitalist ways. The possibility of permitting private ownership was stated in an alternative draft, not in the one presented by the Committee on Matters of Legislation.

**Denisov.** As far as the infamous 500 billion rubles in the hands of dealers in the shadow economy, I took that figure from an article by Professor Sergeyev in EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, No 9, 1989.

**Sobchak.** Interesting. Where did the professor get such data?

**Denisov.** Moreover, this figure was quoted in Issue No 10 of NASH SOVREMINNIK...

*Let us interrupt the dialogue that has started in order to direct readers' attention to the most recent articles in our journal on this matter (in No 18 for 1989: a discussion of the draft Law on Ownership in the USSR, "Impossible to be Smarter Than Life;" remarks by A. Ulyukayev, "New Story of the Pied Piper;" and in this issue, an article by S. Golovnin and A. Shokhin, "The Shadow Economy: For Realistic Assessment"), which cite various objective data and scientific evaluations of the figure "calculation," which have recently entered into discussions on the state of and prospects for the Soviet economy.*

*Meanwhile, the dialogue at the television studio continues:*

**Sobchak.** The dealers in the new shadow economy are not entrepreneurs, but swindlers, cultivated in the theft of socialist property. A swindler is no different from an entrepreneur in that he takes money only for profit and does not invest it in development of production. So, I think, the dealers in the shadow economy are not interested in private ownership, since they feel quite comfortable in the framework of the administrative-command system, with distribution of material goods from above. As soon as this is destroyed, the ground will drop out from under the feet of the shadow economy itself. Therefore, your arguments that precisely its dealers are becoming a new bourgeoisie and can seize political power in society seem groundless to me. In my opinion, it is precisely they, more than anyone, who wish to preserve the status quo. I even think they are an inalienable part of the administrative-command system.

**Denisov.** Here I disagree with you. Yes, at a certain stage of development of the so-called shadow economy, its dealers were vitally interested in this system, at the time when initial accumulation of funds occurred. However, sooner or later, quantity turns into quality, and the process approaches a boundary, when the framework of the administrative-command system becomes crowded, when it becomes necessary to spread one's wings and

break loose into liberty. Here, there is a real possibility of doing this, by acquiring in various ways both the means of production and the stocks of enterprises.

**Sobchak.** There is another detail, a very important one. Everyone knows that, according to existing legislation, any deal involving more than 10,000 rubles requires a declaration, proving the legality of sources of income. I am always surprised when people talk about "laundering" money. Where is the apparatus of the law enforcement agency? Why is it that this law is never applied?

**Denisov.** I am always asking similar questions. Unfortunately, this really is one of the "dead" norms which we very much need in a "living," working mode.

**Sobchak.** What is stopping us?

**Denisov** I think, and not in last place, the imperfection of the legislation itself is stopping us. Second, apparently, are residual phenomena of the administrative-command system and, most likely, the already great influence that these same social forces have acquired in our society.

**Sobchak** It would be understandable if I had said this. However, as an obkom secretary, it is time for you to use power. After all, it is in your hands.

**Denisov.** Let us use it together—state power in your hands. Thus, I think, we will cope with this task jointly. However, let us return to the basic theme of our conversation. We are both lawyers and we know what one or another phrase in the law means. When it is a question of ownership by citizens, the draft states: ownership of the means of production is intended for market-gardening, gardening and, I emphasize, other economic activity. What is meant by the word "other?"

**Sobchak.** Whatever you please, but within the framework established by law! These are very rigidly defined. For instance, where can a citizen utilize means of production today? In individual labor activity, a garden plot, handicrafts, etc.—a fairly narrow circle.

**Denisov.** However, it may become very broad in the future. Incidentally, let us not run ahead. Let us look. If we realize that a breach has appeared somewhere, you are right, no one will stop us from legislatively regulating the development of relations in such a manner, so that the potential threat never becomes real.

**Sobchak.** You are always talking about dealers in the shadow economy. Yet, after all, when the draft Law on Ownership was discussed and private ownership was mentioned, above all, it referred to a completely different category of people. It was a question of farmers, of peasants who are unable to exist without ownership of the means of production, needed in order to process the land, without ownership of farm buildings. In my view, today there is only one solution: to conduct a land reform, to give land to anyone who wants to work it, to free any person engaging in agricultural labor from all forms of taxes, if only for 3 years, in order to saturate the country with food. The main thing is to give a guarantee.

Not to take away from the peasant that which he has made, not to bring back to life the policy of disenfranchising the kulaks. I was on the parliamentary trip to Greece. This is a country where there is virtually no fertile land, yet there the government does not rob the peasants there: It pays them additionally for improving the land, for cultivating something. This is a country which is prepared to sell us grain, not to mention lemons, oranges, and olives. Greece is ready to sell grain to Russia! Some day we ought to get out of this absurd situation!

**Denisov.** We ought to get out of the absurd situation, not someday, but the sooner, the better.

**Sobchak.** Then, let there be labor private ownership, which does not contradict socialism at all.

**Denisov.** Two objections: Firstly, that which we have in mind when passing a law does not always coincide with that which we finally obtain. The framework of the law, in my opinion, has turned out somewhat broader, and permits the development of such relations not only in agriculture. As far as private ownership of land by peasants is concerned, for the time being it is not foreseen here.

**Sobchak.** I am also against the sale and purchase of land, since I realize to what this may lead. The idea was different. We believe that we must reject state ownership of the land and of other natural resources. The people who live on the corresponding territory should own them. If you wish to lease land, then give more favorable conditions for a life-time lease, and stricter conditions—for short-term. In this case, the local soviets and other state agencies should guard the interests of the people, since it is possible to squeeze everything from the land on a short-term lease and later turn it into God knows what and abandon it. Here, we really should protect society's interests.

**Denisov.** However, dealers in the shadow economy are hardly rushing into agriculture. There, it requires labor and the sweat of one's brow, from dawn to dusk, to create the surplus product, which all we citizens will consume. Yet, the development of a private ownership sector in the sphere of industrial production is a very tasty morsel for shadow business, and it will direct capital there.

**Sobchak.** However, after all, we have state power in our hands. We make the laws. We must proceed from life. So, perhaps we must create, as we have tried to do in the draft Law on Ownership, a sufficiently broad framework, in which life would be able to give different variants for developing real economic processes. Do you favor a multi-structure economy, or preservation of the universal state nature of the economy that exists today?

**Denisov.** I am for multi-structure, but for the one that has already formed. I am for the development of cooperatives, but with certain restrictions that are needed today. However, in speaking of multi-structural, I am

also for private ownership that remains within the framework of individual labor activity.

Lastly, what troubles me a great deal is the opening of possibilities for intensified social inequality. As you recall, Article 10 lists the objects of ownership by citizens (house, apartment, dacha, stocks, money, etc.), and here it also states that the make-up and cost of the property of citizens, acquired on grounds stipulated by law, is unlimited. That is, precisely people who have concentrated a great deal of money in their hands will be able to acquire an unlimited number of apartments, stocks, etc.

**Sobchak.** How can they do this if they seized these funds illegally? I repeat: the state should control this.

**Denisov.** A good theory, if the mechanism for monitoring incomes works. If we were to introduce this law tomorrow, as many insist, without broad discussion, without analyzing the possible consequences, our haste, it seems, might lead to intensification of social inequality.

**Sobchak.** Here our views in many ways coincide, but your pessimism regarding the possibilities of our socialist state surprises me. We simply need to establish a normal tax levy.

I cannot agree with the thesis stated in your article that today the party is not people-wide, and cannot express the interests of all social forces in society, both of honest people, as well as of those trying to live at their expense. The division of social forces into honest and dishonest seemed strange to me. The Romanovs, Grishins, and Aliyevs... They are in the party, and previously even held prominent posts in it...

**Denisov** Today, there is a strata of people in society that grew, like yeast, during the era of stagnation and became a sufficiently influential force. As far as criminals who turned out to be within the party ranks (and criminal elements always attach themselves to the ruling party) are concerned, the sole method for improving it is to expose them, take them to court, and punish them with the full severity of the law.

**Sobchak.** However, to this day we are putting these people on honorary pensions, they are fairly privileged, and we reserve privileges for them. Everyone knows that the family members of Stalin's associates enjoy state privileges to this day.

**Denisov.** You, as a legislator, and I, as a party worker, should probably operate jointly. So long as the party has not cleansed itself of people who have tarnished themselves with crime, be it by direct participation in the repressions or by engaging in shadow business, its authority will not grow.

**Sobchak.** Perhaps this could be done by placing the party within the framework of law, having subordinated the activity of all party bodies to law?

**Denisov.** There is a corresponding article in the Constitution. However, apparently, in order for law to become reality, we need the forces of everyone—both legislators, the party, and all citizens.

**Sobchak.** There is also another attitude toward law. Right-wing nihilism has taken root here. Nothing prevents one from violating the law; there are no inner obstacles whatsoever.

I am interested in your attitude toward opposition political structures. Do you consider yourself an opposition member?

**Denisov.** Firstly, as is written in our platform, we think that a multi-party system is not some sort of bug-bear with which we should frighten each other. If the objective prerequisites exist, it will develop regardless of our desires. Or not develop, if prerequisites do not exist. Everything depends on the natural course of events. As far as I personally am concerned, I do not in any way consider myself as an opposition member in the party. I do not see contradictions between ideas, set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's article, and the positions of the Leningrad party organization's platform. My colleagues and I, rank-and-file Leningrad communists, support the direction of development that M.S. Gorbachev personifies. We are for restructuring as a renovation of socialism. We oppose restructuring as an opportunity for restoring capitalist relations.

**Sobchak.** The renovation of socialism, apparently, is interpreted differently. You are in favor of preserving and developing the existing, and Gorbachev is in favor of radically renewing everything.

**Denisov.** In my article, there really is the phrase: "We must develop and improve that which exists." Now, let us see what exists. We have an economic reform which, true, is taking place extremely contradictorily, slowly, and essentially, is marking time. And we have a multi-structure economy, i.e., the cooperative sector and individual labor activity, which we must also develop.

**Sobchak.** However, after all, at your meetings there were cries of: "Prosecute the cooperative workers!"

**Denisov.** Not all cooperative workers, but those who are involved in trade and purchasing activity. This element of cooperatives, in our view, is unacceptable. Thus, by improving that which exists, I do not mean preserving the remnants of the command-administrative system, but developing those elements which represent the new in our economic system.

**Sobchak.** And your attitude toward opposition forces, especially the Popular Front? You have already spoken of it quite negatively...

**Denisov.** I know many people in the Popular Front, rank-and-file members and leaders. I think that it is heterogeneous. The majority are healthy forces, sincerely operating under the slogans of democratization, glasnost, and the struggle against bureaucracy, against remnants

of the command-administrative system, etc. I support the development of relations with these forces.

*While the dialogue was on the air, the studio telephones literally went wild: viewers wanted to ask their own questions of the broadcast participants. So, the final part of the discussion consisted of answers to their questions. Unfortunately, we are forced to resort to abbreviation here:*

**Question.** Why is Sobchak defending the cooperative workers? Is he a member of a cooperative, and if so, which?

**Sobchak.** I am not defending the cooperative workers, but the idea of the cooperative itself as a requisite element of a multi-structure economy. Today, those who stigmatize cooperative workers and cooperatives, perhaps, do not know history. After all, cooperatives were organized in the middle of last century as a means of self-defense for small private entrepreneurs and craftsmen in their struggle with large private owners. The first and main principle of cooperatives is cooperation and mutual assistance. Therefore, the cooperative is a collective formation, precisely inherent in socialism. It is no accident that Lenin rated it so highly.

I myself am not a member of a cooperative and have not received a single ruble from a single cooperative worker. I am defending the idea, but I also favor strict measures in the struggle against false cooperatives. We have a fairly large number of these. It is another matter that we, at the suggestion of trade union functionaries, have almost sunk, in general, the idea of the cooperative itself.

**Question.** Why is Comrade Romanov, to this day, receiving a personal pension and enjoying all the good things in life?

**Sobchak.** This is a question for Yuriy Aleksandrovich.

**Denisov.** And not even for me. None of those demanding the prosecution of Romanov have yet named a single crime for which he should be judged.

**Sobchak.** Well, I can name one. We often judge a man for stealing 100 rubles, yet we do not judge those who have cost the state billions in losses. This is very bad. For instance, the dam—this, unquestionably, is a crime. The crime is not the idea itself, but the fact that they started building the dam without a well-developed, thoroughly considered, ecologically substantiated project. We all know what this led to.

**Denisov.** I agree, but first we have to develop a legal mechanism for accountability.

**Sobchak.** First, we need a mechanism for political responsibility. The party itself can do this.

**Denisov.** There are few political mechanisms for responsibility that could rule out this kind of abuse. We have many projects on a country-wide scale, which really are criminal in the final account.

### Is Disappointment Warranted?

*The studio lights went out. The broadcast was finished. We think it left many with a feeling of dissatisfaction. It was not what people expected. The debate was held, and it was sufficiently sharp but, there was clearly no "duel," no "single combat," nor "corrida." We wanted to know why. Who better to answer this question, than the television debate participants themselves? We asked them to continue their discussion, this time for the readers of KOM-MUNIST. The suggestion was accepted. It seemed to us, that both opponents were no less interested than we in analyzing the just completed discussion. Therefore, our first question suggested itself.*

*Your impressions from this talk?*

**Sobchak.** Most favorable. The talk showed that we have far more points of contact, than differences.

**Denisov.** I had expected there to be more polemics. The initial position seemed too different. However, the truth is born through arguments. If it is not struck dead in the heat of the moment... A direct meeting is good, it gives an opportunity to reach common conclusions, removing problems that seemed unresolvable.

*Which was greater, the similarity of positions or the similarity of characters?*

**Sobchak.** Both one and the other. Yuriy Aleksandrovich and I both support positive changes, we both do not wish to exacerbate the situation and, I think, we are both striving to find a resultant, which would offer real movement forward. The similarity of positions was brought to light through this.

*A question, to refine positions: What is the CPSU today—an organization of people, similar in terms of their convictions, or a coalition of forces, cooperating on the basis of compromises under the pressure of certain circumstances?*

**Denisov.** The party lives, so long as it includes people who are similar in terms of conviction. It is another matter how this unity is achieved: by thrusting one's point of view, which rules out the possibility of discussion itself, or whether this unity is a result of dialogue. However, there are dialogues and there are dialogues. What did people expect today? If our positions were diametrically opposed, it means that right now we, in the course of the discussion, could easily be trying to strangle one another, after which everyone would leave satisfied. We need a democratic exchange of opinions in order to develop a truly common concept. We wrote in the Leningrad party organization's platform that we understand the principle of democratic centralism to be the broadest discussion before making decisions, a unity of action after making it, and the right of the minority to express its viewpoint publicly, openly.

**Sobchak.** I would have answered the same question differently. Today the situation in the party is fairly complex. It is intensified by the fact that a rift has

appeared between the party apparatus and rank-and-file party masses. This has not occurred accidentally, but due to the system of party nomenclature created by Stalin, which has functioned for many years. It must be admitted, it still operates to this day.

What determines the position of the apparatus, the form of its existence? Above all, party documents, for instance, the instructions on elections. I, a rank-and-file communist, even secretary of a primary party organization, do not choose. Only members of the bureau can choose, and they are already secretaries. The obkom secretary is not as far removed from me, as the Lord from the believer, not to mention the higher authorities. Therefore, I consider the enhancement of conservative forces a very real danger to the party right now. There is also left-wing extremism but, I think, conservative forces, which do not want to and cannot change, but in many ways define the atmosphere in the party, have far greater significance.

*Are you assuming that they are a majority? In any case, in the apparatus...*

**Sobchak** Let me give a specific example. I went to the United States together with Andrey Georgiyevich Braun, Tselinograd Obkom first secretary. There, I told him: I am prepared to come to you, to your apparatus, as an instructor. Why? Because he is a progressive person. He does not speak very eloquently. At his meetings, most likely, people do not listen properly. However, he understands that we must solve all problems proceeding from real life. And so he acts. He came to the oblast leadership and saw that, if they planned any longer in the old way, it would be impossible to live. He has achieved changes in the plans for kolkhozes and sovkhozes. That is, he has done work, real, specific work. Somehow everything comes simply and naturally to him.

*Scarcely any system can depend on one man, good person or no, is this not so?*

**Sobchak.** This is the whole point. There should be a natural selection of precisely such people for leadership posts in the party. The essence of such selection is a democratic method for forming the party apparatus.

**Denisov.** True. And very complex. We run into the question of the party's interrelations with the mass information media. It is obvious to all that we must never repeat that which was. Yet, what should these interrelations be like? I, an obkom secretary for ideology, should answer this question clearly. However, for the time being, I too have not yet fully clarified this system of interrelations for myself.

**Sobchak** The party meeting resolution noted that the mass information media have turned into a means of information terror. How do you feel about such a party resolution?

**Denisov.** A meeting is a meeting. There is much talk in the city, as though this resolution was made by the

obkom. No, the party organizations were the initiators, and they drafted this resolution.

**Sobchak.** Can you name even a single mass information medium, which would be a means of information terror?

**Denisov.** No, I do not think so. I do not think that this formulation is correct. It was a question, apparently, of certain speeches which excited public opinion.

**Sobchak.** If there had been no such formulation of the question at the party meeting, I would not have given my speech on television. I was forced to talk about this in "Fifth Wheel," because hundreds of letters had come from citizens who were simply frightened by the meeting. It made the impression of an exploding bomb: "Are Zhdanov's times, with their intolerance and so on, returning?"

**Denisov.** I assume, we will not return to the period of Zhdanovism. Yet, such a meeting is an action that always elicits such accusations. There has been more than enough juggling of facts at public meetings.

*We say: "Socialism," "capitalism," "private ownership," "social justice"... Words seemingly known to everyone, customary, but on examination, people often have essentially different interpretations.*

**Denisov.** I agree. We must hold a dialogue in the same language. However, there has been virtually no serious discussion on this subject either in the party, or in society. It is needed.

*Are you sure that during today's talk you used identical concepts, in speaking of socialism and private ownership?*

**Sobchak.** Let me state my interpretation. In proclaiming not state ownership, but ownership by citizens as the basis, I see a return to genuine socialism. Therefore, it is no accident that the following categories are written in the draft law: ownership by citizens, collective ownership in its diverse forms, and state ownership. Note that state ownership is only a third. If there is no ownership by citizens, all the rest of its forms have no significance, since this is no longer socialism. Socialism means citizens are both politically, as well as economically in the center. Everything proceeds from the individual, the rest is derived. I see socialism as a system, oriented toward man, which ensures social equality and social defense of the individual person, proceeding in all solutions of social problems from the person, above all, and not pitting collective interest against the interests of the individual, and not pressuring the interests of the individual through the interests of the collective. Otherwise, the main thing, the person, leaves socialism. So I see socialism.

**Denisov.** ...As an association of individuals, free both economically, as well as politically.

*Including in ownership relations?*

**Denisov.** Anatoliy Aleksandrovich and I have come to the agreement that it is free in this as well, under the condition that ownership does not grow into exploitative private ownership.

**Sobchak.** Yes, of course. However, it is not quantitatively restricted, and is allowed to own means of production in cases established by law. For instance, for peasants, craftsmen...

**Denisov.** How do you, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, relate to the legal mechanisms which rule out non-labor income and hired labor?

**Sobchak.** I think that hired labor should not be entirely ruled out. The point is this: Today our state is taking up functions not inherent in it. It is an apparatus of political power and should not be engaged, for example, in consumer services. I would also add public catering and even trade to this. This is not the state's job at all. This should be transferred, above all, to collective ownership (cooperative, ownership by labor collectives, joint stock, mixed, joint, etc.), in which the state can also participate, but it should not itself engage in this. It can invest its resources in the development of a network of hotels and public catering enterprises, but these enterprises should be self-managed. That is how I see the problem of eliminating the state monopoly, of freeing it from functions not inherent in it. For a long time we have believed that the specific nature of socialism lies in the fact that the state unites political and economic power. It turned out that the state not simply implements power as an owner, but directly manages. It has become a universal employer, which organizes everything itself and does everything. This inevitably leads to bureaucracy, on the one hand, and on the other, gives rise to the hired worker, alienated from the means of production.

**Denisov.** State ownership is a rudimentary form of public ownership. A theoretical and practical search is being made for new ways to develop public ownership. To say that we have already found the one correct solution... You will hardly find serious people, so sure in their assessments and opinions.

**Sobchak.** However, the first step has nonetheless been made. Let us consider leasing. Today, it is granted on privileged conditions to agricultural enterprises: you convert to lease, and they will write off your debts. The state is doing this so as to stop managing in places where it cannot cope. Let us recall how we tried to arrange trade in fruits and vegetables. What didn't we do! We created ministries, strengthened, reinforced, but we did not understand that fruits and vegetables have one specific feature: they spoil rapidly. The state machine is too slow. While it works, the produce rots. So, we must convert to lease. If the lease collective becomes an owner in this sphere, I have no fear that this will lead to anarchosyndicalism. This is impossible if, in Lenin's words, the top command levels are in the hands of the state. Today, it is wrong that the top, as well as the bottom, are in the

same hands. There is no path to capitalism here. In this, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, maybe we have a difference of opinion.

**Denisov** Except the state has somewhat weakened in the sense of control. Excellent laws exist (on the struggle against non-labor incomes), which in general, it seems, are not applied even once.

**Sobchak.** Let us be frank. How come they are not applied? Because the administrative-command system exists and, by the way, because the party apparatus has reduced the prosecutor's office to such that one would have to spend a month of Sundays looking for one independent person. People are afraid to resolve any question without consulting the obkom.

**Denisov.** I personally, as secretary, have never interfered.

**Sobchak.** The blame is not yours personally. One day a colleague of yours, in my presence, holding the Law on Cooperatives in his hands, said: "How much does it cost? Ten kopeks? It is worth a half-kopek!" The oblast and city prosecutor's chairmen of the city and oblast courts, and the UVD chiefs listened to him. He gave them instructions: we must organize a number of big trials, arrest several cooperative workers and, in general, start introducing order.

**Denisov.** Every institution of power should work within the limits of its authority. We really (this is one of the "achievements" of the era of stagnation) have cultivated a whole galaxy of state leaders of all ranks, who do not take responsibility upon themselves. Be he a prosecutor, be he whomever you please...

**Sobchak.** To avoid responsibility, people often prefer to do nothing.

*Nowadays, many speak in the name of the working class: Left-wing, right-wing, moderate, semi-moderate. However, the working class is not a homogeneous mass.*

**Sobchak** The concept of "working class" itself has greatly changed.

*However, claims to represent its interests are coming from forces with opposing aims. We recently noticed a figure: according to some calculations, by the year 2000, 80 percent of workers in Japan will have a bachelor's degree. Meanwhile, alas, we cannot lay claim to such rates of scientific and technical progress, but this does not free us of a need to predict the social and ideological consequences of such development, the change of social structure. Have you thought about this?*

**Denisov.** Forecasting is not easy, but possible. As far as accusations that the party represents the interests of only the working class are concerned, this is not so. Our platform states: having arisen as a party for the working class, today it represents the interests of all working people, i.e., all those who live on labor incomes. The CPSU believes, unlike our opponents in the United Front of Working People, which is party for the working

class alone and is trying to bring matters almost to reviving the dictatorship of the proletariat, that this is the very extreme from which we are distancing ourselves. Therefore, I believe that it is groundless to accuse us (I am speaking for the Leningrad party organization) of fencing ourselves off from the intelligentsia and trying to pit the working class against it. If it seems so to some, it means we have not managed to express our position clearly. So to speak, we were misunderstood. I will not start hiding behind this stereotypical justification. We must comprehend why we were unable to express our position clearly. This is very important.

**Sobchak.** Today, a large segment of the scientific and technical intelligentsia is actually the most genuine working class. Engineers with higher education toil at many work places. They are a working class both with regard to ownership, as well as to payment, and because they engage in direct labor.

*However, let us return to the completed television debate. It seemed to us that both participants in the dialogue, by coming face to face, have made slight steps away from their positions, have yielded a bit and reached a certain compromise. That is why many points of contact immediately appeared...*

**Denisov.** This is natural when there is a dialogue.

**Sobchak.** When there is a dialogue, positions are refined.

*It seems to us that it is not so much the convergence of positions that is important, as much as that a normal democratic way to compare different viewpoints was objectively and visibly demonstrated to a million-strong viewing audience. Possibly, it might have seemed dull after tempestuous meetings, but, we think, the television audience and readers will agree with us: it was more fruitful.*

*There was no duel, but we are not disappointed.*

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### Democracy in Theory and Historical Practice

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[Article by Andranik Movsesovich Migranyan, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The reform of the political system that is unfolding in our country and has key significance for the fate of restructuring requires clear theoretical interpretation of the following questions. What are the initial boundaries, from which our movement is beginning? At what end result should we arrive? What difficulties have we run into in Marxist theory and in the real functioning of a political system? What are the ideological and theoretical principles of the theory of democracy and the institutional system of the West, and what of this legacy

may be suitable in the course of the revolutionary restructuring of our political system?

### I

In order to explain the meaning of many processes occurring in the political life of our society, it is unusually important to trace two traditions in the development of world political thinking, concerning the understanding of the nature of democracy as a form of management. The basic tenets of each of them, with greater or lesser success, have been implemented in the practice developing contemporary societies during the organization of a political system.

The first tradition, as even Popper noted in his day, begins with Plato and continues on up to Marx and Lenin. The theoretical idea of this tradition answered the following question (and from this point of view attempted to comprehend the nature of power and, consequently, of democracy): Who rules? With Plato, we already find classification of the forms of rule depending on the answer to this. If one man rules, it is royal power, if a small group of the best and noble—an aristocracy, and the free citizens of a city—democracy. In many ways, this idea was the basis for the concept of the state and power, developed by the founders of Marxism. For them, the state is a weapon in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of the exploited classes and for strengthening the reign of the exploiters. Hence, the definition of the bourgeois state, given in the "Manifesto": "Contemporary state power is only a committee which manages the common affairs of the entire bourgeois class."

Thus, in the center of Marx's and Engels' attention, the key to understanding the nature of the state and power is the explanation of the question of who rules. Such an explanation of the nature of the state and power gives us a key to understanding the central idea of the classics about when and why a state should wither away. In the conceptual plane, Lenin followed them very conscientiously and consistently both before, as well as after the revolution. The development in our country of a post-revolutionary political system and a mechanism for state power was an attempt to implement the general theoretical principles advanced by the founders of Marxism. The logic of the arguments was as follows. Whereas under a bourgeois democracy not all of the people rule, but only part of it, after a socialist revolution the whole people becomes involved in the process of management, thus becoming at the same time both the rulers and the ruled. Total participation by the people in managing the state brings democracy to its limit as a form of state management and turns the process of management into self-management. In completing this logical system, we unexpectedly bring to light the surprising similarity between this understanding of state power and the organization of power in the "Social Contract" of Rousseau, who believed that all members of a society should participate in managing the state through the formation of the "common will." In this regard, however, he

presented no mechanisms whatsoever for revealing this will in the societies of the New Day. As a result, a somewhat abstract system was obtained, which did not provide substantial guiding points for building a working institutional mechanism for popular self-management. True, we find specific considerations on the subject of organizing a mechanism of power in Marx's and Engels' analysis of the experience of the Paris Commune.

However, from the viewpoint of modern political theory and practice, the experience of the Paris Commune is unacceptable for organizing power in the large and small national states of the New Day. Why? What did the Commune represent? I assume that it did not even revive policy democracy, i.e., direct democracy with the participation of a whole people in solving the most important problems, but was, rather, a special form of power in a besieged fortress. Under extreme conditions in a small space, the representatives of the city that had been established met, decided key questions and then departed to local areas, in order to rapidly implement said decisions. Obviously, such a form of power is applicable only for an unusually simple and small community, which has found itself under exceptional conditions. The absolutization of the form of organizing power in the Paris Commune was the result of the well-known disdain for the achievements of mankind in the sphere of organizing a democratic mechanism of power, for the institutions, traditions, and the history of establishment and development of the state and of a political system, as well as for values, in and of themselves significant for organizing the life of a post-revolutionary society.

Although the Commune did not succeed in ensuring a stable and effective form of power, it nonetheless played its role in shaping an opinion in the classics and their followers that it is possible on this path to achieve fullest democracy, full popular power and, consequently, to overthrow the state and all its institutions.

This idea was received seriously in Russia, and Lenin and others attempted to implement the abstract logical system of Rousseau-Marx-Engels in practice, no longer for a city founded and existing in a state of siege, but for one-sixth of the planet.

The idea that socialist democracy is management by an entire people was implemented in our country through the mechanism of the soviets. However, the forms and institutions through which the people were universally involved in the process of management led not to the withering of the state (although formally, we did everything necessary so that, according to Marxist theory, the state in its old meaning has died. It really has disappeared entirely in the form in which it exists in the West), but on the contrary, to its ceaseless reinforcement and alienation from the people.

The great gain of the revolution, the Soviet form of organization of power, encountered serious difficulties in fulfilling the tasks placed on it of developing laws and

controlling the activity of the executive bodies. The original idea, born through the creativity of the masses, for the representation of workers, peasants, and soldiers in soviets had very great significance, providing an opportunity for representatives of the people from "down below" to voice their opinion on one or another vitally important issue. The representatives of all strata of society personified the common will of the people, through the expression of which the new power legitimized its first decisions, of cardinal importance to the new order. Through the soviet system, which was sort of like a referendum with participation by the basic part of the population, popular will was involved in solving the most important questions—war and peace, ownership, land, and the principles for organizing political power. In the starting stage of establishing the new power, the soviets appeared in a certain sense to be agencies of direct democracy, where representatives of all classes, through the voters' instructions, revealed the will of the people. To a certain extent, this is reminiscent of the ideal concept for developing the common will and for organizing political power which we find in Rousseau's "*Social Contract*." However, in theory, as well as in practice, we have not rejected the representative form for organizing higher bodies of power. This representation was necessary in order to ensure the "technical" formation of the common will, and not at all for establishing a representative democracy with all the problems related to this form of power, in which representatives of different interests in civil society are elected to bodies of power and do their work professionally.

In practice, due to the fact that the principle of direct democracy (the attempt to ensure universal participation of a whole people in forming the common will via the soviets) was implemented in combination with the principle of formal-representative democracy (the election of a deputy as a delegate for conveying this common will through the instructions of the corresponding electorate), our legislative branches of power thus remained in a rudimentary and amorphous state.

As a result, we obtained neither direct democracy, i.e., a real opportunity for the entire electorate to participate directly in forming the common will and its implementation in making legislative decisions, nor a formal system of representative democracy, since the representative is, essentially, deprived of independence. In the political system which took shape, he acts only as an intermediary who, through instructions at one or another level of power, transmits the will of his own voters. Therefore, an independent niche was not found for such a representative-delegate in the political system. There is nothing surprising in the fact that legislative power here turned into a sphere for unprofessional activity, having lost the functions and authorities that were shaped over the course of many centuries.

Today we know that almost all political systems use a referendum for one or another cardinal question, with the participation of the entire people, when it is necessary to reveal the will of the majority, proceeding from

the principle of national leadership. It goes without saying, no one would take it into his head to call a referendum on every subject in the course of legislative or administrative activity. Questions are constantly solved by existing representative bodies of power, which control the work of the executive bodies. Under our conditions, the legislative bodies become unique "referenda of deputies," but real power is in the hands of the executive bodies, elected by no one and accountable to no one. We are trying to answer the question: Why did this happen and could it be different?

In order to implement the Marxist idea of withering the state by involving a country's entire population in management, a mechanism of power was created that would ensure this participation and which would implement the accumulation of the "common and united will" of an entire people by combining the principles of direct and representative democracy. However, in any society, unless it is a barracks, there are always different interests—property, ethnic, social, class, etc., which hinder the formation of this "common and united will." In order to put the Marxist-Leninist model of political power into practice, it was necessary to alienate people from all of their individual, group, and other specific interests related to ownership, membership in one or another ethnic group, various social strata, or class. It was necessary to depersonalize all these interests into a sort of super-interest (which is common and united precisely due to its alienation and depersonalization), which would dissolve all specific interests within itself and enable us to shape the "common and united will."

In our country, the state acted as the voice of this super-interest and will, alienated from individual interests, as a subject to the command of different social, ethnic, and other groups. It remained only to ensure the necessary conditions so that different real interests would not have an opportunity to take shape and leak up from below into this mechanism for forming the "common and united will," so that real life would not hinder the implementation of an ideal process for making decisions.

The total alienation of the people from ownership by way of complete state possession, the declaration of the solution of all key problems in socioclass and ethnic relations, which had become an inalienable element of social consciousness on the whole and of individual strata and groups, removed all complexities in the functioning of the ideal model for universal self-management. Therefore, it is no surprise that a system that operates ideally in society is a system from which life, with all its manifestations and problems, has been driven out entirely. Such bodies of power, although they have lofty names and outward attributes, in fact stop noticing the people who live real life.

This ideal mechanism for popular rule leads to results, directly opposite to those intended. A people, a society falls into total dependence on the despotic power of the state, which has appropriated for itself the role of shaper

of the people's will and has all necessary punitive means at its disposal, in order to "persuade" anyone who doubts that the state's decisions are the most adequate expression of his own concealed aspirations and passionate desires.

In order to more fully clarify why this happened, we must trace the second tradition in political thinking and political practice, which has not been developed in our ideology, but now moves into the foreground under conditions of modernizing the political system. For this tradition, the central question is how power is organized. In other words, not "who rules," but "what rules," or rather, whether law rules in a state and whether this law is identical for all citizens.

## II

In the framework of this tradition, power and the state are no longer viewed as a kind of cohesive totality, but as an institutional mechanism that should be constructed in such a way as to ensure the effective participation of the people in the process of management and self-management. Modern Western political systems were formed on this basis, with their mechanism of power and with principles of cooperation among citizens, society, and the state. Constitutionalism and the concept of the law-governed state appeared in the framework of this tradition as well.

Its ideological tenets were embodied in many ways through trial and error in a real mechanism for effectively organized state power. Sometimes the best achievements of various peoples in the past were used, sometimes not assuming at all that they were in practice implementing the doctrine of democracy. Moreover, the democratic political mechanism was almost completely built, for example, in England, long before the popular masses were allowed into politics. The doctrine of liberalism had a colossal influence on its formation. By this token, against the conceptual ground that already existed in the 16th century in England and Holland, and later, in the 18th, in the United States, and later still on the continent, the political system implemented not the doctrine of democracy in a pure form, but rather, a doctrine of liberal democracy in which the values of liberalism dominated over the values of democracy. It is not surprising that Montesquieu, in analyzing England, already the archetype of a bourgeois democratic political system at that time, quite clearly separates democracy as an ideal type, embodied in the classical policy system, from democracy as a model for the real political system that had existed in England in the 17th-18th centuries.

Let us dwell briefly on the basic elements of said tradition both in the ideological sphere of forming a liberal-democratic symbiosis, as well as in the plane of forming a real mechanism in practice.

It is necessary to emphasize that if the idea of liberalism had never been incorporated in the doctrine of democracy, then the contemporary form of organization of power would never have been able to arise in the West.

The inseparable values of liberalism, such as individualism, individual and inalienable rights and freedoms, the entire set of rights known as negative freedom, or "freedom from" (i.e., from interference on the part of the state and society), should be organically included in the mechanism of power, which at the same time would ensure the political equality of all in the eyes of the law. Therefore, it is no accident that even though the originally created political mechanism also ensured, at least formally, this equality in the first bourgeois democratic countries, active political participation was nonetheless sharply limited. The British political system was reminiscent of an aristocratic democracy, since the basic mass of people remained behind the line of active politics. Obviously, in the initial period of establishing the democratic mechanism of power, only a limited circle of people were able to use the complex political system that had taken shape in such a way as to preserve its stability.

Proceeding from the experience of many countries that switched to a democratic political system, it seems, it is possible to deduct the following law: In the starting stage of its establishment, a democratic mechanism is very fragile and can be easily destroyed by the broad involvement in the active political process of masses who lack sufficient general and, especially, political culture. In order to provide freedom and independence for a separate individual, proceeding from the doctrine of liberalism, it was necessary to create a special mechanism. For precisely this reason, both the theoretical idea, as well as political practice took the path of answering not so much the question of who rules, but other questions: How to structure power, so as to guarantee the equality of passive political rights for all, and at the same time, active political rights for a certain part of society as well; how to put an end to the principle of concentrating power in one center; how to weaken the role and influence of the state, which had become a threatening factor, especially in the era of absolutism in Europe. Thus, the main problems were legal guarantees of personal freedom and personal self-expression, as well as weakening the state and the dispersion of power both among different parts of the same state mechanism, as well as among various institutions of civil society. In raising and answering these questions, Western societies started on the path to creating a constitutional, i.e., law-governed state, where the central question is already that of how much the law rules in society.

Of course, in that period the political mechanism objectively met the interests of the most wealthy and educated classes. However, as the experience of man's development shows, apparently, there is a certain law: When one tries to create a mechanism in a country, which has not had a lengthy development of the elements of personal freedom and a law-governed state, that would immediately guarantee the participation of the entire people in management, this, as a rule, turns into the establishment of despotism.

For the triumph of individual freedom and protection of the individual from the arbitrariness of authorities, it was necessary to deprive (with the help of legal acts) all trans-individual institutions and communities of their religious nature, which was done by putting the state under society's control and secularizing public life. However, since strict regulation by the state and by religion of the individual's personal rights and freedoms and of their forms of manifestation disappeared, it is easy to assume that, during self-realization, separate individuals and their voluntary organizations and associations, in expressing their interests, would unavoidably become involved in conflicts with each other. It was necessary to give these conflicts a public and legal institutional nature. Only thus was it possible to ensure the legal expression of plurality of interests in society, the legal resolution of conflicts within the framework of the corresponding state institutions under the "observation" of civil society. In permitting these conflicting interests in the political sphere, it was necessary to create a mechanism that would provide conditions (within the framework of a representative form for organization of power and for decision making), under which the majority is unable once and for all to claim rightness and usurp power. The representatives of the minority also had to preserve all necessary legal guarantees in order to ensure the legal defense of their interests, both within the framework of civil society, as well as in the political sphere. Paradoxical though it may be, only one country, Great Britain, has succeeded in creating all this complex, multi-faceted, multi-dimensional mechanism from start to finish.

However, it would be unfair not to note that the previous development of mankind, of course, had accumulated tremendous achievements in this field. Various peoples have introduced different elements of political culture into the treasury of political theory and practice, which were organically received and developed in England over 6 centuries. What are we talking about?

Athenian policy gave the world a model of public power. However, the ancient Greeks did not manage to find a mechanism in the political sphere for institutional regulation of conflict among different social forces and, as a result, were unable to overcome the totality of power, i.e., the concentration of total power in the hands of the one (royal power), the many (aristocracy), or the entire people (democracy). The Romans succeeded in doing this. The citizens of the Eternal City, after the uprising of plebes against patricians, having created the institution of the popular tribunal, contributed to the formation of a mechanism for checks and balances of power. Machiavelli has directed attention to the fact that institutionalizing conflicts between the senate, consular power, and the popular tribunal was a source for the inner dynamism of power and society. Such a mechanism ensured participation in the political process of the entire free population of the city and carried the conflict of interests

over into the sphere of public politics, without thus leaving certain important antisystem forces outside the legal political process.

The Germanic peoples made the next colossal contribution to political practice. They gave the world, in addition to the Greek policy and Eastern one-man forms of royal rule, a political system based on principles of representation. The bourgeois-democratic parliamentary political system grew virtually from estate-representative forms of power. Within the framework of estate-representative monarchy in the English parliament, a struggle took place for influence among royal power and the representatives of different estates. In the early Middle Ages, we already observe all three of the most important elements of contemporary parliamentary democracies: the public nature of power, its representative nature, and the presence of a mechanism of checks and balances, whose purpose is to not permit the concentration of power completely in the hands of one particular institution, class, or estate.

However, in England yet another qualitative leap was made in the sphere of building the state, which gave all these institutions a nature different from antiquity and the Middle Ages: political practice and political theory went hand-in-hand here. The concept of natural right, the idea of the autonomous individual with inalienable rights, the contractual nature of state power and, mainly, the partition of the "individual-society-state" triad made a colossal strike against concepts, coming from antiquity and the Middle Ages, about the organic and indivisible nature of their interrelations. The political theory of the New Day advanced the individual as the central element of the political system and began to consider expedient only that mechanism of power, which is able to the greatest extent to ensure the inalienable natural rights and freedoms of this separate individual. In the theoretical structures of New Day philosophers, for the first time the state began to be considered an alienated, super-societal body, possessing great possibilities for the enslavement of society and citizens. Proceeding from the concept of the contractual nature of a state's appearance and from the primacy of the individual and society with regard to it, the political thinkers of the New Day emphasized the need for civil society to control the state, requiring searches for a new institutional mechanism in order to hold the state "in check." Such a mechanism was created in England. In analyzing the British political system, Montesquieu interpreted it theoretically, and in political theory this mechanism is known as "separation of powers." Here, state power is considered a certain super-societal institution, unrelated to the struggle of various socioclass forces, alienated from society, and already dangerous due to the fact that, in concentrating the entire fullness of power in a few hands or one institution, it becomes in fact uncontrollable.

Montesquieu proceeded from the fact that society is capable of most effectively controlling only a power, which is fragmented and whose separate parts are in opposition to each other. Whereas England came to this

as a result of its own organic development, the idea of separation of powers, formulated by Montesquieu under the influence of British political practice, was not sufficiently obvious what with the external preservation of old institutions in the English political system, and the founding fathers of the United States implemented this principle in its pure form.

In the course of many subsequent decades, the struggle between the legislative and the executive branches of power for influence on politics led to the strengthening of executive power. However, in the past decade, increasing activeness is observed in legislative bodies, which wish to regain lost positions.

Thus, it is becoming entirely obvious that, in the first stage of establishing a democratic political mechanism, both theoreticians, as well as practitioners were concerned about ensuring freedoms and rights of separate individuals and about weakening the role and influence of the state and state regulation. That is, in the starting stage, this mechanism ensured "freedom from," simply asserting the priority of liberal values over the values of democracy, in particular, of freedom over equality. However, the establishment of modern liberal democratic political systems did not occur without serious conflicts and cataclysms, which repeatedly required corrections of the institutional system.

Returning to the evolution of contemporary representative democracies, we should note yet another turning point in the development of Western political systems.

After the bourgeois revolutions and degradation of the state's role to the position of "night watchman" and "necessary evil," civil society is becoming the sovereign master and controller of fates. However, a process of differentiation is taking place in its framework as well. All the key structures, formal and informal, turn out to be in the hands of small, well-organized, well-supported, educated groups of the population, trying no matter what to preserve the existing situation, which gives them complete freedom of action. The ideas of Smith, Bentham, and Locke, and later also of Humboldt, Constant, Tocqueville, and others made it theoretically possible to substantiate and reinforce in practice the limited role of the state in society's life. Formal equality in the eyes of the law and a representative form of democracy with the limited access of broad masses to the political process ideally contributed to the purposes and interests of those who ruled in civil society. It became apparent that the liberal-democratic model, on the basis of which lies the principle of negative freedom, does not meet the interests of most of the population and creates a constant tension between different interests.

The broad popular masses were faced with serious problems, related to the change of their position both within the framework of civil society, as well as in political life. In the course of the entire 19th century in countries, where liberal democratic representative forms of democracy had existed, an intensified struggle occurred for the

political participation of all citizens. Society began to consider the state an institution for implementing its own interests. The entire 19th century was marked by the pressure of popular masses for the purpose of receiving political rights and influencing the election of representatives to different structures of power, in order, through them, to have an influence on civil society, regulating one or another spheres of its functioning. As a result of these political skirmishes, attempts appeared to develop a positive concept of freedom ("freedom to"), the concept of a socially responsible state, to achieve the expansion of progressive social legislation, etc. This process continues to this day in the West. Conservatives, especially in the heat of the profound socioeconomic crisis in the late 1970s, have frightened everyone with the fact that the West allegedly is becoming witness to a new suffocation of society and the individual by the state, that Western societies are on the threshold of a new absolutism, and now a depersonalized state bureaucracy already holds the place of the autocrat, controlled by no one and pursuing its own goals. In turn, the liberals and leftists think that the possible economic, political, and social institutions of civil society, found in the hands of a minority, still hold very strong positions and, in the final account, foist a state on others, regardless of pressure from the broad electorate on elected officials or of illusions, beneficial to themselves, of the cardinal problems in society's life.

Thus, from this brief review of the development of the theory and institutional mechanism for liberal democracy, it is evident that both normative theory, as well as the institutional mechanism in the process of their evolution have overcome a number of profound crises. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, these crises had two causes: firstly, existing bourgeois democratic institutions had not coped with current economic and social problems, as happened at the turn of the century and in the 1930s, and secondly, the liberal-democratic political regime turned out to be sufficiently liberal, but insufficiently democratic, as happened in the second half of the 19th century in England and the United States, where access to sociopolitical life was closed to an enormous mass. Both at the turn of the century, as well as in the 1930s, so as not to be crowded out of the political process, liberalism was forced to take into account changes which had occurred in the world as a result of involving the broad masses in politics, and to bring its ideas and values into conformity with reality. The next crisis of the liberal-democratic system gave grounds for the overwhelming majority of Western economists, sociologists, and political scientists to note that, as a result, the slant toward democracy and neglect of the values of liberalism had become too great. This already threatens the establishment of totalitarian and despotic state power, in the face of which all are equal, and equal by way of helplessness. This time, the liberal-democratic system got out of the crisis not by shifting to the left, as was usually done in the last more than 100 years, but conversely, by shifting to the right, toward asserting the basic values of liberalism at the expense of democracy.

Now, when modernization of the Soviet political system has entered a decisive phase, the development of an effective and clear concept for developing our democracy acquires particular topicality. The creation of such a concept is impossible without taking into account all aspects of the evolution both of liberal-democratic theory itself, as well as practical historical experience in developing institutions for democracy. This makes it possible to put our practical work to create new institutions of power on a more solid theoretical footing, and to avoid spontaneous experimentation and dilettantism in such an exceptionally responsible area. It seems, at this stage, the theoretical ideas of economists, philosophers, lawyers and political scientists should be aimed at developing a theory of democracy which, taking into account our ideological and theoretical legacy, the specifics of Russian political tradition, as well as the current situation in the socioeconomic and political spheres, would organically and integrally include all the elements that have survived historical verification in the process of the sociopolitical evolution of industrially developed countries over the last few centuries. The presence of such normative theory, perhaps, in its first phase and not quite complete, but open to further development and change, will guarantee that we will be able to define priorities and specific directions in the long term for practical implementation of the concept of a law-governed state. Moreover, this makes it possible, from the first steps, to constantly develop political theory and political sociology, using them to establish a degree of correspondence between the function of the political mechanism and the requirements of theory.

A reciprocal influence of the political mechanism and normative theory is possible in this process. Public discussion and, as a result, corrections of political institutions, are expedient in revealing their nonconformity to each other. However, another development of events is also possible. The real functioning of political institutions and analysis of their activity might also bring up questions, which require making one or more corrections in normative theory itself. In connection with this, it is impossible not to express serious fears on the subject of the intentions of an entire set of USSR people's deputies in the near future to pass a new USSR Constitution. At this critical stage, while society is in a process of transition (both in the theoretical, as well as institutional respect) from one state to another, passing a new Constitution would be clearly ill-timed. If we are counting on a long life for it, it should be based on utterly effective and clear theoretical tenets, and these do not exist for the time being. At the same time, the necessary conditions should be created in society in its economic and socio-political spheres, the prerequisites for stable, effectively operating political institutions. These processes are only just being developed and, by all appearances, will occupy a fairly long historical period. However, so that the old Constitution does not fetter our actions on the course of modernizing society at each specific stage and in each specific area, it is possible to remove some of its individual articles and clauses or temporarily decree new

ones. It is hard to overestimate the role in this work of the Committee on Constitutional Supervision, already called upon to act now, before passing a new Constitution, as an expert council, where our best legal forces should be concentrated on the project, in order to ensure legal irreproachability and political stability in converting from the old Constitution to the new.

Conversion to a democratic political system requires colossal stress both on theoretical potentials, as well as of the political will of those who are implementing and, moreover, leading restructuring. Not only successful gains, but also inevitable painful losses await us on this path. However, without them it is impossible to bring our country onto the main road of world civilization.

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## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE

### On the Psychology of Ethnic Conflicts

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[Text] Right now, ethnic problems and conflicts are among the most acute and painful, representing almost the greatest, no longer potential threat to restructuring and democratization in our country. This is recognized by virtually all studies of processes occurring in the USSR. However, the economic and partly sociological factors which determine hold the focus of attention, and study of the sociopsychological components is in practice lacking, although these were also touched on in the discussion of the CPSU draft platform on the party's ethnic policy under contemporary conditions. Furthermore, ethnic requirements and conflicts in a significant part bear a psychologically stipulated, subjective, acutely emotional nature. Therefore, in order to solve interethnic problems, we need a systematic approach, which presumes a multi-level study with an indispensable singling out of psychologically stipulated causes and mechanisms for their appearance.

In a single-ethnic state, ethnic problems simply do not exist. The appearance of representatives of another nation, which differs in a linguistic, religious, cultural or ethnographic regard, creates functioning ethnic criteria for comparison. Ethnic features in and of themselves are not psychologically important, except for the differences of one nation from another (on which attention is usually focused). Precisely interethnic comparison, in many ways, is the psychological basis and mechanism, by way of which the image of another nation is shaped. In this regard, the dissimilarity of ethnic features, as a rule, is exaggerated. The less the practice of interethnic interaction, the more distorted the image of the other nation, on

the basis of which incidental, often caricatured features can be founded. A tendency to exaggerate the differences between nations and to minimize their inner differences can often be traced in the development of stereotypes. In cases when, due to one or another historical reason, ethnic conflicts have taken place, enmity and prejudice are preserved for a long time in the existing ethnic stereotypes. So to speak, the fathers ate grapes, and their children—a bitter aftertaste. Distorted ethnic stereotypes, in turn, become a source for new interethnic conflicts and substantially complicate the positive solution of problems. Ethnic prejudice is very inert, as a consequence of which it, like a bacterial spore falling into a nourishing environment long after its birth, regains its disease-causing, murderous strength, giving rise to ethnic conflicts.

The correcting influence of the mass information media on ethnic stereotypes is greatly complicated, since people naturally avoid information which disagrees with their system of stereotypes and orientations. At the same time, they actively seek information confirming their views. Even in cases of the nonconformity or weak conformity of stereotypes to realities, a person may keep his conviction in the rightness of his opinion and attempt to convince others of this. Since information on many problems in our contradictory world is not simple, people in such cases are inclined to interpret it, basically, as confirming their own positions.

Ethnic stereotypes are learned in childhood, meaning, unconsciously and uncritically. As a consequence, they function predominantly at the subconscious level. The specific features of the unconscious—emotionality, illogic, symbolism and, consequently, little susceptibility to rational conclusions and conscious control—to one or another extent are inherent in structures of the ethnic psyche (in connection with this, in studying the specific features of the ethnic psyche, the concept of a collective unconscious, which appears in the ideas of C. Jung, may be promising).

Ethnic feelings hold an important place in a person's psychology, since ethnicity is an individual's life-long and almost most stable social characteristic. One can become wealthy or poor, change social, class or party membership, become an atheist, believe in God, or change religions, but ethnicity remains the same. Ethnic feelings play a compensatory role, when a person seeks a source of self-respect in his ethnic membership. In cases of unsuccessful careers or personal life, of difficulties in identifying with a certain respected group, there is always the possibility of raising one's self-esteem by way of demonstrative ethnic identification. (The American psychologist E. Becker formulated a theory that a primordial "dualism" motivates a person: internally, he must be part of some kind of community and, at the same time, stand out. Above all, the most accessible community—ethnic—acts as this community. Membership in an ethnic community is used ever more often as a basis for distinction). The more ethnic feelings are compensatory and psychologically protected in nature, the more

they take the form of nationalism, of hostility toward other nations. Then, nationalism becomes a haven for people with a subjectively unsuccessful fate.

In the ethnic psyche, an unconsciously functioning mechanism such as transfer (carry-over) has great significance. Of interest to us, firstly, is the ability to accumulate the energy of irritation from conflicts, different in terms of their nature, and transfer it to ethnic problems. Since our life abounds with big and small squabbles, worries, and problems, the likelihood of attempts to blame the representatives of other nations for these difficulties is high. Secondly, the transfer of negative stereotypes from one nation to another is possible. It, alas, is made easier by the fact that in our large and very multi-national country, experience in daily interaction among representatives of many nations is extremely inadequate. We know little about each other.

The ability to store up energy from non-ethnic conflicts and the compensatory function of feelings of ethnic membership make it possible to manipulate ethnic feelings, to carry the energy of social protest over to a different, interethnic track. The bureaucracy and corrupted strata have already used this and, evidently, will use it many times again, in order to direct popular discontent away from themselves. We have witnessed such attempts in Alma-Ata, Nagorno-Karabakh and other areas. Such actions provoke the country's leadership to apply force and administrative measures, which is a threat to democratization and fraught with the danger of returning to a command-bureaucratic system.

In the time of Stalinism, precisely such a system conducted a policy of re-settling entire peoples, campaigned for the struggle against "cosmopolitanism," and created the "doctors' trial" and others, which, essentially, is a state transfer, a carry-over of discontent into an ethnic track, putting responsibility for one's own sins and errors on ethnic "enemies." Such forms of "enemy," entering into ethnic stereotypes, are in fact a delayed-action bomb, capable of giving rise to interethnic friction even decades after the events which caused them. This is what we are encountering right now.

In the functioning of the unconscious, symbolism plays a special role and, therefore, the heightened emotionality of everything related to ethnic symbols is not surprising. Consequently, in order to achieve social calm and normalization of interethnic relations, it is expedient to remove limitations on the use of ethnic symbols, if restrictions still exist. Ethnic symbols are not only flags and hymns, but also historical persons, memorials to culture and various historical events, etc. True, the very same symbols may be evaluated exactly oppositely by different nations. This means that a source of tension is preserved, ready to blossom into a crisis situation, if it is not regulated by a high level of civilized communal life.

The similar nature of the function of the ethnic unconscious is displayed in the existence of a double standard: everything that offends one's own ethnic feelings is

perceived exceptionally painfully, often as caused by ill intent, and at the same time little attention or none at all is directed to the ethnic feelings of others, to one's own actions which may offend representatives of other nations. Displays of a double standard increase manifold in an atmosphere of ethnic conflict.

Usually, the connection between a conviction (orientation) and reality is relatively weak even in stressed relations. As an example, let me cite an experiment, already classic, which was done in the 1930s. Professor Lapier traveled about the United States with a young Chinese student and his wife. They stayed in 66 hotels and ate in 184 restaurants. In all the hotels except one, they were given a room, and they were never denied service in a restaurant. After a while, a question was sent to all these institutions, asking if they accept Chinese as guests (at that time there were strong anti-Chinese sentiments in the U.S.). Ninety-two percent responded that they do not accept Chinese. Lapier, and many other scientists after him, interpreted these data as a reflection of an important difference between real behavior and orientations. Almost all the owners of the institutions conducted themselves in an acceptable manner, but expressed clear orientations of intolerance, when they received a question in direct form. Naturally, such a hidden orientation instantly converts into practical intolerance in the event of open conflict, which explains its explosive nature.

A strain on ethnic relations may lead to the appearance of an inferiority complex among part of the ethnic minorities. The action of subconscious defense mechanisms in this case evokes a desire (often unrecognized) to conceal one's ethnic membership, and gives rise to a heightened sensitivity in perceiving everything relating to one's nationality, to demonstrative aggressiveness on national issues, and to nationalism.

If we view the social psyche as a kind of aggregate, in many ways our social subconscious prevails over social consciousness. Phenomena and personalities, previously forbidden for objective study or even for discussion, are in fact also subconscious psychological mechanisms (displacement, taboo, idealization), whose negative influence on the psyche is described in detail in many works. This accumulating influence explains the unexpected crises in interethnic relations, seeming groundless to the outside observer.

Unconscious forms of interaction and communication, when the individual does not have personal control over a situation, are typical of the behavior of people in critical, crisis situations. One of these is the crowd. It is a spontaneously formed community of people, united for a brief period for a more or less incidental, but highly emotional cause. The emotional content of the surroundings (excitement, aggression, anger, etc.) is transferred to the individual in an excited crowd. It appears in the individual not as a consequence of an adequate assessment of certain events, but as a result of direct influence of the emotional state of the surroundings (so-called

infection). In a mass of people, a manifold reciprocal strengthening of emotional influences occurs according to the principle of positive feedback. Therefore, it is no accident that many excesses of both an interethnic, as well as other natures, began relatively calmly, but as a result of the intensive self-excitement of a crowd acquired a sharply aggressive nature, which in a number of cases has led to violent actions (pogroms, arson, murders, etc.). S. Parkinson was right, believing that "subject to the law of a crowd, we return to the Stone Age, rejecting all that has been achieved by mankind." The fact that out of a sufficiently large number of mass occurrences now, the overwhelming number of excesses occurred on ethnic grounds, attests to the threatening force and special danger in this situation of emotional infection and self-excitement of a crowd, operating together with the other unconscious mechanisms of an ethnic psyche, possessing heightened emotionality (transfer, double standard, etc.).

The suggestibility of people increases sharply in a crowd. The suggestibility mechanism operates without need for proof or logic. In this regard, a critical nature in the perception of information and the conscious nature of behavior decrease substantially, and the evaluation and control of a person's own reactions become more difficult. Persons who have authority in this area, the halo of fighters for the rights of a nation, have a special effect of suggestibility.

The diktat of definite social moods and expectations relates to the laws of a crowd. A crowd does not wish and will not listen to speeches, not meeting its views. The crowd's delight appears in response to that which it wants to hear. It suppresses the individual, deprives him of independence, regardless of what matter he defends, right or wrong. As N.A. Berdyayev noted, "any gathering mass is a danger to freedom."

The conflicts arising in our country on ethnic grounds show that a significant (if not basic) force, which has directly participated in excesses, is youth. The psychological factors determining this feature of the conduct of youth can, it seems, be separated with a certain degree of conditionality into two mutually complementary groups: age features of the psyche, and youth's social position in society.

In the first group, maximalism, emotional instability and heightened excitability, the often incomplete nature of formation of a system for psychological self-control, the sublimation of sexual energy into energy of aggression (it has been somewhat unacceptable for us to speak of this), higher suggestibility, and susceptibility to emotional infection are inherent in youth. In general, a large (compared to adults) share of the unconscious psychological reactions in the overall structure of the youth psyche and the low level of formation of conscious functions (control, assessment, self-assessment) lead to the fact that youth are guided in their conduct by the "principle of satisfaction," rather than the "principle of reality," and this often leads to exaggerated, unrealistic

requirements and a lack of desire to take existing circumstances into account. The enumerated features contribute to the fact that youth are greatly subject to the influence of a crowd, and that young people are easier to manipulate.

In the second group, there is low social and economic status. The earnings of young people are lower on the average throughout the country; millions of young families stand in line for housing and to get places in kindergartens and nursery schools. The list of the problems of youth, unfortunately, is far from exhausted by this. The situation is intensified by the economic difficulties being endured by the country. Hence, the psychological discomfort, uncertainty, and aggressiveness. In particular, mass unemployment among youth was a factor that has aggravated the situation in Fergan Oblast.

An important psychological element is the aspiration of youth to realize themselves, to find their place in a complex surrounding world. Therefore, for many young people, ethnic and nationalistic movements may represent a fortunate new opportunity for self-realization, particularly during the crisis which the Komsomol is undergoing.

Difficulties in evaluating events, an unstable social and material status, the absence of clear prospects, conflict of motives, a break in one's former system of values or stereotypes—any of these factors is enough to elicit aggression, both socially, as well as ethnically oriented. Yet, after all, the whole set of these factors acts on a person simultaneously! Disruptions are practically inevitable. Such is the objective reality of our day. The bodies of state power and administration must not fail to take this into account.

The essence of the current situation may be explained with the help of the well-known concept of "bifurcation." The specific features of systems and the laws of their development determine the branches for further evolution. Along these branches, development is also implemented by way of a gradual change in the system's parameters. However, when an evolving system comes across an intersection of branches—a point of bifurcation—it becomes unstable. The choice of direction for its further development at this time may be determined as a result of the most insignificant, incidental influence. Under conditions of potential stress, the reaction to the initiating event is usually exaggerated (let us recall, for example, the reaction to removing D.A. Kunayev from the post of first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee), and would not have happened under other circumstances. The intensity of conflict grows in a geometric progression, and over a relatively brief period a conflict can achieve frightening sharpness: outwardly, everything is calm and then suddenly—a tornado.

The mechanism for kindling interethnic dissension is fairly simple. As a rule, corrupted persons, fearing exposure and counting on surviving in the confusion of

interethnic strife, act as initiators. Sometimes, local authorities use such a method to keep their chairs, speculating on ethnic problems and stirring up the native population against ethnic minorities. In provoking interethnic conflict, the forces interested in it refer to real problems and difficulties. However, their reasons are interpreted distortedly and the representatives of the nation against whom they wish to set the crowd are blamed for everything; at the same time, rumors are conceived and spread which defame the "enemy," and dozens of "witnesses" and "victims" appear. The unification of a real problem with the fictitious "faults" of various ethnic "enemies" gives the whole set of accusations psychological authenticity. In the final stage of many interethnic conflicts which have occurred in recent times, besides psychological preparation, the organizers have used alcohol and narcotics.

Since ethnic conflicts spread according to the principle of a chain reaction (i.e., a positive functional feedback exists: the longer the conflict continues, the more strongly it develops), it is very important to take steps at the stage of origin, at the very beginning of a conflict, in a timely manner. Overlooking the moment means having to deal not only with a conflict, but also its consequences, and they may end up being far broader and more tragic.

A spontaneous lessening of social tension is rarely achieved without the participation of extremist forces. Extremism, including ethnic, like any social phenomenon, has its own social and gnosiological roots. A cultural and psychological tradition exists, going back to V.I.S. Solovyev, which lies in the search for earthly perfection, in the desire to justify belief by actions or by change of that which N.A. Berdyayev later called world objective reality. He noted the contradiction "between this hope and reality, full of disillusionments,... in which life is damaged," and made a decisive choice in favor of hope and the ideal. This humanistic tradition, strange though it may be, leads to maximalism, the unacceptance of the realities of life with its inevitable compromises, and an unrealizable desire to liken real life to an ideal. In this regard, demands are advanced for rapid, radical changes without considering the historical situation. This tradition, in a transformed form, can also be traced in the Soviet period. We are obliged by numerous troubles in the history of the country to aspire to create, at any price, an absolute kingdom of Good, united with the pathos of society's revolutionary transformations. As a result, there are attempts to fit the entire diversity of life into an *a priori* system, to adjust life to ideals and to pass off the desirable as the real. Such maximalist approaches to the ethnic question or in interethnic relations (everyone is an internationalist, everyone is for the convergence and confluence of nations), as a rule, give rise to extremism. The more so, since we lack a culture of compromises.

The critical period in which we find our society is characterized by a considerable asymmetry between political freedoms and the economic situation. The

unbalanced nature of different structures means instability of the system, and it no longer works as a unified whole. The regulating mechanisms are being broken, the sphere for using the former repressive bureaucratic methods has reduced, but new, democratic methods have still not been perfected and function poorly. This situation creates a feeling of uncertainty and confusion in the masses. Former stereotypes are being broken, but new ones, as a rule, have not yet been formulated or conflict with the old ones. A person, unestablished in a world which has become incomprehensible to him, enters a state of concealed aggression, which becomes evident with even an insignificant provoking event.

Previously, for example, the representatives of the native nationality in one or another union republic knew that they had an open or hidden advantage over the others (acceptance for jobs and schools, promotion at work, etc.); a double-standard was cultivated. The changes that occurred in cadre policy (a requirement to promote people according to practical qualities) evokes resistance in many, and in a number of cases even talk of "domination by outsiders." The psychological unwillingness to accept a change in the double-standard may engender, in persons of the native nationality, a feeling of infringement, of unfair insult, and may be implemented in aggressive behavior.

In general, mass disillusionment with the development of social processes can serve as a source for various kinds of extremism, including ethnic. Moods, as a rule, change according to a sinusoid: after raising hopes and expectations for favorable changes, a drop inevitably follows if expectations are delayed. This is also happening now: after exaggerated expectations at the start of restructuring, disillusionment, evoked primarily by economic disorders, have set in among a certain part of the population. In the period of raising public moods contradictory results (something achieved, something not achieved) are assessed, as a rule, positively. During a decline in public moods, such results are usually evaluated negatively.

The transition from an administrative system to a democratic one is also implemented through the mastery of the psychological mechanisms of a person's behavior and influences on it. Let us cite only a few of them.

**The opportunity to control the situation.** A psychological experiment described by T. Peters and R. Waterman attests to its role. Several complex puzzles and tedious proof-reading work were presented to two groups of people being tested. A rather loud, distracting, and unpleasant noise carried up from the depths of the building. One group was simply told to work on the assignment. Experiment participants in the other group were shown a button, by pressing on which it was possible to cut off the noise. The group with the switch solved more puzzles by a factor of five and made an insignificant number of mistakes in proof-reading. However, here is the paradox: not one of the people being tested used the switch even once. Thus, merely the

knowledge that it was possible to control the situation was important. This experiment serves as a psychological basis for the need to expand democratic rights and possibilities for independent decision making by people in any sphere and in ethnic issues as well. The opportunity to control the situation, combined with a feeling of personal responsibility for that which occurs, will contribute to normalizing the situation and to a sharp reduction in excesses on an ethnic and other basis. Consequently, raising the independence of ethnic regions (regional cost-accounting), ethnic and cultural identification, and equal rights beyond dependence on ethnicity will, in our opinion, contribute to improving interethnic relations. This is the best prevention for ethnic conflicts but, alas, not so much today, as much as tomorrow, when the culture of human interaction is raised.

**Resistance to compulsion.** One of the distinctive features of our society is the fact that people, tired of many years without glasnost and, for the first time, having received a real, but undecidable freedom of choice, are reacting very painfully to all manifestations of compulsion. Yet, in the ethnic sphere, prohibitions and compulsion as methods for solving a problem are even less capable of giving positive results. Therefore, the teaching of ethnic languages, the forms and methods of their teaching, the use of ethnic symbolism, preservation of ethnic traditions, creation of ethnic societies and ethnic-cultural centers and other aspects of ethnic development should, as is now acceptable, be determined democratically.

**Effect of an attentive attitude.** In psychology, the so-called "Horton Effect" is well-known, obtained in experiments by E. Mayo at the "Western Electric" Company in the United States. At the beginning of the experiment, E. Mayo proceeded from the fact that labor productivity depends exclusively on the state of labor conditions. They improved one of the factors, illumination, and productivity increased noticeably. Later, when the experimenter was ready to study another factor, he returned the illumination to its previous level. However, labor productivity increased again. This gave grounds to conclude that the main influence lies not so much in the conditions of work in and of themselves, so much as in attention to people. Naturally, in an administrative-bureaucratic system the operation of the "effect of an attentive attitude" has the opposite sign. It is very hard to change a "minus" sign to a "plus," even with great desire: the habits of an indifferent bureaucratic attitude toward people and toward work are so corrosive. If a problem exists, discussions are held concerning it, and yet no movement is made toward its solution, this kind of attention (and right now there is a great deal of it) carries a negative psychological charge. Without proper consideration, without conscious use of psychological factors for organizing society's life and ethnic relations, many of its problems will be either unresolved, or resolved through conflict.

Restructuring has sharply raised the political activeness of the masses. Everyone must, so to speak, take lessons in

democracy. Yet, this also presumes mastering knowledge of the behavior of a person and the masses, so that not just the dramatic and tragic consequences of events will warn the participants in social and interethnic interaction away from decisive administrative, forcible pressure on the "opponent." Whereas previously the authorities had abused this method, democratization has now made it accessible to everyone, which has led to an increased frequency in conflicts under conditions in which a law-governed state, a law-governed culture of society are still undeveloped.

Practical consideration of the psychological components of ethnic relations is introducing a necessary link, so lacking in the past, into the implementation of the CPSU's ethnic policy. The "profound respect for the ethnic feelings of every people," of which the CPSU platform "Ethnic Policy of the Party Under Contemporary Conditions" speaks, is required not only from the mass information media and state and party agencies, but also from the peoples themselves, from every person: the sphere of ethnic feelings is very fragile, and it is hard and slow to heal from intentionally or carelessly inflicted wounds.

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### The Shadow Economy: Realistic Assessment

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[Article by Sergey Dmitriyevich Golovnin, candidate of economic sciences, and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shokhin, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] To judge by newspaper articles over the last one and a half years, perhaps, not a single economic process is developing as tempestuously and rapidly as the shadow economy. The dynamic is truly stunning. In August 1988, the newspaper TRUD made an estimate of 70-90 billion rubles. The next spring, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI raised the scale of the shadow economy to 100-150 billion rubles. By summer, the estimates had more than doubled: the capital of the shadow economy had reached, according to data of the same MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 200-240 billion rubles, and ARGUMENTY I FAKTY defined the size of its "budget" as 300-350 billion rubles. By the end of the year, the capital of this sphere of activity had already reached 500 billion rubles (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA). Of course, the data from the USSR Minister of Finances, V.S. Pavlov—30 billion rubles (by the way, this value was circulating in scientific circles back in the early 1980s)—or USSR Goskomstat's official estimates of the amount of unearned income (5.1 billion rubles), lose out against this background.

With such a dynamic of the shadow economy, it seems obvious to conclude a rapidly growing number of underground millionaires, enriching themselves by way of a

knowingly criminal path. They have already been counted, and it seems there are many: 100,000-150,000 people.

How do these figures arise? Can they be trusted? These questions are not at all idle, for today these data are being used ever more actively as a weighty argument in debates on the national economy's paths of development. If we believe that a tempestuous growth of the shadow economy coincided with the period of development of market relations, with the formation of independent economic structures (cooperatives, leasing, joint stock enterprises), etc., it means that they are the reason feeding the shadow economy and create favorable conditions for the legalization and laundering of "dirty" money. Hence, the demand for a correction in the course toward radical economic reform, since "marketization" of the economy leads to a growth in capitalism and legal seizure of economic power by the mafia.

While not denying the existence and even the increasing activity of the shadow economy, or a strengthening of income-property differentiation in society in recent years, let us suppose that, along with this, we must nonetheless treat the figures and data in the pages of the central press more responsibly. From the school classes in literature, we all understand the characteristic of Gogol's Khlestakov: "An uncommon lightness of thought." Right now, a similar lightness has appeared among many economists in their quantitative estimates and measurements: one or another figure that appeared one day begins, like a snowball, to grow, up to sizes corresponding to the author's goals.

Estimates of the shadow economy are especially "lucky" in this regard: They have a number of authors (every article is accompanied with a remark "by our estimates..." or "I think..."). However, bold declarations, unfortunately, are very rarely accompanied by a description of the methodology on the basis of which these estimates were obtained. However, this is not all. Confusion of concepts is nearly always permitted. A whole swarm of terms are now being used to describe the shadow economy: its capital, budget, the incomes of mafioso business undertakings, turnover, etc., etc., are being estimated. Yet, these categories are almost never defined. At the same time, it is understood that the volumes of commodity-material values, involved and used in shadow circulation, should be separated from the capital of the shadow economy ("payment for labor" enters here) and from the incomes of people engaged in this sphere.

Also, the fact that the shadow economy is not at all one and the same as criminal activity is not taken into account. Specialists should know and explain this, since in the mass consciousness the shadow economy is associated almost synonymously with the machinations of the mafia. In such a situation, the line between scientific analysis and similar-looking arguments is shaky. One cannot help but recall Goethe's Mephistopheles: "As soon as a shortcoming occurs in concepts, they can be

changed with a word." So this does not happen, let us define the concept of "shadow economy" itself.

The shadow economy, in our view, is the sum total of uncounted, unregulated (as opposed to established in the standard documents and rules of economic management), and illegal forms of economic activity. In its contemporary form, it was directly caused by the command-administrative system and is a direct continuation of its characteristic features: rigid centralization of planning and rationed distribution of resources, the predominance of power motivations in the management system, arbitrary methods for making decisions aimed at quantitative parameters, hierarchical criteria for evaluating leading cadres, constant reproduction of equalization tendencies, etc. The structural elements of the shadow economy are an informal economy, the fictitious economy, the illegal part of the "second" economy, and the "black" economy.

The informal economy is closely tied to the implementation of personal power motivations in the administrative-command procedures for making plan and management decisions. Thus, the process of developing a plan in pre-reform economics was a *sui generis* "bargaining," the participants of which were the central economic agencies, sectorial ministries, associations, and enterprises. Part of this process was the formation of a plan arranged for all sides and the "winning" of resources. Such bargaining was implemented not on the basis of universal criteria (ability to pay, budget restrictions), but often proceeded from personal connections and subjective priorities.

Under these conditions, the mechanisms for intrapersonal hierarchical cooperation (to a certain extent constructive and inevitable in a command system of management) often form a favorable environment for economic crime.

The real functioning of economic mechanisms in the framework of the administrative-command system of management constantly reproduces the relations of the informal economy. The actual existence of a market for means of production, with their funded distribution, serves as an example. The shortage of certain centrally distributed resources and surpluses of others of their kind, found in the reserves of associations and enterprises, brings to life an unsanctioned commodity exchange among economic subjects. This commodity exchange makes it possible to avert the complete paralysis of production and, in addition, inevitably gives rise to enormous nonproduction outlays, bribery, extortion, and corruption.

The basis of the fictitious economy is the various figure-padding, violations of bookkeeping, and deviations from established norms and standards, enabling one to receive non-labor incomes. He who is even slightly familiar with economic realities knows that these phenomena are of a mass nature and most often are unrelated to organized

crime. Inalienable features of the administrative-command system, such as the diktat of the producer, a disproportion between supply and demand, and orientation of economic activity "toward the indicator" constantly give rise to these phenomena.

The "second" economy (here we will use the Hungarian definition) is usually understood to be all the forms of production activity that are conducted outside state or kolkhoz production—individual labor activity, small group industry (artels, small cooperatives).

Part of the "second" economy is legalized, registered and taxed. However, it does have elements of concealment from financial and control agencies, relating strictly to the shadow economy. Until recently, artificial prohibitions essentially forced the "second" economy into illegal forms. The passing of laws on individual labor activity and cooperatives led to a significant reduction in the illegal sector of the "second" economy (the number of those engaged in individual labor activity grew by a factor of 4, having comprised more than 700,000 people in 1989, and the number of cooperative workers exceeded 4.5 million people, working in more than 200,000 cooperatives).

However, of course, today the process of legalizing the "second" economy is far from finished. There are many obstacles on this path. These are the weakness of existing financial services, which encourages avoidance of taxes, the absence of a developed system of markets, which forces them to rely on illegal sources for resource supply, and excessive administrative regulation, including illegal. Lingering doubts in the long-term nature of the current state policy regarding individual labor activity and cooperatives seriously complicates the matter.

The "black" economy—illegal production activity in which sometimes entire enterprises or individual links of state enterprises become involved—is most closely related to economic crime. Its base, as a rule, is theft of socialist property. Precisely here, it is a matter of organized crime.

The most diverse interests are interwoven in the shadow economy. Essentially, many, if not the majority of us, participate in it to one extent or another, as we have tried to show above. Such involvement is not at all synonymous with the active participation of those who operate in the shadow economy on personal initiative. Moreover, there are no grounds for identifying the shadow economy with economic crime, and all participants in shadow economic relations, with criminals.

In real life, the results of the function of the shadow and the official economies are interwoven and it is virtually impossible to separate them without special methods for verifying the authenticity of information on economic processes.

We shall attempt to evaluate separate types of shadow economic activity, having briefly set forth the methodology on the basis of which such estimates are obtained.

Let us start by defining the volumes of the fictitious gross social product and the monetary incomes related to it. The irrational use of resources, reflected in the accounting system as nonproduction outlays and losses, comprised more than 29 billion rubles in 1988. In other words, the losses counted from economic mismanagement alone turned into fictitious gross social production in the indicated amount. However, real wages are paid for this "production" activity. Proceeding from the fact that the share of the wage fund in gross social production comprises about 18 percent, the value of such payments can be estimated at approximately 5.2 billion rubles for 1988.

Figure-padding in the amounts of work fulfilled at the enterprises which were checked makes up an average of 1-2 percent of the real volumes. Thus, in our gross social product, which exceeds 1,500 billion rubles, figure-padding can be estimated at 15-30 billion rubles, and payment of wages for fictitious work, accordingly, at 2.7-5.4 billion rubles.

Data on defective work and lowering the quality of consumer goods make it possible to obtain an average (weighted average according to their volumes) estimate of the volume of low-quality items as 7.2 percent of commodity circulation, or about 26.4 billion rubles. Approximately 4.8 billion rubles in wages are paid for the output of such production annually. If we apply this estimate (due to unavailability of other data) to the output of industrial and technical items as well, the volume of all low-quality production and goods is 109.8 billion rubles, and payment of wages for defective work is, correspondingly, about 19.8 billion rubles.

Soviet criminologists and law enforcement agencies make a sufficiently realistic assessment of damage from various types of crimes. We will not stop at only one method for determining the possible damage from concealed thefts. According to USSR Goskomstat data, shortages and thefts amounting to 439.2 million rubles in 1988 were attributed to culprits, including court-verified theft in shortages amounting to 17.3 million rubles, or 3.9 percent of the total sum. At the same time, the law enforcement agencies have exposed thefts, committed by way of appropriation, embezzlement or abuse of official position, robbery, and petty thefts of state and public property amounting to 159.9 million rubles, i.e., 142.6 million rubles (159.9 minus 17.3) characterize the damage from concealed thefts that do not form shortages. Given the conditional nature of such an assumption, we can presume that this also makes up about 4 percent of concealed shortages which have specific culprits. Thus, the latter are estimated at 3.7 billion rubles. Moreover, 1.5 billion rubles in shortages and damage of valuables is written off, beyond the norms for natural loss, as production outlays (handling expenses), with an absence of culprits. Thus, the sum of damage from possible thefts can be estimated at 5.2 billion rubles. An important source of thefts is also the illegal write-off of shortages as natural loss.

According to Gostorginspeksiya data, 30 of every 100 consumers are cheated, and on the average the cheating amounts to about 10-20 kopeks for a single purchase. In the country, 146-164 billion purchases are made annually. Consequently, the amounts of cheating may be 4.4-9.8 billion rubles per year.

A significant quantity of goods entering the trade network is distributed among acquaintances, often falling into the hands of speculators. Thus, in the first half of 1989, the USSR MVD, jointly with worker's and people's control, tested 160,000 retail trade and public catering enterprises. At one-third of them, violations of the law were exposed, including goods hidden from sale amounting to 35 billion rubles. If these indicators are applied in calculations for the year for all trade and public catering enterprises (one-third of almost 1.1 million units), we obtain a volume of goods hidden from open sale amounting to about 0.5 billion rubles. If we take into account that scarce items are received for sale, all the same, at least once a month, and that the tests were not total in nature, the indicated sums may then justifiably be increased by a factor of 12, i.e., goods on the order of 6 billion rubles are concealed from sale and received by "needy" people.

Here are some estimates of the sizes of a number of shadow economic processes, which, even if with a minimal measure of authenticity, can be made proceeding from existing statistical data and materials from selected studies.

Is it possible to estimate the scale of the shadow economy on the whole, taking the above into account? The mechanical addition of the listed sources of unearned wages and direct thefts would give a sum of several tens of billions of rubles, which, it would seem, confirms the estimates used by a number of authors, who see the main cause of our economic difficulties in the shadow economy. However, we cannot mechanically add them up. Analysis of the sources of "shadow" incomes refutes the concept of these authors. Firstly, it is obvious that a large part of these incomes come into the hands of workers and employees of state enterprises, is used for consumption, and does not become capital for underground business. We know very little about this capital, which unquestionable exists. Secondly, the shadow economy, as a result of studying its genuine component parts is not only, and not so much a cause, so much as the consequence of deformations in the legal planned economy. It is only proper to join with figures that which is joined by socioeconomic content. Due to the heterogeneity of the elements of the shadow economy, their summation does not give grounds for any serious conclusions whatsoever about processes occurring in the national economy and, therefore, is suitable only for frightening people with the horrors of the mafia. Global estimates can only be made with highly conditional assumptions, and must be used extremely cautiously.

Let us seek corroboration in Western studies in the field of the shadow economy. Regardless of the diversity of approaches here, the conditional nature of estimates is clear. Judge these approaches for yourselves:

The "monetaristic" approach, in which an estimate is made proceeding from the volumes of monetary resources, circulating in the sphere of the shadow economy. The starting point is the assumption that payments are made and accounts settled in cash in the shadow economy. Here, the center of attention is taken by the correlation between the volumes of cash and bank deposits on demand, the share of bank notes with high face-value in the overall volume of monetary circulation, the correlation between the volumes of cash in circulation and the overall value of current accounts in monetary expression, as well as the change in the level of taxation and shifts in the share of cash in circulation. The main difficulty: to this day, no one has managed to reveal the intensity of circulation with the illegal component of monetary circulation related to the shadow economy.

The "Palermo" approach is based on inter-regional or inter-city comparisons (by regression analysis methods) of actual consumption with the value of declared income. The gap between these amounts in "Palermo," which is taken as the place with the most widespread shadow economy, will be large no matter where. By comparing the value of the gap in "Palermo" to its sizes in "cleaner" regions, one obtains an approximate estimate of income from the shadow economy ("black" additional product). Then, its average value is taken, and on its basis an estimate is made for the country on the whole.

The "labor" approach: the number of people employed in the shadow economy is estimated. Specific levels of unemployment are compared to the averages for the country and the region. Factors which influence the value of the first, but are clearly unrelated to the functioning of the shadow economy, are eliminated.

The "sociological" approach is based on clarifying the situation with the help of surveys of people, related or in a position to be related to the shadow economy.

The "sectorial" approach proceeds from the hypothesis that the investment of certain sectors in the shadow economy (construction, production of narcotics, underground distillation, repair, etc.) is significantly higher than all the rest. It presumes to estimate only these and, having added the approximate balance going into other sectors, determine the size of the "black" profit.

As we see, even a brief description of foreign approaches to the quantitative assessment of the shadow economy attests to the limited authenticity of the results obtained on their basis, and to the presence of a number of assumptions. Therefore, the incoherence of such results is not accidentally large: the shadow economy in Western countries comprises, according to various estimates, from 5 to 30 percent of the gross national product. One

thing is interesting: Western specialists consider such variation natural, given the absence of reliable and accurate methods for estimating the shadow sector. This cannot be said about domestic studies: they try to stun people with an "accurate" and incommensurately high figure. Yet, it is not complex to obtain one. Here is one of the methods (methodologically, it is sufficiently complete, at least compared to many others, which lack even a mention of methodology). This method is aimed at estimating the monetary resources of the population which have settled into the depths of the shadow economy along the channels of shadow ("black") consumer markets. The dependence is analyzed between the dynamics and structure of the population's monetary savings and the process of spontaneous, uncontrollable redistribution of incomes. The scales of the latter are determined by estimating the so-called surplus monetary savings of the population ("hot" money), corrected by the value of obvious unsatisfied demand. A fairly large number of methods for estimating surplus savings exists. According to a method developed by one of the authors of this article, the volume of surplus savings can be estimated at a level of 200 billion rubles (this estimate has become the most popular and reproduced today). According to USSR Goskomstat data, obvious unsatisfied demand for goods and services was 70 billion rubles in 1989. If we compare about 200 billion rubles of surplus savings and the 70 billion in obvious unsatisfied demand, it can then be assumed that the 130 billion ruble difference no longer reflects the population's unsatisfied demand. From here, it is only one step to proclaiming this sum the volume of the shadow economy.

However, are there grounds for such a conclusion? At least three circumstances force us to caution against hasty conclusions. The first is the "tolerance" in quantitative estimates of surplus savings and the obvious unsatisfied demand. Other methods exist for estimating surplus, forced savings. According to some of them, their volume comprises on the order of 150 billion rubles. The official estimates of obvious unsatisfied demand also behave dynamically: at the end of 1989, its value "rolled over" the boundary to 165 billion rubles. If we compare these values, no shadow circulation whatsoever is seen in the consumer sector. So, before making the corresponding conclusions, we must carefully study all methods and determine their reliability, authenticity and comparability. Moreover, the speed of circulation of money in the shadow economy remains unknown (we need not prove that calculation of this parameter could lead to multiple differences in estimates of the scales of the shadow economy).

Finally, the "black" market leads to increasing the real prices of purchases, and thus, also to a growth in normal savings, serving the expenses of the population. "Hot" money and savings are not separated by the Great Wall of China, and it is extremely hard to realistically evaluate the process of transformation of forced accumulations, created by unsatisfied demand, into long-term savings. The above methods do not consider all these facts, which

mean that they increase the amount of surplus savings and, thus, of the shadow economy. So, we wanted to surprise readers with a reliable and highly impressive estimate of the shadow economy. However ("lead us not into temptation, but free us from evil") we must be satisfied with that which is. Yet, a very complex socio-economic phenomenon exists and there is a need for its careful scientific analysis and evaluation.

We want to be understood correctly. The shadow economy, unfortunately, had become a reality (and highly marked) of our life, and it would be short-sighted to underestimate its scales. Nonetheless, we must clearly distinguish between the struggle against manifestations of the shadow economy, a leading place in which should be held by intensification of reform, and the gain of political capital for frightening society.

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#### A 'Civilized Dealer' Among Us. On Restructuring Economic Priorities

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[Article by Viktor Aleksandrovich Volkonskiy, laboratory chief, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Economics and Forecasting Scientific and Technical Progress, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Restructuring long ago became imminent in our society. This is true. Yet, at the same time society has turned out to be unprepared for a sharp turn. This concerns not only the restructuring of the economic and political system, but also profound ideological, as well as sociopsychological premises, which often seem either obvious or are not at all consciously recognized, from which we proceed in our actions and assessments. One of these "obvious truths" is the concept that the main thing is to produce a product. Distributing (selling or dispensing) and consuming it are an easy matter.

This "truth" of ordinary consciousness, sanctified by the dogmatically interpreted theory of productive and non-productive labor, was also supported here by official ideology, which to this day believes that the national product is created only in the sphere of material production, and employees in the nonproduction sphere live, consequently, at the expense of redistributing the wealth created by workers and peasants.

Discussions on this subject have been going on for a long time in our economic press. The complete scientific groundlessness of this theory has been brought to light. It is not worth raising these questions again. However, today they have acquired a new, acutely topical significance, since it is becoming ever more obvious that only a truly radical change in all economic relations can prevent the crawl of our economy toward collapse. A

"partial improvement" of economic life without a radical change in its mechanisms leads to the cultivation and intensification of economic and social conflicts, not to their resolution.

It is now finally commonly recognized that the economy should be regulated by the market. But what is the market? It is a definite type of economic activity, precisely intermediary activity. Here is what becomes clear: this activity is literally crushed here. Whereas in terms of the level of production per capita we lag behind the U.S. by a factor of 2 or 3 (according to various estimates), in terms of the development of trade and credit-financing activity we lag, respectively, by factors of 6-9 and 18-27.

In 1985 incomes from trade, material and technical supply, and procurements comprised 46 billion rubles, from credit-financing activity and insurance—12.3 billion, with a gross national product (GNP) of 780 billion. In the U.S., the corresponding indicators were 735, 685, and 4,200 billion dollars. As we see, not only the volumes of intermediary activity are incommensurate, but also their share in the national product (in the USSR—5.9 and 1.58 percent, and in the U.S.—17.5 and 16.3 percent). Perhaps the reason lies simply in our backwardness? Or, possibly, the volumes of activity themselves do not differ, for instance, the number of people employed in it does not differ, but only its social evaluation (assuming that our bank profits are far lower than in America)? No. We can take the share of those employed in intermediary activity and compare the USSR in 1985 with the U.S. in 1950 (in this regard, the levels of GNP per capita, according to estimates by several specialists, is comparable). In U.S. trade in 1950, 11.3 million people were employed, or 21.2 percent of all employees. In the corresponding sectors in the USSR in 1985, there were 10 million people, or 7.7 percent. In the United States in 1950, 2.8 percent of working people were involved in credit and financing activity and insurance, and in the USSR in 1985—0.9 percent. The difference in the overall volumes of trade activity even more strikingly characterizes the comparison of percentage level of trade additions (or reductions) in the price of goods in the USSR and in developed countries. Today in the USSR this level is about 7 percent, and in the U.S., about 40 percent.

The sphere of credit and financing activity in capitalist countries is distinguished by a significantly higher relative level of payment for labor than in the USSR. Whereas for them this level is substantially higher than on the average throughout the national economy, for us it is lower. In recent years, the salary of an economist in the rayon department of a bank was 120 per month, for a department chief—160, and for the head of the rayon department—240. Salaries in the financial system are about the same. In this regard, the average wage for a worker in industry in 1986 was 216 rubles, and in construction, 253 rubles. Twenty years ago, the average wage in the credit and financing sphere was almost equal to the wage of an industrial worker. Now, it is 15 percent less. Under such conditions, is it really possible to

involve a sufficient number of employees, capable of managing millions of rubles of state funds with initiative, honesty, and knowledge of the work? How should we view this discrimination against intermediary activity? Maybe this is our advantage over market countries: are we saving public funds, obstructing the development of a parasitic stratum in society? All our economic practice speaks against such an assumption.

The contemporary market is a very complex mechanism for revealing, cooperation, and coordination of economic interests, and is a most democratic mechanism, making it possible to involve all large, small and very small economic subjects in the management of social production. Let me illustrate the role of intermediary activity with the example of price setting. One of the striking differences between a market economy and our economy lies in the sharp differences in prices for identical or almost identical goods in different stores. If you ask in a small store for a certain kind of door lock, which customers no longer demand, the salesperson promises to obtain it and it will arrive in a week, but you have to pay a factor of 10 over its usual price. This is normal: one must know who might have or produce such an item, communicate with him, and track it down in a warehouse. This requires expenditure. For industry, such service may solve a most acute problem. Yet, economizing on service expresses itself in industry through a serious drop in quality and, finally, through expenditures an order greater.

Soviet economists have become accustomed to the traditional struggle of price-setting specialists for unified prices, to prove the irrationality of the existing system of prices, which offers one and the same materials and machines to agriculture at lower prices, than to industry, and differentiates the level of purchase prices for agricultural production according to zones, etc. Is the principle of uniform prices really wrong? Of course, it is right, but only when it is a question of centrally established prices.

What does the incoherence of prices (often several-fold) for one and the same item in different transactions or in different stores say? Above all, it says that the process of fumbling about for a balanced level of prices, for equalizing them with consideration of accompanying services and obvious and non-obvious benefits for producers and consumers, requires a great deal of time and constant efforts from an entire numerous army of employees in trade and other intermediary organizations, as well as of the producers and consumers themselves. This time the efforts are entirely commensurate with the outlays for industry itself. As the experience of our economy attests, their replacement with a routine, formal calculation of material and labor outlays leads to large losses and a drop in the efficiency of production and in the population's standard of living.

To the extent of development of a market economy, the role of the management system is inevitably concentrated in the intermediary links. At first, this is trade.

With the development of capitalism, the leading role transfers to banks and finance corporations. This is understandable: before producing something, one must determine what precisely to produce and for whom. These are the key questions. More often depends on their correct or incorrect answer, than on the workers' skills and diligence.

Under conditions of freedom of economic activity, to one or another extent all economic links are associated with the fulfillment of intermediary and management functions. In this regard, however, a division of labor occurs. Information about the state of affairs and experience in evaluating it, to a significant extent, are concentrated in the intermediary links. This information work is formalized and is becoming routine. The concept that virtually all economic management reduces to such routine operations is a mistake that everyone shared until 1921.

Meanwhile, trade or credit and financing activity also presumes knowing how to forecast the situation, depending on many factors, how to notice in time and decisively react to changes in the situation, and knowing how to establish human contacts. Underestimation of the creative, conscious element in intermediary activity was an important precondition for creating the total administrative management of the economy in the early 1930s. One of the tasks of the administrative-command system was to "correct" the economic proportions which form in a market economy.

These concepts re-emerged in the 1960s in the idea of achieving the optimum centralized management of the economy using a network of computers and optimization models. Of course, the basic developers of the theory of optimal functioning of the economy had always related it to expanding the independence of economic agents, to reinforcing their interests and responsibilities, and to a market mechanism. However, optimization theory in itself gives grounds for a bureaucratic interpretation, since a choice of already-formed alternatives takes the center of attention. Meanwhile, it is precisely the discovery of new possibilities, obtaining trustworthy information about them, and the exposure of interests which are of basic significance and represent the greatest difficulty.

The administrative system, realizing or "sensing" that economic power in society is concentrated, basically, in the representatives of intermediary activity, declared precisely this activity the exclusive domain of central state agencies.

Direct relations between the producer and the consumer were broken. Between them, the planner appeared, i.e., a bureaucrat, not bearing material responsibility himself, like a trader or banker, but to make up for it, providing the administrative system with reliable tools (the plan and funded distribution) for preserving its leading position with respect to enterprises. Independent commodity exchange operations, besides the state system of material

and technical supply, and deviations from centrally established prices were declared serious crimes, and violation of the administrative system's monopoly on distribution of consumer goods—speculation. Buying an item where it is cheap and selling it where it is especially needed and, therefore, expensive is an activity which, in European countries, has always been valued as one of the most respected. Only in critical moments of history (usually during a war or immediately after one) was the state forced to distribute scarce resources through extra-market methods. Then, violation of the state's monopoly was condemned as speculation.

Only lawful, legal, registered intermediary activity is approved by society. Unlawful forms of it are condemned and prohibited by society in any market system as "shadow" activity. Essentially, this refers to the recently passed USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, forbidding the trade and purchasing activity of cooperatives as unlawful and uncivilized.

The ideology for discrediting intermediary activity has an ages-old tradition proceeding from Eastern despotism. Such activity made the economy independent of the state and, therefore, was considered a force which undermined state power. In the ideology of Ancient China, where the state claimed the role of universal regulator of public life, a system of rank was formed, according to which traders held one of the last places, after bureaucrats, warriors, and farmers. This tradition is still strong today. G. Myurdal, for example, notes that in Southeast Asian countries all the best "human material" by tradition is drawn out of business and into the bureaucratic apparatus.

In democratic countries, there is a clear division between the role and functions of economic subjects, whose purpose is economic gain, and of state bureaucrats, whose function is to control the conditions, the "rules of the game," under which the activity of the economic subjects develops.

Since virtually our entire economy is state, there is no such division. This leads to the fact that all state employees who manage the economy behave like market agents, and the planning system takes up the functions of coordinating economic interests. The processes of compiling a plan and distributing resources are converted into something resembling an undeveloped market, in which a universal equivalent, money, has not yet appeared. Here, besides material resources, assignments and limits act as objects of exchange; official money is only one of the conditions of each transaction and is far from the main object of the parties' interest. It is clear that the efficiency of such an undeveloped exchange system is very low. In order to convert it into a modern market, the employees need quite different skills.

Our social consciousness deems natural the high wage rates for workers whose labor relates to high skill or great responsibility. However, social awareness does not apply the need for direct connection of payment for labor with

its results to administrative and intermediary labor, where the results (and losses) can exceed the results of a worker's labor by a factor of hundreds and thousands. The average wages for employees of the state apparatus and economic administration in 1987 was 187 rubles per month.

We well know what this stubborn discrimination against administrative and intermediary labor leads to: compensation for these disproportions by way of the steady expansion of legal and illegal forms of redistribution. These are the various advantages and privileges, bribe-taking, distribution among friends, thefts in small and large amounts and, in recent decades, also the appearance of a widespread network of organized crime, uniting criminal elements, trade employees, and managers.

Right now, although the need to convert to market conditions has already been recognized, re-interpretation of the place and role of intermediary activity is perceived by social consciousness with the greatest difficulty. Even from economists, one can often hear: "The main thing is to produce output; distributing it is not a complex matter." About the cooperative worker who, without violating any laws whatsoever, earned 50,000 or 100,000 rubles a year, they disdainfully say: "Speculator! After all, he has produced nothing!" Understandably, these same words, addressed to law breakers, are entirely justified.

The Russian intelligentsia has always had strong anti-bourgeois attitudes. We do not like those who enrich themselves. The state should become wealthy, not its citizens. In Russia, as well as in Southeast Asian countries, far from the best "human material" went into trade. Lenin's boldness and authority were needed in 1921, in order to tell the society's revolutionary elite, accustomed to winning thanks to their heroism and military discipline: "Learn to trade!"

Today, the traditional "anti-bourgeois" mood is reinforced by several objective circumstances. In the West, a store where one is guaranteed to be able to buy everything one needs and supply oneself for a week in 10 minutes, or the bank that takes upon itself all concerns for your accounts with suppliers, receive high incomes. In other words, their incomes are justified by the quality of the services that they offer.

Under our conditions (state-established discount prices, bans and restrictions and, mainly, universal shortages and scarcity of goods and services), cooperative workers do not at all have to expend efforts to ensure quality of service in order to receive high incomes. It is simplest to purchase goods at low state prices and to sell at free (cooperative) prices, after only slightly processing them, in order to avoid the charge of speculation. Or to use the sharp differences between prices within the country and abroad.

However, we must not blame cooperative workers for this. They are not philanthropists. Their function is to

find the most profitable spheres for applying their strengths and resources. The state's function is to regulate this activity and even prohibit those forms of it which are unlawful in nature.

The fact that, under the existing conditions, individual links of state trade are becoming a material base for organized crime and corruption on the part of employees of the state and economic apparatus, is significantly more serious. This situation can be eliminated only by creating a full-fledged market, with the elimination of shortages and imbalances. However, in order for this to occur, we must maximally encourage trade and bank intermediaries, for they are the creators of a market. Without breaking the scornful attitude toward "dealers" and financiers, without starting to treat people who know how to "make money" with respect, we will not arrive at an efficient economy.

Conversion to the new quality of socialism requires not only the change of economic and political mechanisms, but also of our entire way of life, the criteria for evaluating a person's activity in society, an of basic ideological, value, and cultural stereotypes of behavior.

Whereas previously the situation in society was determined by status, by one's role in the state (official) hierarchy, and the criteria for success was approval by a higher authority, or to put it simply, by the leadership, now an objective economic assessment of the result of one's activity, the consumer's approval, should be the basis.

The field of independence, evaluation and reward, rights and responsibilities are determined not by the decisions of higher agencies, but by law, indifferent, impartial, and common for all. In the economic sphere, this means the definition and specification of ownership rights. A reform of ownership relations is topical both as one of the necessary prerequisites for converting to market mechanisms, as well as precisely as the creation of market subjects.

Strictly speaking, the formation of a market does not require converting from state to private or group ownership. In order to create a commodity market, it is sufficient to strengthen the enterprise's rights to the disposal of production, and in order to create a capital market—rights to the disposal of property.

Final control by the owner-state can be combined with the broad independence of enterprises or departments with regard to disposal and utilization, such that in a certain sense it is possible to consider precisely them the real owners, and the state—only a nominal owner.

The combination of owner, distributor, and user of property in one entity, in one collective, long ago went into the past throughout the world. Or more precisely, if it remains, it does so in the relations of small- and some medium-sized enterprises and farms. As far as large industrial corporations are concerned, here the functions of disposal of property, as a rule, are separated from its

use (i.e., from the direct producer). Dreams of combining them in the entity of a labor collective, it seems, remain a utopia. In particular, the experience of Yugoslavia attests to this, where the policy of turning direct producers into the subjects of expanded production was carried out most consistently, especially after the 1974 reform. Nevertheless, in the opinion of Yugoslav economists, in most cases the disposal of financial resources and the questions of expanding production are in the hands of administrative and technocratic groups in large associations, banks, and sociopolitical organizations.

Methods for control on the part of society, for integration of labor collectives and individual workers into a national economic production complex can and should be diverse. Under these conditions, the concept itself of public ownership can no longer serve as a sufficiently reliable criteria for distinguishing the socialist method of production and tendencies to deviate from it, its deformations, since this feature itself implies re-evaluation as applied to specific types of economic relations.

Is there a great difference between a state "lease" enterprise, enjoying complete independence in the formation of its production program and implementing production at contract prices and disposing of all cost-accounting income, and a cooperative, operating at state valuations and leasing its premises and equipment? What kind of enterprise should be considered "more socialist:" a cooperative that hires workers according to a labor agreement, or a family farm? In general, it is impossible to answer such questions without analyzing specific conditions in the national economy: to what extent are the rights of a state enterprise real, do hired workers participate in the cooperative's business, and how much is a farmer integrated into the system for social production?

In such a case, what will distinguish socialism from capitalism? We must turn to the goals of building a socialist society. The requirement of converting to public ownership from private was advanced as a way to build a more just, humane and effectively functioning society. Socialism should provide a high level of well-being, social justice, and social guarantees for the person. Apparently, every economic form should be rated from the viewpoint of achieving these goals.

The difficulties and complexities of restructuring push many into the search for a "class enemy." Here already, not in the "samizdat" book by M. Dzhilas, but in the journal NEVA (No 1, 1989), we read that the bureaucracy is a new class, and it is a question of depriving it of ruling positions. Why does such a simplistically Marxist formulation of the question which, incidentally, also closes with entirely practical measures of mechanical reduction in the number of state apparatus employees, elicit a chill reception from many intellectuals? Because it is perceived as a variation of the theme of "eliminating kulaks as a class." Yet, the main task of all thinking and honest adherents to restructuring lies in making this profound and very difficult change for society through

the least painful method. For heaven's sake, let us not start thinking now in the same categories as in the 1930s. Did the 20th century teach us anything after all?!

In my opinion, restructuring will occur the more calmly, wisely, and effectively, the more we succeed in not pushing capable and honest people out of the administrative apparatus, but, conversely, in making them its supporters, using their experience and skill. In short, having changed the goals and methods of activity of management employees, having transformed the administrative superstructure into a credit and financing superstructure.

Thus, changing the attitude toward intermediary activity (above all, in its civilized credit and financing form), and finding ways to "build" entrepreneurial motivations into the system of modernized socialism, is the imperative of the strategy and tactics of restructuring. On this path, we will experience the most acute shortage of skilled cadres, of contemporary legal norms and socioeconomic institutions, as well as a great many other things. We will encounter the misunderstanding and resistance of part of society. Possibly, not of its very worst part. We must be prepared for this. However, there is no other way (if we, of course, intend to go forward, and not backwards, sideways or in circles).

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### **Western Experience and the Danger of "Stalinism Upside-Down"**

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[Article by Theodore Shanin, professor at Manchester University]

[Text] The new economic mechanism being formed in the course of restructuring organically includes elements such as a market for commodities, capital investments, and securities, and other components of a market economy. These are all fairly well developed in world practice. Therefore, the increase in interest in the experience accumulated in this sphere by Western countries is natural. Various opinions are being expressed about the possibilities, conditions and results of its application in the Soviet economy. The editors wish to acquaint the readers with the viewpoint of the renowned English sociologist, T. Shanin on these problems:

In listening from the sidelines to debates on restructuring, one very soon begins to distinguish two things that seem more persistent than others: the choice of the right program for further development, in the first place, and the possibilities of using Western experience, forms, and methods of market economy, in the second. The significance and interrelation of these two these is obvious. A profound crisis is at hand in Soviet society. Its sources lie in the mistakes of the past. Therefore, the aspiration to find such a well-considered program which

would be definitive, error-free and desirably painless is understandable. In the industrialized West things turned out better. After all, the shelves of stores there are fuller, and most of the population lives better. It is proposed to adopt and include in the program for the future those elements that determined success in the West, but did not exist in the Soviet economy. Usually the "free market," unrestricted competition, is considered the main "lacking element."

Such a formulation of the question, in my view, blocks the path to understanding it. The facts say that Western Europe (and it is closer than other "Western" countries to the Soviet Union both in terms of the starting point for modern development—the ruins of 1945, and in terms of its goal—a "state of universal prosperity")—is a poor model for a "free market." In England, for example, the prices for milk are not at all the result of free play of market forces. They are set by the government, by the Commission on European Communities, and by national cartels. The construction of industrial enterprises and residential buildings is determined here (or in France, Holland and in other countries) by state laws and municipal decisions more so than by demand and the incomes of construction bureaus. The "free market" can be found in textbooks, written by monetarists, in the pre-election propaganda of the conservative parties, and does not exist "in nature" in Europe, but only in Paraguay and Chile. The successes and limits of our economic development in reality are determined by a combination of different economic and social forms and the means and principles for their implementation. Precisely the free development of combinations, i.e., flexibility of interrelations, the conversion from one form to another, gives strength to our economic system, not the supposedly unrestricted "free market" or other conclusions from the 19th century.

Erroneous concepts of the structure and functioning of Western systems are not at all without blame, when political decisions are made on their basis. Thus, the introduction of self-financing in scientific research institutions of the Soviet Union, i.e., subordinating them to the laws of the market, was reinforced by the erroneous example of the West and was an attempt to borrow corresponding experience. Yet, after all, our real experience attests to precisely the reverse—in Western Europe new things in large-scale science, as a rule, are created and, one would think, will continue to be created outside of market relations. In places where, as in the United States, the power of the market over science is stronger, ideas, methods and bright minds must always be brought in from outside. Our humanitarian sciences, which also develop outside the framework of market laws, have created and are creating these same minds, thanks to which Western Europe remains a leader both in terms of the quality of development of science, as well as in terms of the level of socioeconomic progress. The presence of such minds determines the quality both of social, as well

as of private life, which one cannot express in quantitative indicators, for example, the number of automobiles per capita.

Another mistake lies in the fact that people look at the economic structures of the West and the East through the prism of dualism: either the "state and plan," or "capitalism and the market."

In such an approach, economic forms which usually are called informal (I prefer to call them expolar structures) are left outside the field of view. These are the socioeconomic structures, in which the choice of strategies of production is determined not by the state, but also not by an indifferent "aspiration to maximize profits." They are noteworthy not for their sizes or the amount of income, but for the fact that they are carriers of the logic of preferential and optimal choice of forms of labor and income. ("Our" A. Chayanov and "our" K. Polani were the first to begin studying such structures, and their ideas became widespread among us and received further development). It is also a question of family-labor enterprises and inter-family labor, economic expression of "monopoly" on individual capabilities (a painter of designer, working for himself), the shadow economy, and "jobbers." Millions of families in Western Europe live and operate according to the laws of these socioeconomic structures, which to a large extent determine the high efficiency of our national economies. For many, such forms of labor are preferable, and therefore they abandon the "formal" economy of factories and institutions. Socioeconomic progress does not lead to the disappearance of expolar forms, but conversely, their scales grow and their influence strengthens. Without them, the picture of the modern Western world is inaccurate and the view of the future of Soviet society is unrealistic.

There is yet another factor, without which Soviet society's concept of our experience remains distorted. Decades of official falsehood have taught many in the Soviet Union to relate cynically to appeals to do voluntary and selfless acts in favor of other people or society on the whole, to altruism as a factor in socioeconomic development. The opinion that each looks only after himself, and fear of the authorities or sheer egotism are the only impetuses for action, existing both there, and here, is often passed off as realism. In fact, this is a utopia, although a dark one. The appeal to help starving Africans (outside the state and outside the market) gathered more funds here than the income of a dozen millionaires. The largest land-owner in England, being neither feudal, nor a powerful bank, is the National Trust, an organization created with the money of hundreds of thousands of simple people, who are buying the most beautiful regions of the country in order to protect them from the destructive actions of the construction business. Such a voluntary and independent organization, an association of consumers, is often stronger than mighty capitalist concerns, and can "beat" them in the market, forcing a change of programs and prices. Indeed, the numerous wealthy and not so wealthy patrons here

are creating various kinds of funds, paying for stipends, expeditions, exhibits and so forth, not just for the sake of obtaining income and self-advertisement. Time will prove that the disbelief and altruism of today's generation of Soviet citizens, at least, is unwarranted and harms the new political thinking, the development of plans and legislation.

So, to study the experience of other countries from the viewpoint of the tasks of restructuring is useful and necessary, but precisely to study, i.e., to look at it not through the pattern of Soviet or Western textbooks, but to take in the entire wealth of its diversity and contradictions.

However, nonetheless, in my opinion, the main weakness of the debates on restructuring lie not in the fact that certain elements of Western practice are misunderstood. It is of a general nature and is related to attempts to find an error-free program for further development. In such a search is the root of delusion and a testimony to the misunderstanding of that which must and should be learned from the West. It is a question of misunderstanding the overall nature of social structures for economic development, the value of the general methods and system. Marx once remarked that the traditions of dead generations weigh, like a nightmare, on the minds of the living. The search for an error-free plan as a way to overcome social crisis has its roots in the deepest layers of the Stalinist path. This is, in a certain sense "Stalinism upside-down," a Stalinism which ended up in the arsenal of the enemies of Stalinism, since they are trying to interpret the new using old categories.

If we compare the plans for development, which were drafted in the countries of West Europe in 1945-1980, to that which in fact occurred, above all, the mistakes made in plans are plain to see. Nevertheless, development on the whole was highly successful, and the results obtained are impressive. These unquestionable achievements are not the result of fulfilling a plan or of the fact that a pre-conceived plan was right from the start. It is not the result of the activity of a "outside the plan" free market. There were plans and they, of course, were implemented. However, it is important to note that they were implemented in part and with endless changes. The differences between the plans and reality were not accidental. The point is that in every plan for the development of social systems there are elements of unpredictability. This is related to the fact that every system consists of a set of elements in a dynamic, and the speeds of each of the elements are different and variable. Unpredictability is increased with the growth in the complexity of the scope and duration of programs. Under such conditions, if one adheres to plans dogmatically, the mistakes contained in them begin to have their own influence on the situation, rapidly intensifying difficulties. Even if the plan which was made gave the expected results, this would cause such transformations of the situation that it is no longer possible to follow the same path further. Modern mathematics and physics analyze similar situations with the help of the theory of nonlinear development and chaos

theory. In the social sciences, the complexity of such analysis increases, since the choices and errors made by the subjects of development have a powerful influence.

What were the general causes of West Europe's success in rising from the ruins and hunger of 1945 to its contemporary standard and quality of life? I think that they lie not in the accuracy of the plans that were made, nor in the spontaneity of development (i.e., not in the "freedom" of the market), but in comprehensive social systems for self-correction. Mistakes were endlessly corrected. This was done rapidly and efficiently. A mechanism for correcting mistakes and reacting to that which the state had not predicted, capitalist forms, and expolar economies, took the center of economic development. Most important was not the compilation of an error-free plan beforehand, but the presence of a social structure for economic leadership both "from above," as well as "from below" (and also an understanding of what political and administrative decisions can do, and what they cannot do). The value of Western experience for the supporters of restructuring lies precisely in this. Without taking this into account, it seems to me, it will be difficult to entirely overcome both the legacy of Stalinism, as well as the utopia of "Stalinism upside-down," according to which all problems can be solved using a new ("anti-Stalinist") program, later "pressuring" the executors for its fulfillment. The alternative to rapid and simple solutions are more difficult and slower, but to make up for it, there is greater realism in such an approach. Its essence lies in a new interpretation of the problems: less planning, more intelligent leadership, and the development of systems for self-correction.

In systems for correcting mistakes, two central elements interact: ideological and structural. The first is supported, above all, by the social cultivation of an ability to perceive phenomena in all their complexity and interaction, a readiness to live and work under conditions of unpredictability. This presumes a mistrust, deprived of all cynicism whatsoever, in "quick and easy" solutions, in super-plans, and an understanding that one needs not the focus of a magician, but improvement of the social system of leadership and personal behavior. This is also related to learning tolerance toward that which seems incorrect or excessively complex. Not just democracy and civility in personal relations lie in tolerance toward that which is not understood. It makes it possible to more rapidly spread the new and necessary and, consequently, is a way to accelerate real changes. Hostility toward the unexpected and unplanned destroys the sprouts of the future and, conversely, the greater the tolerance, the higher the social efficiency of rapidly changing societies.

Finally, in order to create the second structural element of social systems for correcting mistakes, the presence of democratic political systems, flexibility of economic organizations, freedom of choice for those who work and think, and the free movement of people, resources and ideas, are necessary. In this regard, it is also important that in the USSR a struggle is being thrust against the

bureaucracy, although this is inaccurate and often demagogic, and here there is also potential for mistakes of "Stalinism upside-down." I think that today you need not a struggle for annihilating the bureaucracy, but for a bureaucracy that knows how to work, is subject to public control, restricted by laws and not too ponderous, i.e., organized as a system for self-correction and included in a broader self-correcting political system.

The successes and failures of restructuring will be determined, in my view, by the development of an ability to listen, think, act and, over and over, correct the mistakes of restructuring, knowing that they will mandatorily exist and that they can be corrected. Apparently, it is necessary to focus greater efforts, than has been done before, on this and on forming social mechanisms for the correction of mistakes.

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## SPIRITUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

### Dance With Sabers in a Dark Room

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[Article by Nikolay Mironovich Keyzerov, doctor of philosophical sciences, Professor]

[Text] The film based on M. Bulgakov's story "Dog's Heart," which was shown on Central Television, triggered various reactions. Some praised the actors performing the main roles; others criticized improvisations and the liberty taken with many of the themes in the story; others again tried to link it to our time, without having an entirely clear idea how specifically to do this. One thing was unquestionable: the character of Sharikov clearly became a type of social character which generates different reactions, as N.V. Gogol pointed out. Gogol wrote that many ladies would say about the main character in "Dead Souls," "how repulsive!" An official would point to his neighbor at an acquaintance, saying "look, look, there goes Chichikov!" It is only those who think profoundly, in private, who would silently ask themselves the hard question: "But is there some feature of Chichikov's that I share with him?"

Sharikov is rude and simply loathsome and very negative. He represents a summed-up social connection, a social phenomenon similar to Oblomovism which we, who are neither members of the nobility nor serfs, try to eliminate in ourselves as intellectuals, workers and peasants. Sharikovism is a social trait. It is the opposite of civilization, embodying poverty of the spirit, a kind of beastly aggressiveness and ordinary swinishness. Above all, it is an impulsive primitive confrontational reaction to surroundings, an emotional-explosive model of behavior, not controlled by reason or social restraints.

A very indicative episode in the film is the one in which Sharikov-the man instinctively reacts to a cat the way a

dog would. He rushes at it, we hear the tinkle of broken glass and the din of falling objects. An entire philosophy and, frankly, a philosophy which is not entirely that of a dog, is revealed behind such a grotesque loaded action, as it does in other similar scenes.

V.I. Lenin accurately noted that the "zoological individualism" had already been restrained by the primitive herd and the primitive commune. The biological principle in man is controllable only as a result of socialization, of the development of the reasoning man converting from savagery to civilization. The significance and strength of the social regulators increase; the structure of social relations which appear in the course of evolution changes as well.

Historical experience in the development of society and culture proves the profound foundation of Marx's formula that "...man is not only a natural being but also a human natural being..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 42, p 164). To this day, however, we come across a variety of interpretations of the "call of the wild," found in the concepts of biopolitics and views on human behavior as resembling a "human zoo," in the spirit of social Darwinism, and considerations concerning the primary "genes of hostility and aggressiveness." In frequent cases such biologizing concepts are the result of prejudice and scientific misunderstanding.

Ethnographers were somewhat puzzled when archaeologists surprised them with the discovery in archaeological digs an extremely old human skull showing clearly man-made holes. The version that there had been wars since the very dawn of mankind became popular, although the explanation could be simpler. The point is that the cranial structure of primitive man indicated an insufficient development of the behavioral control centers. Our distant ancestors were not as yet ready to plan and implement a refined strategy of conducting a campaign against distant neighbors. However they could simply grab a piece of rock or a stick and hit a neighbor on the head so hard that not a finger but the whole fist of a curious scientist could pass through that hole tens of thousands of years later.

K. Marx traced the natural dynamics of social developments which prevailed over the instinctive-biological and spontaneous forces of the human universe throughout history. Conversely, Freud studied the magma of the subconscious, of borderline sociobiological conditions which influence individual life and behavior. We have become accustomed to dealing with verbs in the perfect mode: harnessed zoological and biological principles in man, educated individual of a new type, and so on. We forget, however, that every time and with every child the domination of the social over the biological must be recaptured, based on the social experience of mankind, for it is not transmitted genetically. "Man among wolves" becomes a wolf himself.

Frequently, breakthroughs of the biological syndrome in social and political life become catastrophic. As

described by his contemporaries, Ivan the Terrible, who was one of Stalin's favorite historical figures and whom he tried to emulate, had the trait that if greatly angered he became like a madman and "foamed like a horse." In terms of manic-aggressive behavioral syndrome, he could be considered as perfect predecessor of Sharikov had he not, in between delirious hallucinations, not run the state or engage in a rather active correspondence with the Prince Kurbksiy, who had escaped the royal wrath by fleeing to Lithuania.

We do not see an end of the controversy as to whether Ivan the Terrible was schizophrenic while Stalin was paranoiac and at what stage of the disease did they commit their various political actions. This argument is underproductive and leads us astray. Clearly, both were bloody tyrants. A tyrant is either an essentially sick person or a person who, sooner or later, becomes mentally ill in a sick society. Absolute power, not blocked and restrained by democratic institutions, becomes irresponsible and absolutely vicious and worse than even the most terrible paranoia, for it encompasses all social and spiritual diseases combined.

In his memoirs, Decembrist I.D. Yakushkin writes that during the parade in front of Emperor Aleksander I, who was on his horse, all of a sudden a muzhik ran across the street. Instantly, the emperor spurred his horse and rushed at the runner with a naked sword. The police immediately brought the man down with their sticks. I.D. Yakushkin wrote that this picture impressed him profoundly both for its dynamics and hidden meaning. He unwittingly remembered the story of the cat transformed into a beautiful woman who, in her new role, was unable to see the mouse. The social reflexes of the great of this world in terms of the "cat-mouse" or "cats and dogs" relationship are in the nature of an impulse.

Sociology and political studies study social phenomena which have nothing in common with biological motivations, not to mention zoology with its impulsive reduction of the simplest control centers and primitive animal-like reactions. Comparing the superior forms of social activities with the primitivism of the simplest quasibiological manifestations of life is the result of a disease of a special kind, which is unique in terms of its severe consequences.

Under the rule of bureaucratic structures and methods, the people thirst for simplicity and natural behavior. Here, apparently, we find one of the reasons for the frequently heard "cry from the heart:" "Why make things more complicated, we need simplicity, we need to solve everything in one fell swoop!" "What is the purpose of amending the laws, why not promulgate a good ukase immediately?" "Put an end to such considerations, dialogues, agreements, formulas, etc." How in this case not to recall the Russian saying that simplicity is worse than theft. The primitivism of reactions and the desire for a simplified variant of a decision are not all that harmless.

Impulsive reactions to the solution of vitally important problems, from my viewpoint, are today inadmissible in a highly organized society.

There is yet another threat. Many managers complain that they are "involved in current affairs," that they are "besieged by papers which demand an action" in essence, but that they lack the necessary time or, briefly, that "they have no time to think." They are forced to plug one hole or another, to unravel bottlenecks, systematically to move numerous levers in an increasingly dangerous situation. The interpretation of such actions on some levels of management of the country is increasingly beginning to be reduced to an alarming minimum. The share of sensible principles is catastrophically diminishing, taking place under conditions of a steady emotional drain and it is no accident that those involved in a project eventually "collapse," and that managers and executors "break down" psychologically and morally. Under such circumstances the thoughtful and sensible discussion of all aspects of the problem by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet are an imperative of the situation and the times, as well as a hope that weighed resolutions and laws can be passed.

Increased stress in our speech has become a kind of civic virtue. Foreign tourists have noted that there is a great deal of shouting in our country. The style of oratorial speeches is frequently such as to make us think that the Civil War has still not ended and that somewhere under the rostrum or in the hall a stick of dynamite is about to explode. "Everywhere passions are seething...." The psychological atmosphere is restless, uptight and painful. It blocks change and triggers rejection and intolerance of anything new.

In the past, emotional stress under the conditions of practicing democracy by public meetings repeatedly highlighted the tendency to suppress rationality. This leads to sad results, particularly when fanatical ravings by people deprived of normal living conditions and subject to false stereotypes are deliberately and speculatively encouraged. The groping "pursuit" of the cat goes on. It is jokingly said that philosophers are engaged in looking for a black cat in a dark room, ignoring the seething passions, comparable to performing the famous "dance with sabers" in that same dark room, at an intensified pace, fierceness and range of sharp weapons.

Stalin sowed the "dragon's teeth" in his theory of the aggravation of the class struggle and total permissiveness for the sake of superior objectives and unleashed the bloody hysteria of terror. The world of blind groping passion is extremely primitive and the power of such passion is terrible. As we know, Lenin feared that a division within the party and a rivalry among its leadership would have dangerous consequences. He was concerned with reducing the influence of purely personal and random circumstances. He emphasized the particular significance of the elements of "knowledge, education and training which, in our country, are ridiculously

low compared to all other countries.... We are still all too inclined to compensate for knowledge (or believe that knowledge could be compensated) with zealousness, haste, etc." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 391). He did not specify the results of such a rush to power in the policy of uncontrolled passions and instincts in a country which had become savage as a result of the imperialist and Civil Wars. These possibilities were obvious and required no extensive explanations.

The problem of culture and power and the spiritual prerequisites for political rule and leadership reached its full magnitude the day after the revolution. In economics, surmounting backwardness and providing the missing objective prerequisites for the building of socialism seemed fully attainable through energetic activities by the system. What about the system itself? Was it realistic to expect that the mass of illiterate people, with no experience in managing a state, having gained access to its levers, would learn, as their consciousness and competence grew, cautiously to handle the controls, use the great power of the state for its specific purpose rather than crush the people with it, like walnuts? Obviously, learning how to manage in the course of managing demands a price to be paid. The main thing is to avoid catastrophic consequences, for otherwise such learning begins to resemble amateurish experimentation with an active nuclear reactor.

The tremendous achievements of the socialist cultural revolution are universally known. This was a turn of historical significance. However, life does not stand still. New generations actively engage in social practices. Their involvement with science and culture takes place anew on each occasion, on the basis of the new requirements of the scientific and technical revolution and, again and again, raising the standards becomes necessary.

No science but literature clearly formulated and answered the question of the role of the readiness of the human factor to exercise power. Let us note that Russian literature was brimming with compassion for the little man. Despite the pure and dedicated love for those who suffered in this world, its representatives soberly considered the way Gogol's forgotten official Akakiy Akakiyevich Bashmachkin would behave in the new society, where the power will be in the hands of people like himself. The answer to such questions is clear. The powerless person must change. He must become different. What if this does not occur, and neglect proves to be stronger than pious hopes? The office where Akakiy Akakiyevich was transferred required basic creative skills and independence. This proved impossible in his case, and he begged to be taken back to his routine copying of documents, which was done.

Let us imagine something different: Akakiy Akakiyevich has nonetheless become a chief which, if there is change, could be quite likely. F.M. Dostoyevskiy, who spoke out in favor of the humiliated and insulted, discussed in his

novel "*The Demons*" the administrative enthusiasm of newly hatched officials of this kind. He prophetically noted the following: assign to any, even the most insignificant person to sell railroad tickets, and this nobody will immediately consider that he has the right to look at you like Jupiter the moment you want to buy a ticket: "I shall show you my power."

More than anything else, power reveals the presence or absence of spiritual qualities in a person, testing his readiness and ability to act as a moral being. With Sharikov's character, M. Bulgakov warns us against the triumphalism of social experimentation with people and the particular danger of dark instincts getting out of hand, when the experimenter himself becomes hostage to the powers he has unleashed. M. Prishvin wisely noted that "the ethic of socialism consists of instilling greatness in small things." It is necessary to "instill" it within each generation, all over again, in the new rounds of historical development and under changing circumstances. Let us point out that what is needed is to instill in the small person the heart and mind of the great one, but not to fan in the weak person the all-consuming fire of passions which could extinguish even the last spark of reason.

The senseless and primitive limited reflex of obedience which Stalinism developed in the bureaucratic upper-crust was clearly described in the novel by A. Bek "New Assignment." So far, however, neither literature nor science have described to its full extent the nature of the sociopsychological dynamics of large social groups acting under the influence of emotional reflex incentives, when reason is essentially excluded as a "forgotten intermediary" in the system of "emotion-crowd action; incentive-group reaction, etc." The mechanism of mass psychoses and national extremism has been insufficiently studied. The power of reason and the manifestation of feelings within a civilized framework are one hundred times more necessary in social life, when such life involves the participation of huge masses of people. The uncontrolled development of spontaneous processes under circumstances marked by social tension reveals a catastrophically dangerous nature.

Hegel is frequently quoted: "Nothing great has ever been or could be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead and quite frequently hypocritical morality that opposes passion as such." However, this reveals an incomplete understanding of the positive meaning of subsequent Hegelian views to the effect that the educated person experiences things more profoundly than the uneducated one. Why? Because the former considers the phenomena of life from all viewpoints "and at the same time he is superior to the uneducated one by the power he has over his own feelings." It is this power of the mind over the feelings that is frequently today in short supply in spontaneous or even planned meetings sponsored by various civic movements, although their programs include items which are quite important and valuable.

K. Marx wrote about the furies of private interest, when "the fiercest, the basest and the most disgusting passions of the human soul" enter the arena of the struggle (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 23, p 10). We must point out that the furies of group egotism are no less disgusting and that nationalistic extremism exceeds in its fierceness many other base passions.

Many are those who see Sharikov as a person devastated by endless drunkenness, a callused gross cynic with vulgar manners. This image is accurate but superficial. Such excessive savagery would be obvious to all. The appearance of such a person in a public transport vehicle or on the street would create a certain "empty space" around him. The citizens would stand aside, distancing themselves, switching to another vehicle, showing their indignation.... Sooner or later, however, the militia would step in. The end, when the excess of anticulture has been eliminated and the disturber of the peace will be sweeping a street or breaking ice on the sidewalk, this will be interpreted as a restoration of the violated order.

This, however, is the on outside. As in Shaw's "*Pygmalion*," everything is changed and shocking behavior is converted to seemly manners as a result of education. The theory of a biological predetermination of hereditary criminality, and Spenser's aphorism to the effect that golden mores cannot be developed from of the instincts of a pig, do not, as a whole, find any confirmation in social practices, although they show amazingly frequent correlations. In any case, tracing the biological series in the social area demands a special study. Much more essential is the clear and ever more frequently detected disparity between the political and cultural levels of development and professional training, on the one hand, and the requirements of the social environment, the nature of the job and the performed functions, on the other. This phenomenon has been described in different terms. In militia practices, for example, it is quite delicately referred to as "incomplete consistency with the requirements of the service." In terms of special areas requiring professional skills and training, the formula of "professional unsuitability" is applied. Many more even finer descriptions may be found in official cadre references: incompetent, inconsistent with increased requirements, not given to self-improvements, not keeping up with life, etc. One could indefinitely go on enumerating the features of lacking general and professional standards of cadres based, alas, on entirely specific facts.

An experiment in irresponsibility and incompetence was that of the Chernobyl reactor and, respectively, of the life of the citizens of a huge country. The result is known but, in my view, has not been fully interpreted. The fog of the gas condensate, which turned into a terrible explosion at Ufa, and the endless sequence of other accidents were the results of professional ignorance and slovenliness. Consider the figure recently published in PRAVDA: in the past 18 years we have had more than 150 severe accidents, each one of which, given a chain development of events, could have assumed a catastrophic scale.

Before the dry-goods freighter "Petr Vasev" had rammed the passenger steamship "Admiral Nakhimov," its first mate, who was on the bridge, admiringly pointed out, looking at the hull of the latest design: "We shall pass by each other nicely...."

Indeed, what rapture at the brink of the precipice.

In a little while the "esthetics" of ignorance, thoughtlessness and lack of professionalism will overstep the fatal boundary. Clearly seen today is a trend toward an increasing lack of skill in manpower on all levels. The number of workers wishing to improve their skills has declined by nearly 3 million. Frequently the people recruited to attend the necessary courses on different management levels are those who either would like to "relax" or people one would like to be rid of, considering their total practical uselessness. According to statistics, most engineering and technical workers do not visit technical libraries, have no books of their own at home, the range of their professional interests is extremely narrow and manifestations of creative initiative and independent thinking are blocked by the fear of "being noticed by superiors." Many engineers who were involved in the Chernobyl tragedy were aware of the existing danger but "feared" to express their views or insistently defend them.

Perestroyka frees the people from the complex of fear. However, is it possible to confuse such freedom with the freedom of total permissiveness?

Controlled calm and the skill of voicing one's opinion have long been highly valued as manifestations of inner freedom. V. Astafyev's "Mournful Detective" offers an encyclopedia of impulsive forms of human behavior, incomprehensible from the viewpoint of common sense, not to say reason. The fact that such phenomena are becoming typical is confirmed by the steadily growing list of senseless cruelties and thoughtless crimes which, in the time of glasnost, are being openly discussed. In Astafyev's novel we mentioned, we find a curious picture: a chained dog hurling itself forward in an effort to "bite the electric train." This is, so to say, the reflex of nonfreedom, the "instinct stopped short by the chain."

Impulsive manifestations of unprovoked rage, violence and destructive emotions in young people are well-familiar phenomena. This does not occur only among fanatics of hard rock or from other stimulants. Park benches toppled upside-down, slashed seats in trains, broken windows and light bulbs in tunnels and numerous other manifestations of social vandalism and outbreaks of juvenile crime are all rooted in the vices of the socialization of the individual and the weaknesses of restraining and civilizing mechanisms of social and self-organization. Western sociologists who deal with this phenomenon tend to speak of the impulses of released destructive energy which, finding no outlet, accumulates and unexpectedly bursts on the surface. Whatever the case, impulsive forms of social behavior on the lowest level are becoming increasingly widespread

and dangerous. A typical example of such a social phobia is the increased hostility toward cooperatives and indiscriminately identifying them with the black market.

Yet Lenin considered cooperativization an indicator of socialist civilization. In order to achieve progress in this area, in his view, a major change was necessary, a complete shift in the cultural development of the entire population. In his time it was difficult to assume that a situation could arise in which a certain segment of the population not only would oppose cooperativization for itself but would also begin actively to hinder and aggressively to oppose others from joining cooperatives.

The opposite of mental deficiency has always been intelligence and an inner standard, the work of the mind and the efforts of the heart. We must point out that in our country, during some periods, a hostile attitude toward intellectual labor was encouraged quite consciously and the consequent reaction to such efforts was one of quite refined ideological and psychological manipulations. This affected even a talented film such as "Chapayev." Let us recall a short but significant episode: the famous Kappelev psychological attack. A line of the enemies of the revolution rises to the attack, irrevocably and systematically, in model order, as though on parade drill. Someone shouts, "they step beautifully!" This is answered with a single word by one of the fighters on which the camera focuses as he takes aim and retorts: "Intelligentsia."

We are familiar with the aphorism that the more skilled labor is the more sensitive it is to lack of freedom. Society and the authorities which, by one means or another, denigrate the dignity of science and culture, depicting the scientist as some kind of relic in the "department of useless objects" doom themselves not only to vegetating but to something worse as well.

Prejudice is largely irrational, reduced to a rejection, a fanatical intolerance of words, concepts and phenomena. The "image of the enemy" was created in the course of decades of cold war; today it has largely been destroyed by "reasons appealing to the mind," but the parallel emotional syndrome of alienation and hostility continues to exist and to counteract the assertion of a new political thinking.

In distribution relations the emotional strain leads to swinging from one excess to another and to a loss of clarity of vision. In ancient Greece, as a sign of protest one philosopher blinded himself in order not to see the good life that bad citizens enjoyed. Social injustice leads to outbursts of extremism, stress, deafness to the arguments of opponents, and futility of appeals for moderation. Severe shortages ascribe to efforts to procure objects a certain biological aspect in the struggle for survival, in which those with the sharpest tongues, the most high-handed and the most merciless or, in a word, the people with a low mentality, enjoy a clear advantage. Basically the intellectual principle is alien to them, for which reason they do not consider the intellectual as

their equal. He should feel worse than they do. He should obtain and does obtain less in exchange for his toil. It is said that the Chinese condemn the "red-eye disease," jealousy. This attraction for equalization is the source of all evils and difficulties: lack of interest in the results and quality of labor, social apathy and dependency, rejection of scientific and technical progress and irresponsibility.

In our country no one envies the earnings of most intellectuals. People even sympathize with them: "Look how many years he studied yet he earns less than a loading worker, spending sleepless nights and being responsible for everything." Still...

Material equality does not satisfy people with a low mentality. They want the totally unnatural "equality" of skills, capabilities and intellect. Hence a kind of reflex of aggressiveness concerning talent, expressed as "what makes you better than the others?" This militant question is addressed not only to scientists or writers but also worker-rationalizers or farm lessees. It is true that it is easier for the intellectual, because talent in the spiritual area is quite noticeable and quite individual and unique, and quite strongly popularized compared to ordinary life.

Many were those who were quite concerned by the pitting, as noted at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, of the person wielding a shovel against the person holding a pencil. Everyone understands what this is all about. In general, the shovel is pursuing us like a hallucination. Trench instruments were used in Tbilisi. There was a startling picture on the front page of OGONEK: A long range of shovels with a microphone attached to each one. Simply a shovel (without a microphone) has become a kind of symbol of the huge mass of unskilled manual labor. Sometime in the past our procurement workers had ordered 56 million shovels with handles. Imagine for a moment this forest of raised shovels. It could indeed block the light of reason.

The shovel is the symbol of technical backwardness, manifested in the realities of spiritual impoverishment, primitivism and regressive moods. The hope that perestroika could lead to quick changes in this area is unrealistic. A great deal of time is necessary. Until then, until changes in the area of labor have occurred, we must be aware of the extent of the danger stemming from routine labor with its respective concepts and stereotypes in thinking and acting. We must also plan steps to protect perestroika processes, which are inconceivable without the intellectualizing of social life.

What to think about the fact that a significant portion of the population firmly rejects any kind of complexities? In his diary, L.N. Tolstoy wrote: "The thinking person knows how complex any assertion and how frequently questionable it may be...." Many people stop thinking when thinking becomes difficult and, therefore, also fruitful. The fruits of perestroika are, for the time being, most tangible in the intellectual, international and political areas and in order to determine the true scale of what

has occurred and been accomplished we must engage in the hard work of thinking, and comparing the present with the past. Metaphorically speaking, the fruits of perestroyka, although visible, are hanging quite high on the tree. Many measures have not as yet yielded the expected results. Instead of asking why, there are those who, with childish directness, transfer their irritation, discontent and impatience to the word "perestroyka," the more so since, as a general symbol, it is being used much more frequently than are reports on the specific components of perestroyka accomplishments. Concepts are not insured against inflation, depreciation, superficiality and even impulsiveness such as, for example, the "socialism of feelings," "instant communism," etc.

Social impulsiveness in human behavior is totalitarian in nature, peremptory. It does not tolerate dialogue or feedback. It is a disease of society which was long suppressed and finally, like millions of individually coiled springs, screechingly begin to uncoil, jumping out of their own nests and hitting the other springs. The growing worsening of moods and the whirlpool of passions, excitement caused by unrealized or postponed expectations, and impatience make the reactions of some people and, in some cases, even entire social strata, hysterically intensified and improper. Emotional extremism intensifies, unwilling to consider sensible arguments. Under the pressure of emotions the intellect itself becomes, to a certain extent, irrational. It turns out that the fruitful soil of civilization, which has been nurtured for thousands of years, is thin and brittle. We frequently describe it as the foundation. Alas, it is easily eroded by the flood of feelings and passions. Where do science and intelligence, the results of long years of education, disappear? After the scandals in Fergana, Sumgait and other places, the question arises: "Was civilization an illusion and fiction? What is it that turns secondary school and university students into gangs of pogrom-makers, and savage throat-cutters in the centers of most ancient cultures?"

It is obvious that imbalance, and unbridled passions threaten not only the foundations of a law-governed state but also cause a decline in basic discipline. This was sharply pointed out at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies; many labor collectives and the public are actively calling today for improvements the level of organization and strengthening law and order. The success and acceleration of reforms depend on the condition of the social environment, on the moral climate in society.

Naturally, the emotional aspect of the moral personality and of civic movements can be very productive and positive when aimed at unifying people sharing emotions, joys and sadness. The feeling of universal sympathy for the people of Armenia and the support given to them during their hour of great tragedy were noble. The sacred civic feeling of patriotism inspires people to great actions and dedication. A great many things in life and throughout the world would lose their luster and attractiveness without a strong emotional support, such as love

for the fatherland, children, native city, collective, relatives and friends. Lofty feelings embellish our lives and fructify the multi-colored world with the treasures of culture and the spirit and morality, and it is thanks to them that man can oppose base motivations and instincts. Today, at the present crucial stage of perestroyka, the importance of spiritual values and hard-earned experience, which need interpretation, increases. We cannot avoid arguments and passions. In the course of their tempestuous flow and natural upswings we need neither big nor small cults. All we need is the admissible cult of Reason, and a consideration of our cultural wealth as the most sacred of objects, and the priority of the humane principle in society and the law-governed state.

Recently Central Television repeated the film "Dog's Heart," which now is the recipient of the first prize awarded in an authoritative international competition. It would be interesting to see whether the televiewers, who fiercely oppose the processes of renovation and hinder perestroyka with all their strength, will be able to ask themselves the honest and difficult question in Gogol's spirit: "Is there not in me some small bit of Sharikov?"

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## PUBLIC OPINION

### The Fifth Year; Readers' Letters and Evaluations 905B0014K Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 77-85

[Review compiled by S. Yarmolyuk]

[Text] We have lived through one more year, the fifth year of perestroyka, a year saturated with momentous events, principled polemics and difficult decisions. This was a year full of concern and alarm but hope as well. The editorial mail reacted to each turn of events and changes in moods, reflecting, to a certain extent, the condition within society. We tried to publish more letters (which remains a task for the future as well). In each of our 18 issues there have been 15 to 20 items (unfortunately, this is our maximum given the present size of the journal). The journal published either separately or in selections and surveys a total of 477 letters, almost one out of each 13 received by the editors. As we begin the new year, we decided to somehow sum up the readers' views for the past year, for they contain assessments, judgments and expectations.

#### 'Is This a Close Concern of Ours?'

One year after the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum, one of our readers wrote: "I greatly fear that the perestroyka initiated by the party will not be accepted by the people as their profound personal concern. They will not assume responsibility for its implementation but, as you can well imagine, few passengers aboard a ship

would call for its hitting a rock." I believe that life has indicated quite clearly (as confirmed by the mail) that the past year became somehow a turning point precisely in this respect and that the majority of our people would hardly be described today as "passengers." Society has been brought into motion and, naturally, as it becomes involved in renovation and as they assume their share of responsibility, the people try to gauge the reliability of the "ship" itself. "I believe," writes Comrade Muchak, from Kiev, as though continuing this old letter, "that one should not excessively blame the ship's crew if the ship is so built that it could capsize with the slightest storm. The ship itself must be redesigned. In order to ensure greater stability, in frequent cases it suffices to shift the freight from the deck to the hold, to the bottom part of the ship and tie it down...."

The understanding itself of the renovated society which we should achieve in the course of perestroika is varied, and the different approaches and views and demarcation of forces have become clearly apparent. The danger is arising of we, by ourselves, are not making our own boat to roll either by all of us rushing to one of its sides or else trying to grab the wheel and change its course, etc., to continue with our metaphor.

A great deal of the mail received during the year deals with this problem.

"The events in the Kuzbass electrified the country. We will be hearing more about them, for they touched upon one of the most sensitive nerves in our social system," wrote last summer engineer V. Kukanov, from Novokuznetsk. "Although the time to draw final conclusions from these events has not come, some considerations must be expressed right now, before it is too late. Why did the strike break out initially precisely in the Kuzbass? Why was it that the local party, economic, trade union and other "traditional" management authorities and influential groups were caught unawares and are now entangled in the tail end of events? Finally, what should we do to prevent the epidemic of strikes from spreading throughout the country, for this would be not only a catastrophe for the Union but a tragedy for every one of us personally. This is the first thing which comes to mind when we try to analyze the Kuzbass events. The second group of problems is much deeper and more depressing. It is related to the essential reasons for the events. It pertains to the role, significance and place of the working class and the party (in the traditional understanding of those terms) both in recent events as well as in the subsequent processes of perestroika. Some unpleasant consequences derive from them, which affect the interests of a large number of working people and members of the apparat and which many people will find difficult to understand and, having understood them, to accept them."

"The first, the revolutionary step was already taken by the Kuzbass miners. On the spur of the moment they followed M.S. Gorbachev's appeal, who suggested to the Krasnoyarsk workers to take the power in their own

hands by themselves, from below. The strike committees are already being reorganized into workers committees which are in fact replacing both the anemic trade unions, the helpless councils of labor collectives and even the local soviets. New leaders have clearly emerged in the strikers' committees, including communists who were ignored and suppressed by the command-administrative system in the past. All that remains now is to legitimize this fact at the forthcoming party conferences and elections for local soviets. The outcome of such elections is undoubted."

"We should not fall into extremes, take the working people away from their jobs and engage in endless elections, meetings and conferences. Let them work in peace and not be distracted. Let everyone do his job.... Is it necessary to convene congresses under extreme conditions, when decisions must be made in a few seconds? If we had people such as Lenin on all levels of the hierarchical management system, from top to bottom, today there would be no question about democracy. The majority of people have no desire whatsoever actively to participate in the management of society, not to mention management in the center. For example, most workers prefer, even at their own worker meetings, to remain unnoticed. Nonetheless, the people need strong leaders. In other words, there is no public demand for popular rule there is for strong leaders. True democracy means less the participation of the people in social management than management for the sake of the interests of the people and society or, at least, of the majority of the members of society.... The closer management style comes to the interests of the working people and the stricter it is, the more desired it is by the people and, therefore, the more democratic.... The struggle for power should be the concern of no more than a very small handful of the most, the most.... As far as the others are concerned, it would be better to develop in them work discipline, responsibility, and an honest and conscientious attitude toward their direct professional obligations" (from the letter by Yu. Fisin, candidate of psychological sciences, Kazan).

"Do you not think that you made this so-called revolution with the forces of the party's leadership and the intelligentsia? Obviously, you consider us the drab crowd of loafers who do not have to be taken into account" (from the letter of electrician V. Ishchenko, Zaporozhye).

No, the editorial mail provides no reason to agree with the conclusion of teacher and labor veteran K. Artamonova from Kharkov, according to which "we have command unanimity; our system has weaned us from asking, objecting, questioning and disagreeing." The letters reflect the debate which is taking place today. "We would have achieved much more had Stalin not died...." "Our people work quite well but there has been no one to organize them after J.V. Stalin.... How can we fail to consider Stalin as being right in everything? He subordinated everything to the interests of the country and the people. The people understand this and cannot

participate in his persecution."... "The conservatives are relying precisely on chaos in order to discredit the reform. Already now they cannot refrain themselves from exalting at difficulties and failures. The situation is getting out of control. Difficulties in society are increasing and efforts may be made to institute a harsh regime and system as a solution to the crisis. History proves that dictatorship does not solve problems. The dictator leads society into an impasse. A system which is not answerable to anyone is terrible."... "The main thing is that we must take people strictly to task for displaying national hostility, whatever its origin, at which point gradually the national problem will be solved."... "Let us not speak of the universally accepted classification of society which was filed away with the silent agreement of the scientists, with the note 'dogma,' in order to avoid asking the 'sensitive' and tactless question: Which class is today in power in our country?"... "As a communist I cannot avoid responsibility for everything which has taken place. Nonetheless, I am unable to determine my own guilt. Throughout my long life I always tried honestly to carry out my party, civic and professional obligations" (from the letters of V. Budzko, Minsk, Yu. Ivakin, Gudernes, F. Chuchuvatkin, Penza, P. Gnezdilov, Orel, and A. Seregin, Simferopol).

Some letters are aggressive ("the people are rising against this and it is not today's nationalists from the outlying areas of the country that will lead them but the true patriots among the workers and peasants and not the elitist soviets" (from the letter by A. Tishkov, Kurgan); some letters express hate and, let us point out, of late their number has increased. Nonetheless, it is not they that set the overall tone of the mail.

"As of today I am for perestroyka. Previously I hesitated, and doubted that perestroyka would take place. I cursed the dry laws. Now matters are different: I have seen the truth. The truth straightens out the heart. This is not simply a beautiful statement but the essence of the changes which are taking place in the heart of every working person. All of us were so stupefied during the period of stagnation that we considered as virtually ordinary the custom of saying one thing and doing something else. We concealed the truth deep in our hearts and did not let our souls speak out. A person without a soul is simply a tool, a hired laborer. The poetry of labor became a shameful concept. In our country the slogan that 'the economy must be economical' was reflected in our behavior as the principle of 'do less and earn more'.... Our suppressed souls are beginning to reappear. Let us be more daring! People, do not be afraid! The ice of stagnation is cracking!" (From the letter by engineer P. Sartykov, Kyzyl).

Here is a letter by V. Zimin from Moscow or, rather, something more than a letter (it has more than 30 pages of handwritten text), but an address to the editors: "I will write an introduction to my letter when I have finished writing it. As I reread it, I can notice quite self-critically the imperfection of my thoughts and the poverty of my vocabulary. What can I do, I am a worker and I am more

handy with my hands. Perhaps I should not have undertaken to write this letter at all, for we have in our country outstanding economists and journalists whose works are read by the entire country. Their works have everything pleasing to the people: clear descriptions, a profound study of the reasons for the present economic situation, facts and figures which strike the imagination, and daring and exciting predictions and recommendations. However, as I read the works of our leading specialists and as I hear their statements, I have begun to notice that I frequently disagree with their opinions. Whereas I am almost totally in accord with that part of their statements dealing with an assessment of the economic situation of the country and the reasons for the present difficulties, I have my own viewpoint concerning the plans they present for political and economic reforms. My viewpoint is based on rich practical experience and practical knowledge. My profession allowed me to visit hundreds of industrial enterprises in our country and abroad. I tried, to the best of my ability, in the course of such trips to study the life of enterprises, their economic conditions, the relationship between enterprises and the state and society, and the difficulties and problems they are experiencing. I have also looked at the underground economy and have come across corrupted individuals. I was among the first to take a hand in the cooperative movement, with no particular success. On the basis of my experience I have formulated a plan for political, economic and social reform. It may seem unrealistic, utopian and even stupid. However, applying it in its entirety or in parts as part of the already implemented steps to stabilize the economy, I can determine, with a great degree of confidence, whether such steps would work efficiently or will turn into stillborn laws, resolutions and plans. Naturally, there is a huge gap between the way I conceive of this plan and the way I have presented it in writing. Perhaps, however, a specialist (providing that he is interested, naturally) could help me rewrite it in accordance with all scientific rules. I would be grateful if my letter is read by A.M. Yemelyanov, USSR people's deputy representing our Leninskiy Electoral District."

You must agree that such people are, naturally, not "passengers" by any means....

"The present condition of socialist society is by no means cloudless. The need for its restructuring which, incidentally, has been realized not only in our country, is the best confirmation of this fact. The people, previously restricted within the frame of what was officially permitted, have stood up straight and, although with great delay, have asked for an account. No, whatever people may say, the time is right and gradually, despite the complex events in life, everything will fall in its place and everyone will get what is coming to him. To try, by quoting Lenin, as has happened and is still happening today, to defend what was essentially a departure from the right ways of the building and development of socialism or to dump the real cause of perestroyka in a container made of empty words means to ignore

common sense and the hope of the people for an imminent better future" (from the letter by **L. Borisov**, docent at the Moscow Aviation Institute, to which we shall return later).

"Today confusion and fear dominates the minds of many people. There are reasons for this. Karabakh, Fergana, Tbilisi, Novyy Uzen, and Abkhaziya are words which are now in the mouths of the people throughout the country. Hundreds of people have perished in the course of clashes between ethnic groups. Above all, we see no turn for the better. The economic situation is continuing to worsen. The global socialist system is collapsing in front of our very eyes, like a house of cards. It is true that our press is cheerfully proclaiming this to be a normal phenomenon. However, this is hard to believe," writes **A. Dyachkov**, from Moscow Oblast.

"The First USSR Congress of People's Deputies has already taken place. This is an outstanding phenomenon compared to other recent events. However, it did not leave me with a sense of great satisfaction. The reason may be that I put excessive hope in it.... The congress was unable to solve the question of how to combine the independence of the worker with subordination, responsibility with freedom of action, etc. This is particularly important to me in the health service in which I am employed.... What difference does it make if a minister is approved by the Supreme Soviet, for he will become part of a system which was created before him and will become stuck within it. Little depends on the minister alone, for in addition to him there also is the Ministry of Finance, the Gosplan, the State Committee for Labor, the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry, the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems, the Gosnab, the Ministry of Justice and many others which have tied up everything and everyone and do not let anyone to take a deep breath. We are forbidden to amend wages or the structure of the health care system. We cannot operate on the basis of local conditions, we cannot do this, we cannot do that...." writes **R. Kuzbekov**, deputy chief physician, Sterlitamakstroy Medical Unit, Bashkiriya.

"One does not have to be a major political or state leader or an economist to understand that if the companies in the most prosperous capitalist countries, which have different forms of ownership, would be forced, as our own state enterprises, to assign common laborers to meat combines and work as mechanizers in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, weed and harvest vegetables, cultivate auxiliary plots, build housing in the countryside and repair polyclinics, hospitals and schools, repair their entire inventory and manufacture their own tools and equipment, sweep the streets and pick up potatoes in winter, within a single year they would create such an imbalance that no state, cooperative, share holding, municipal, private or any other type of ownership would be able to rebuild the system," notes **N. Kondrashov**, director of the Automotive Transportation Enterprise in Orsk.

"In our country the solution of the housing problem has been organized upside-down. People set up families, children are born and then the parents go to the state for a handout: give us this, give us that, and all this is considered normal in our country (yet many people are amazed at how many among us have developed a dependent mentality).... Cooperative building has been farmed out to bureaucrats who are unwilling to deal with it for they see no advantages in it for themselves.... Since I am one of those who is interested in solving the housing problem, let me offer my suggestion as to how this could be accomplished," writes **R. Brizhatyuk**, a worker from Naberezhnye Chelny.

Many bitter accusations, questions and facts emerge from the editorial mail, unavoidable all of them, for our present life is what it is. "Three years after the war the rationing system was abolished. Now, more than 40 years later, it has been reinstated, while we keep trying to prove this and that, take umbrage."... "Tell us, where in our country one could see even minor successes? Could it be in disarmament? This already happened. N.S. Khrushchev also started unilateral disarmament, reduction in the size of military personnel and military ordnance, and the destruction of ships, tanks, airplanes and guns, after which, once again, the people had to work harder and recover all this."... "We are touched by the fact that people take one or two calves for fattening. Meanwhile, government complexes are half-empty because of insufficient offspring. Is this right? Recently a worker was detained for stealing mixed fodder. He said that it would be better to look at the way Churbanov kept stealing rather than catch me him with a bag."... "I saw in Leningrad a line in front of a wine store. There were some 500 to 600 people, angry like dogs, waiting an entire day to buy a bottle. There were plenty of militiamen around, only horses were lacking. Such lines discredit perestroika, reducing any ideological work to nothing.... If the leaders are unable, years on end, to solve such a problem, how could they handle the great problems of perestroika?" (From the letters of **R. Sazonova**, Bratsk, **S. Popov**, Yerevan, **P. Dukhovny**, Kiev Oblast, and **V. Borovik**, Leningrad).

"This is the fifth year of perestroika. This may be too short a time span to draw basic conclusions but it is quite adequate to sum up some results (here we go back to L. Borisov's letter). What are they?

"The development of glasnost and democracy and the implementation of a radical political reform are the main components of the current, the visible real results of inner aspects of perestroika. Naturally, this is a lot if we take into consideration the great deformation of our political system which, in the course of its existence, has been frequently subjected to changes most damaging to the cause of socialism. However, all political changes will be properly appreciated only when they begin actively to influence improvements in the socioeconomic area. There are problems the solution of which requires time. That is why one could assume that they are in their

preparatory, their gestation stage so to say and, therefore, invisible to the outside world. However, there also are problems the changes within which should be noticeable as of now. It is important for the public steadily to see perhaps minor but real results of perestroyka. Unfortunately, so far this has not taken place in the area of economics.

"Significant results have been achieved in the area of international activities of our state, which was the first to proclaim a conversion to the new political thinking based on acknowledging the priority of universal human values. The peoples of the world have become tired of endless wars, confrontations and tension. They are impressed by the policy of detente and comprehensive cooperation for which the socialist countries are struggling. Despite the entire importance of the solution of global problems of mankind, however, they cannot eliminate from the agenda problems of internal development of the socialist states.

"...What we are lacking today is a scientific concept for the further development of socialism. For the time being, we are making progress only in laying the foundations of the initial ways of perestroyka. However, we cannot remain long at this stage. We must develop theoretical, philosophical and sociopolitical aspects, which will give us an overall concept of socialism. In proclaiming perestroyka, the party has no right to remain behind the imperatives of the time and to rely, as was the case in the past, on the fact that its authority will remain unshaken, whatever the circumstances. The authority of the Communist Party is organically linked to real socialism."

I believe that it is no accident that in last year's mail, despite the great difficulties existing in the working and living conditions of the people, what prevailed nonetheless were thoughts not simply about streamlining today's life but about a platform for a different, a better life. It is no accident that such thoughts are related to two main topics: the destinies of socialism and the role of the party.

### The Main Question

Issue No 17 of this journal for 1989 consisted of articles on socialism. This included a special survey of the editorial mail. The editors received a large number of letters on this very basic topic. Such letters continue to be received in answer to the article by M.S. Gorbachev (KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989) and other articles, particularly those published in No 17. Naturally, we intend to publish them in the journal for, as has been justifiably noted by our reader and colleague G. Linder from Bologoye, "a contemporary concept of socialism, which we need so urgently, mandatorily requires the type of organic blending of practical pressure with theoretical sharpness and depth of vision." In our present survey, we shall limit this topic to the lines which A. Gumennyuk from Kharkov quotes in his letter, as he thinks about socialism:

"We hear in the mosque that God is the foundation and the essence! Wise men would like to lead us into science. I fear, however, that all of a sudden someone else will come and say: You, blind man! There is another path as yet unknown to you."

Refute, prove and convince, says the reader addressing himself to us.

Issue after issue we are continuing the debate on "Renovation of the Society—Renovation of the Party." As the mail throughout the year indicates, the concern of the people, related to this problem, is continuing to grow. "The train of perestroyka is running despite the party apparatus. This is a fact!"... "Today the CPSU is under attack from all sides. Communists are actively participating in this attack. Examples to this effect number in the thousands. One asks for a start in making local improvements and no one pays attention. The moment a pretext appears, people hop on a plane and rush to Luzhniki, to attend a meeting. Everyone is shouting that in the spring 'we shall see'..." "Perestroyka must be the topic of a separate congress which would represent the entire party and not only its zealous supporters. In the CPSU Central Committee report to the congress answers must be given to the party and the people to an entire set of basic questions, such as what type of society is being built by our people and under whose leadership.... I am writing to KOMMUNIST, for I believe that it is precisely that journal that should raise the question of holding an extraordinary party congress..." "Why are we not learning from our own errors (although it would have been better to learn from someone else's)? We are condemning the Stalinist circle. What made Brezhnev's circle any better? It is only now, in the time of glasnost, that I realize what terrible harm that leadership caused the country. One cannot correct something which had been decaying for decades. Why is it that we are so reluctant to part with those who come from 'that time'? I am not in favor of 'firing at headquarters'. I favor looking at the honest and clean face of a party member, particularly a leader..." "How to react to the fact that some party members are burning their party cards? I do not approve of them... Naturally, it is possible 'not to violate a single principle'. We are familiar with this. However, life does not stand still and without a sensible compromise no progress is possible..." "I found myself near the editorial premises of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and walked through the crowd (I was on my way to a Gastronom store). I heard plenty! At one point I could not restrain myself and told one of the groups that I was a party member and that instead of babbling vulgarities at the address of Lenin and the party, let any one among them come to work with me in one of the sectors of Poklonnaya Mountain, and so on. The people almost killed me. It was only after I resisted that two people took up my side. Nonetheless, they were afraid to say that they were party members. They were wrong. Now, however, I am certain that if true communists could be found among this crowd, people from the crowd

would not have dared to shout 'down with the commissar woman!' (I was wearing a black cloak). Many of those people should not have kept quiet or been afraid of saying, I am a communist, let us speak frankly, like human beings. Yet the crowd included many people who do not believe that all communists are bad" (from the letters of A. Ivanov, Stavropol Kray, N. Sumenkov, Kemerovo, V. Smirnov, Moscow, L. Zadorozhny, Kanev, Yu. Ivakin, Gudermes and Zh. Semenova, Moscow).

Throughout the country today a precongress debate is under way. It will determine the nature of our issues in the new year. It is here, in the spirit of this debate, that I would like to quote the views of some of our readers (I believe that the more space we have given them is justified).

**V. Toldonov and V. Shaydayuk**, docents, Saratov Higher Party School:

"Quite frequently we read in the press that dead party leaders and officials around them are to be blamed for our difficulties and, at the present stage, for the passive attitude of the rank-and-file party members and the bureaucratized segment of the party apparat. Clearly, there is some truth in this. However, this is only a small part of the truth.

"In our view, the basis of the problem is found in the principles of the party's structure and functioning. Despite the various discussions, the debate does not deal with such problems in particular. An unwritten taboo has been retained on analyzing such principles and disclosing their real content. When it comes to the structure and functioning of the party, the apparat has preserved its monopoly on the truth.

"Today few people doubt that it was precisely the monopoly on truth, the monopoly on power, and strict centralism, which turned into a system of vertical subordination, that led the party to the familiar excesses and caused the current crisis. The most dangerous trend today is to claim that a process of true renovation is taking place in the party, that confidence in the party is not declining but increasing and that all that are needed are some few changes in the work style of the party authorities for the apparat to heal itself. Let us point out that surgeon and patient are two distinct individuals. It is still not too late, there still is time for making radical changes in the party.

"A great deal had already been said about the crisis in the party during the first years of the Soviet system. The reasons which were cited were the monopoly on truth, with which we are quite well familiar, as well as the impossibility to ensure the normal functioning of the intellectual potential of the party and the passive attitude of the primary party organizations. Unfortunately, to this day the party has not found truly effective

treatment methods. Its apparatus proved largely incapable not only of managing sociopolitical processes but also of engaging in a serious dialogue in defending the party's honor and dignity.

"To this day, despite the apparent features of the present, the system of hierarchical subordination, accompanied by the selection of obedient workers and "discarding" people who show any independent thinking, remains intact. The hierarchy of party power, presented as 'democratic centralism' of the Leninist type and, consequently, as inviolable, purged in the past and purges today the party apparat from thinking people as though they are alien bodies.

"At the present stage the party needs not only a sometimes ostentatious unity, but real rather than merely declared ideological convictions of its members, their creative autonomy and their scientific understanding of sociopolitical and economic processes occurring in society. The strength of a collective made up of individuals is much greater than that of a collective of like-thinking people. A static party condition could prove fatal both to the party and to perestroika.

"In our view, it is the primary party organization that must be the foundation and the 'master' of the entire CPSU structure. It is the primary party organizations that must create their own authorities on a democratic basis, from the bottom upward and not vice-versa, rather than the directive-issuing superior authorities, and must determine the structure of the apparat, the number of people to be released, personnel wages, type of work, etc."

**Yu. Beylezon**, CPSU member since 1957, Moscow:

"As an old subscriber and reader of your journal, I decided to address myself to the editors, on the one hand, with a question and, on the other, to express a few considerations concerning the political situation in the country and the actions of the central party authorities in this situation.

"Inasmuch as I can assess it, clearly the main question in the current political debate is about 'the role of the party in society'. To some extent this question is related to the view that the situation is that there is a 'crisis within the party'. Such a situation has existed in the past as well, in the course of the party's history, before its 10th Congress, when a debate arose on the role of the party in the management of the state, the participation of the trade unions in managing the economy and involving in such management the broad masses. At that time Lenin called for all party members to undertake to study, with the greatest self-restraint and most thoroughly, the following: 1. The nature of differences; 2. The development of the party struggle. He also said the following: 'We must study both, mandatorily looking for the most accurate arguments which have been made public and investigated in all of their aspects'.

"It would be naive to believe that at the present time there are no differences in the party on this key problem. I believe that the central party organ does not clearly visualize the depth and scale of the increasing differences among party members.

"In such cases one should not discuss many subjects in the name of the party, for today the primary party organizations are being actually asked only to discuss the resolutions and assessments of the central authorities, without clarifying their own views on the role of the party, including a discussion of suggestions relative to Article 6 of the present Soviet Constitution.

"In addressing the PRAVDA editors, M.S. Gorbachev said the following: 'I believe that the time has come to adopt a firm position by our cadres—party and economic—and by our journalists. Incidentally, society expects this. The people are bluntly saying that they would like to know what are the firm views of every member of the country's leadership on the main, on the vitally important, on the fatal problems of perestroika'. Above all, however, it is the party members who wish to know this. They would like to know the views of every member of the Politburo. I believe that we fear to debate within the party, although officially proclaimed, a number of basic questions: the role of the party in society, democratic centralism, its meaning at the present stage, a federation within the party, the admissibility of having within the party groups of people who are not unanimous in their views concerning programs, tactics and organization. The party members should be clearly aware of the views held by the party's leading nucleus and not anonymous position, particularly during the period of preparations for the forthcoming congress. We do not need some ostentatious unanimity.'

**Ye. Radchenko**, docent, Department of Political Economy, Rostov State University:

"The roots of the problem of the party's renovation are found in the very essence of our society. The key to a scientific understanding of Soviet society is provided to us by Marxism. Our entire post-October history is a confirmation of Marxism and, at the same time, a crushing rejection of its dogmas. That is why we must act as did Marx, who found in the commodity system of capitalist wealth the genetic starting point and a specific and general substantiation for the theoretical correlation of the entire variety of seemingly incompatible capitalist social relations. Like Marx, we must find a starting point which would enable us to adopt a proper scale in order to correlate different and even totally opposite parameters within Soviet society.

"Therefore, it is my profound conviction, that the starting point should be one of the unique features of our society, i.e., the upside-down correlation between economics and politics. Whatever economic system we may have (market or nonmarket) and whatever the political system may be (democratic or authoritarian), politics is always the concentrated expression of economics. The

preservation and support of the dynamic balance in this correlation between economics and politics is a form of organic development of society.

"However, this familiar Marxist concept is inapplicable to our society. In our country economics means politics applied in production. Although this is true it is not the entire truth: in our country politics has absorbed economics. In this sense as well one could say that after 1929 there never has been nor is there today any politics!

"Instead of politics we have an imitation and instead of economics, party-economic management. For that reason our economy or, rather, that which is described by this euphemism, cannot do without the leading role of the CPSU. Nor can it do without the ideological stimulation and functioning of the primary party organizations within each production and management unit. Our economy cannot function without the nomenclatural appointment of managers. Our economy cannot fail to be a battle fought against the 'enemies of the people,' 'saboteurs,' etc. Our economy has always been a battlefield for 'discipline,' 'efficiency and quality,' for grain, coal, cotton, etc. "But then why is it that, nonetheless, our Soviet society is a 'world upside-down'? Is the party's aspiration to preserve its power the whole point? This may be true but it would be only part of the story. There has been a change of generations. Something else should be explained: Why is that the party should retain its power in violation of economic law?

"It is at this point that we come to the main problem of party restructuring. It is not a question of the fact that the power in our society is in the hands of a single party (this has frequently happened throughout history) but of its main function. This function, if we reject euphemisms such as 'the party's leading role,' is to maintain our society in an upside-down condition. We can now understand why the democratization within the party has fallen behind the democratization of society: democratization inevitably weakens this party function; its effective implementation requires precisely the maximal centralization of party and state power. The party's monopoly of political and economic power is the main prerequisite which ensures the functioning of our society in this upside-down condition. For that reason, the party cannot avoid engaging in economic management and for that reason as well it cannot convert to political methods in the management of society.

"Understandably, this applies less to the party of today than it did to the party of yesterday. However, the party's role in terms of its main function has still not changed. Today the problem is how to put our society back on its feet with the least political and social costs and how to return it to the path of organic development. This requires more than merely changing the CPSU Statutes. It requires, above all, changes in the programmatic stipulations of the party concerning the communist future. Social utopia neither should nor could be a

programmatic foundation for party political and economic activities. We shall be unable to carry out perestroika without changing the party's nature on the basis of a social democratic model."

**Yu. Chekhova**, doctor of technical sciences, Kiev:

"The majority of delegates to the 19th Party Conference rejected the suggestion that party publications no longer be the organs of party committees but become the organs of party organizations. Therefore, for a while, the Stalinist party model was preserved ('the order of the knights'), according to which the party committee acts on a monopoly basis in the name of the organizations or the Central Committee (or even of a group of members of the Politburo), on behalf of the entire party. How long will this period last? For the time being, no one knows but one would like to believe that it will not extend beyond the 28th Congress.

"Preparations for the congress have been initiated. From the rostrum of the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M. Gorbachev called upon the party members to engage in a discussion although the Central Committee which, according to the Statutes, has this right, is not in a hurry to announce the start of a general party debate. That is probably why the debate, although under way, is sluggish. The 'upper strata' are still keeping silent, waiting. There are those who continue to insist on 'continuity in politics,' i.e., as was the case in the past, that 'the principles must not be violated'.

"I believe in the party. I believe in the moral and political health of the majority of its members, not the party committees exclusively but precisely the majority of the 20 million party members. I believe in them, for which reason I would like to hope that the 28th Party Congress will become a turning point in the renovation and healing of the party. I am convinced that this will require a decisive democratization in the party's organizational structure on the basis of new statutes and a radical revision of ideological and programmatic stipulations. I am not calling for a new program, naturally, for there simply is not enough time to draft one, but for a programmatic declaration; the basic programmatic principles of the party should be confirmed by the congress without failing. It is no longer possible to carry out a perestroika and a truly revolutionary renovation of society on the basis of the program of 'developed socialism'."

As to the question which, for the past year, appears to be the most important one in the mail, we must agree that a sharp, principle-minded pre-congress discussion is necessary. We need a frank and blunt discussion before undertaking the difficult work which lies ahead. It is precisely the party and its best forces that must assume a mission the significance of which is convincingly described, in our view, by V. Kukanov, the engineer from Novokuznetsk, whose letter we already quoted: "It is difficult to expect any success for perestroika if the

social tension, and conflicts among nationalities continue to increase, and if crises in all possible areas of social relations continue to worsen aggravated. Efficient reforms are possible only in a stable society. History proves that social stability is ensured with the help of comprehensively formulated and supported laws, behavioral rules, traditions, etc., which, in turn, are essentially shaped with the help of and on the basis of postulates of one of three factors: religion, ideology or coercion (under a dictatorship). Combinations among the three are also possible. We rejected religion a long time ago. We rejected coercion recently. Dogmatic ideology has collapsed but the outlines of a new ideology are still visible quite poorly, in any case from the viewpoint of mass consciousness. A vacuum has developed, which is quickly being filled with concepts expressing egotistical group, nationalistic, parochial and other narrow-minded interests, some of which extremist, which are destabilizing the situation in the country. We vitally need unifying ideas, concepts and suggestions which, taking into consideration and coordinating all such interests, would unite society on the basis of a consensus."

In the spirit of this discussion, here is yet another excerpt from the same letter: "The miners in the Kuzbass rose not exclusively in opposition to economic difficulties. It was not the shortage of soap and meat that was the main reason for their strike. The shortages were merely "trigger mechanisms" which brought into motion masses of people who objected to the the callous and disrespectful attitude toward their needs. Those who were then present in the main squares of the mining cities repeatedly heard complaints to the effect that more than anything else the miners were hurt by the scornful attitude of superiors, who had come on the basis of their reports but who did not come out of management offices. One of the main requirements of the miners, incidentally, was the wish for a personal meeting with the general secretary. The yearning for reciprocal understanding and for confession was what they needed perhaps more than the wretched sugar and soap. The break in the spiritual tie between the working people, on the one hand, and the domestic 'elite,' the party and economic apparat, on the other, is today one of the main reasons for the aggravation of social relations. For that reason, along with solving socioeconomic and political problems, which is essentially what concerns today theoretical and practical workers on all levels, we should also think of filling the 'spiritual niches' which have been ignored for decades by the party members."

Is this not the reason for which, in the fifth year of perestroika, we receive very few letters about spirituality and morality. In this connection, I recall the thoughts of two educators: teacher M. Zaletaradze, from Borzhomi, and an elderly rural teacher, A. Orlova, from Kirov Oblast who, obviously, tirelessly keep repeating that "no positions, titles, degrees or any material riches can replace empathy, a good and humane attitude toward man." And that "the main thing is to have independent views, and to remain, whatever the circumstances, true

to oneself," and that "spirituality comes from faith in an ideal and an ideal cannot be replaced with money."...

Typically, last year's mail rarely mentions the fact that the essence of party work is work with the people. In an effort to reinterpret a great many things, from global to ordinary, and as he comes across new phenomena and concepts, the individual frequently finds himself alone with his questions. Sometimes he writes to the journal because the people around him will not listen and there is simply no one with whom to discuss and share his doubts or ideas, feeling insignificant as he looks at the dimensions of overall party problems! "Once again I am distracting you from your work. You do not have to answer me. All I wish is to express my opinion, for I find it difficult to keep silent. Furthermore, this is not an exclusive opinion."... "Many people are still quite understandably confused: there are new economic concepts replacing the old and such concepts cannot be simply drilled into the people's heads. The people must be convinced. We should prove to them that, for example, leasing is what they need."... "Why is it that in our country managers do not report to the collectives who have entrusted them with management? City managers as well should report, at which point there would be less 'sinning' and more trust."... "Socialism has a future based on universal human values. The only point is how to revive them?"... "Gradually, we are accepting the idea that it is immoral to be a poor specialist or worker. However, the struggle against immorality will probably be efficient if waged from the position of blending, of combining professional skill with moral qualities."... "In my view, the party as it clearly defines its strategy and tactics, should deem it urgent to enhance the cultural standard of our society, without which even the most humane (as intended) system will turn out to be a sham. Perhaps the party should accept new members not only on the basis of their knowledge of the statutes and the program but also by taking into consideration the general and political standards of the candidate."... "The party must be rid of dirty and compromised people, who have lost the right to call themselves communists. The solution of this problem should precede the socioeconomic and political renovation of society. We believe that under those circumstances the moral authority of the party members and the entire party is not the least important instrument in the renovation of society."... "I frequently think of how could a phenomenon such as the cult of personality become reality. The only answer is that this was the cost of silence or, rather, a payment for our silence and, sometimes, for our indifference" (from the letters of Z. Berkinblit, Uglich; A. Kovalev, Severodonetsk; P. Shelekhov, Kemerovo Oblast; V. Parukhin, Leningrad Oblast; N. Ryabov, Kazan; I. Minakov, Kemerovo Oblast; P. Isayev, Ulyanovsk; and N. Shibaev, Kalinin Oblast).

This is to remind us that the party has 20 million members and it is strong with the views, participation and dignity of every one of them.

### Instead of a Conclusion

We tried to present a picture of last year as seen through the letters and assessments of the readers. It is hardly possible to fulfill this assignment completely. In any case, there was an aspiration not to "smooth over" letters or avoid views with which we do not always agree or to comment on them for the sake of "accuracy" but also, sometimes, disrespectfully. We could be blamed (and we are frequently blamed) for not expressing our own views clearly. In our view, however, it is obvious that the letters do not have to be identical. They must paint the entire picture, such as it is; the views of the journal itself may be found in our editorial articles and other basic works.

Another striking feature in last year's editorial mail is the increased number of anonymous letters. How to explain this? I remember that at the beginning of perestroyka, in an answer to an article on social justice, we received hundreds of letters not one of which was unsigned. Why is that now, in the fifth year of perestroyka, people have begun to lose their voices? Let us quote a few excerpts from such letters: "Matters in the country are not improving because of lack of control and impunity, i.e., there are no disciplinary measures or a firm hand. The Stalinist time has been acknowledged as wrong and so is Brezhnev's. Probably today as well we live in the wrong times."... "There was a time when miners, on the eve of the October Revolution anniversary, would report to the party and the government above plan coal production. Now, as a result of 'perestroyka thinking,' Vorkuta is cheering the Soviet Parliament with its latest strike. The 'work organizers' of perestroyka of the mind are exultant, glorifying the political activeness of the people, whereas we, the rank-and-file party members, somehow are unwilling to shout 'hurrah'."... "One cannot speak with people in the language of half-truth, half-democracy, half-glasnost and half-measures. The people perfectly realize the imperfect nature of informal organizations but it is there that they hear more of the truth and, furthermore, can rely on taking action."...

If we deem necessary to mention this, if there is a need to mention it, what is it that prevents us from mentioning it openly? Here are excerpts from those same letters: "...One would be immediately stigmatized or, to say the least, accused of antiperestroyka feelings."... "In my time I turned to the superior authority with a suggestion related to the draft "Regulation on the Enterprise" and was amazed to find out that my suggestion was redirected elsewhere. It did not contain any complaints but nonetheless I had not given my agreement that it be passed on. Still, no one took my views into consideration. Therefore, as a result of my honest intention, I was treated unceremoniously. That is why, through no fault of my own, I am forced to degrade myself and remain anonymous. Yet I would like to see a time worthy of honest Soviet citizen!"

Is this worth thinking about? This is one of the problems which also affects the work of the editors with the mail.

We find in last year's mail a great deal of thoughts on this matter and a large number of wishes, demands and assessments. We are planning to compile for one of the forthcoming issues a special "Reader to Journal" survey. The time for such a discussion is ripe. Meanwhile, as we wind up this survey, here is a response-wish which, we admit, was pleasing to read at the end of the year: "Yesterday I received issue No 17. I believe that you are not entirely right in your analysis of the reasons for the loss of circulation. Generally speaking, they have been noted accurately but, in my view, not completely.... My family (my wife and my son, 19) are subscribers to a total of 14 periodicals and we simply have no time and we have had to sacrifice some. I begin to realize that this "sacrifice" turned out, to say the least, hasty, for it was limited to the loss of one or two of the first issues, i.e., today or tomorrow I shall nonetheless resume my subscription. This journal has become very interesting to us. I find in it answers to many questions. For some reason, however, reality raises questions which outstrip the pace. I would like to see the journal as well try to anticipate problems. I am heartened by the fact that you had the courage to admit that you 'responded little to alarm signals' (I am quoting from memory). I have been reading your journal for approximately 8 years, initially as part of my duties (party obligation as well) and, in recent years, by choice.... Generally speaking, I like your editorial articles. It is pleasing to realize that you too find it painful to assess the results of your work as would any thinking person. Generally speaking, I approve.

"A. Markovin, 43, CPSU member since 1977."

We are sending him the first two issues and, we hope, that he will find them meaningful.

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## SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

### Biology's Future: Blossoming or Catastrophe?

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#### [Text] Forecast Optimism

Looking into the future, one should stand "on the shoulders of a giant" when drawing one's conclusions, relying both on the experience of the past as well as what prevails today, what is just appearing in the research laboratories and the offices of philosophers. Basic scientific facts, summations and discoveries, which are revolutionizing all areas of human activity, from the manufacturing of food and clothing to space ships and weaponry, appear not only and exclusively by order but also as a result of scientific research for its own sake. Research for the sake of research is one of the main boosters of science. It is precisely thus that scientists

gave society geometry and astronomy, discovered electricity, radio and heredity, determined the contagious nature of many diseases and invented ways of developing vaccines. A great deal of that which is at the disposal of modern man and is used on a daily basis was interpreted by science and created on the basis of scientific investigations. Therefore, I can give a simple answer to the question of whether science owes something to society or society to science: it is society that is the debtor. This debt is increased by the fact that so far society has failed to formulate the moral principles which regulate the application of scientific achievements. The new morality, which is consistent with the realities of contemporary life, is only being created at this point. However, even on this basis we can trust the optimistic forecasts concerning scientific achievements.

Why do I speak of optimism? Many scientists are, in general, reluctant to provide forecasts on possible scientific successes. However, if such forecasts are nonetheless formulated, they are almost always optimistic. The optimism of scientific forecasts can be explained with at least three reasons:

First, this emphasizes the power of science; there are no obstacles in the way of science, cancer will be conquered, old age will be pushed back by decades, etc.;

Second, optimism is pleasing to every individual and to society as a whole; an optimistic scientist is preferable to a pessimistic one;

Third, it is difficult to refute an optimistic forecast, for one can always say: the time has not come, this problem will be solved somewhat later; it is wiser to make optimistic rather than pessimistic forecasts.

As part of culture, ensuring the contemporary level of civilization, science is promising even greater progress for mankind. Problems of energy, health and nutrition will be resolved. Biology will play an increasingly important role in all these matters. It is precisely biology—let me emphasize this—that will ensure the solution of the basic problems of improving the quality of life through areas such as genetics, biochemistry, microbiology, cytology, molecular biology, gene engineering, biotechnology, and immunology. A number of major diseases will be eliminated. New strains of animals and plants will be created and previously unheard of flowers will blossom on earth.

Society must be informed of the tremendous potential of biology. It must contribute to its development if it wishes to ensure well-being under the conditions of a growing human population earth. We must develop biology and biotechnology if we wish to secure everyone's life and health. Let me emphasize the growing role of international organizations in this matter, above all that of UNESCO.

Thus, in 1988, efforts to organize a new UNESCO standing committee on molecular and cellular biology was initiated by Federico Mayor, UNESCO's director

general. Its purpose is to consolidate forces on the main promising trends and to set up a network of leading biological institutions throughout the world. This fact confirms that the understanding is growing in the world community of the tremendous social significance of biology which, through its discoveries, is contributing to laying the foundations on which the well-being of mankind and its prosperity will be built.

However, the optimistic future of biology can be achieved only if we bear two restrictions in mind. The first is related to the political health of society on which will depend the way the achievements of science will be used, to the benefit or the detriment of man. The second is related to the status of today's research. The point is that contemporary science (its biological branches above all) has assumed a new and very dangerous quality: methods and targets of experimentation have developed as part of its arsenal, such that the development of some trends is fraught with the threat of becoming uncontrollable by the will and reason of the scientists themselves. This conceals a danger the scale of which could prove to be truly global. Today the prevention of this danger is seen in understanding the risk of pursuing certain lines of research throughout the world.

Therefore, shall we have blossoming or catastrophe? Based on the example of scientific interests in the areas of genetic engineering and immunology, with which I am familiar, as well as the history of the development of biology in our country over the past 40 years, I shall discuss this alternative in greater detail.

#### Genetic Engineering

Genetic engineering has completed the first phase in its development. Methods were developed for introducing in the microorganisms genes belonging to viruses, bacteria, animals or man. They are functioning in the body of the new host and the thus created culture of microorganisms develops in virtually unlimited quantities the corresponding product which is coded with the introduction of the gene. This method has been mastered by the microbiological industry which already now is providing a number of valuable proteins and ferments, hormones (such as human insulin), vaccines (such as against hepatitis) and some antibiotics. Contemporary genetic engineering enables us to intensify the production of biogas and to enrich ore with the help of specially developed microorganisms.

From the social viewpoint, particularly significant is the work done in the area of hepatitis B and diabetes, for the lives of millions of people depend on its success. Hepatitis B is a severe viral disease of the liver. It is widespread throughout the world, primarily in Southeastern areas. It is encountered throughout our country, particularly in Central Asia. A substantial quantity of a particular viral protein—antigen—is necessary for the production of anti-hepatitis vaccines. This does not apply, strictly speaking, to the production of the virus which, as it were, is incredibly difficult, but to one of its proteins

which, furthermore, must be produced in its pure form. In a number of countries this difficulty has been surmounted through gene engineering. In the Soviet Union this work is being done with the joint efforts of two institutions: the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Institute of Virusology and the USSR Ministry of Health Institute of Immunology. The thus created plasmid (a structure which bears the genes which code said viral protein) was introduced in the yeast cell. Yeast capable of synthesizing the necessary viral antigen in unlimited quantities multiplied. The method for purifying it has been refined to perfection. In 1989 these two collectives were joined by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry which contributed its scientific-production facilities. The production of this life-saving vaccine is under way.

Insulin means life to millions of people who suffer from diabetes. According to statistical data in different countries, the number of such people ranges between 0.1 and 1 percent of the entire population. It is precisely the daily use of this hormone that ensures their good physical condition and, consequently, their social value. However, this is possible only with high-quality drugs. The best among them is not simply the highly purified hormone but a hormone of human origin. How to procure it? In Denmark hog insulin, chemically transformed into human insulin is marketed. Although for the time being this is the best preparation, the company producing it is already beginning the production of human gene-engineered insulin. Similar work has been organized in the United States. What about us? We too are beginning, although with great delay. All the laboratory stages have been crossed and what lies ahead is production. The main participants in this gene-engineering and biotechnological "odyssey" are the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry and the USSR Ministry of Medical Industry Institute of Antibiotics.

Therefore, the great interest shown by society in the success of genetic engineering is determined by its possibility of improving the quality of life of the people. However, another symmetrical aspect of these successes exists, which is fraught with tremendous danger. This refers to the possibility of using those same achievements for the development of microbiological weapons. To this effect it would suffice to give new aggressive qualities to the agents of infectious diseases, which would intensify their contaminating power or to increase the manufacturing of toxins which could make a disease unquestionably lethal. It is theoretically possible to create microorganisms which cause a given disease which could surmount previously acquired immunity. In that case even timely vaccination would prove ineffective. Genetic engineering makes it possible to develop microbes which are resistant to antibiotics. This means that a disease triggered by such an agent will not respond to presently familiar treatment methods. Luckily, I have no specific and reliable examples of the existence of gene engineered microbiological weapons. This, however,

would be possible. It is no accident that at the very dawn of the appearance of genetic engineering professor John Lederberg (United States) together with a group of other noted scientists warned mankind of the potential danger of such work.

A new stage has begun in the development of genetic engineering: the creation of transgene plants and animals. Essentially, this means introducing in the sexual cells of animals or plants new or additional genes. They lead to the creation of new organisms with new qualities. In other words, it is a question of creating plants and animals, i.e., superior organisms, which previously did not exist in nature.

It is along this line that several institutes in Moscow and in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan have developed various technologies for the restructuring of plant cells. Cellular lines have been developed for tomatoes resistant to the antifungal preparation Canamycin; a transgene tobacco resistant to the X-virus; alfalfa and potatoes which contain the legumin gene, which is the "reserve" leguminous protein. The latter is particularly interesting, for the development of alfalfa and potatoes greatly enriched with protein would become, under our conditions, one of the promising ways of solving the problem of the lack of feed and food proteins. It has already been widely acknowledged that difficulties related to compensating for protein shortages, based on the microbiological industry, have proved to be hard to surmount, while the possibilities for the extensive cultivation of soybean in the USSR are greatly limited by the country's climatic conditions. In this connection, the further development of transgene alfalfa and potatoes which carry genes of a "reserve" leguminous protein and their practical utilization is a major task for the scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences and VASKHNIL.

In a number of countries, as well as in the Soviet Union, huge economically valuable fish species have been developed as a result of the transgene introduction of additional genes of the growth hormone. Intensive work is under way to determine the structure of genes which encode in the organism of animals features of medical or agricultural importance. Researchers from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General Genetics and Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry have decoded the structure of the protein genes in cow milk, "reserve" proteins in wheat and oats and a group of genes in rye and barley and the coding proteins of the photosynthesizing system. The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Molecular Biology has decoded the meuroleukin and metastasin genes. Such work brings us closer to understanding the metastatic mechanisms, i.e., the ability of cancerous cells to metastasize.

Therefore, in the immediate future transgene animals could become producers of milk or wool with special qualities. The introduction of the genes of the growth hormone will make it possible to raise huge fish or inordinately big animals. It may become possible to increase resistance to disease, etc.

Naturally, any manipulation with the genes of human sexual cells today falls in the area of morality and ethics. However, correcting some genetic defects in somatic cells is becoming reality. This applies, above all, to some genetic disturbances in blood producing. The point is that blood making cells could be extracted from the bone marrow of a sick person. Their defective genes could be replaced by healthy ones. Such "repaired" blood-generating cells could be easily reintroduced into the body of the patient.

The practical application of a technology for the production of transgene plants and animals has been undertaken. I am convinced, however, that it is precisely now that we must loudly sound the alarm. I am referring to the possibility of the multiplication of transgene plants in nature and, as a consequence, the destruction of natural biocyanoses with unpredictable ecological consequences. Nor is the spreading of monsters and aggressive animals, insects above all, excluded.

### Immunology

Let us now cite a few examples from immunology, which has given mankind outstanding results such as the discovery of the blood groups and the ability to develop immunity to dangerous infections. The discovery of immunological blood groups solved the problem of blood transfusions. This procedure is saving millions of lives. The creation of immunity through vaccination led to the defeat of poliomyelitis and the total elimination of smallpox. Many infections are now kept under control. However, to this day we have no good vaccines against influenza and some intestinal and parasitical diseases. There is no anti-AIDS vaccine. Contemporary immunology is close to the threshold of their development. New principles for the development of vaccines have been formulated. Scientists working in the areas of molecular and cellular immunology, together with immunogeneticists, are finding ways of efficiently controlling the immune response of the body to alien substances.

This trend is important not only in the creation of new generation vaccines. We are seeking ways of surmounting immunodeficiencies. Primary, secondary and acquired immunodeficiencies are being encountered with increasing frequency. The deficiency of the immune system is the reason for most chronic diseases. Obviously, their spreading is related to environmental pollution, urbanization and various types of ecological changes. The immune system controls the biological cleanliness of our organism. It protects its internal steadiness or, in other words, it ensures the internal ecology, the ecology of the body. We speak a great deal of protecting the environment of the earth and less about protecting the inner environment of the human body. Thus, it is precisely the immune system that protects us from viruses, bacteria, alien proteins, allergies and cancer. Mankind will either intensify research in the area of basic immunology and find ways of surmounting

immunodeficiencies and allergies or else their dissemination will increase and threaten the existence of civilization.

We must distinguish between the problem of the ecology of the body from that of human ecology, which has been developed of late. As we know, human ecology considers man under different living conditions on earth, his place in the ecological systems and his influence on them and the influence of ecological consequences on human health. The ecology of the body studies not only the human organism but also any complex animal organism. The body of mammals consists of 10 to the power of 12 or 13 of coexisting and complexly interacting cells, which are the basic life units. Each group of cells, combined with other groups, forms the tissues and organs. They multiply in their specific areas and up to a certain limit. Such multiplication is "prohibited" elsewhere. Metaphorically speaking, each type of cells has its own territory, its ecological niche. Quantitative or qualitative changes in multiplication and changes in the correlation of cells indicate disruptions, diseases, cancer or the death of the organism. The "ecological" interaction among cells within the organism could be considered a kind of closed biosphere. The scale of the biosphere of the earth is approximately 10 to the 13th power greater than the scale of this biosphere of the organism. In other words, a roughly similar proportion prevails in the dimensions of man in the earth's biosphere and the blood or liver cell in the biosphere of the body.

The ecology of the body, as an important scientific discipline, is only now being established. However, it is already clear that the main guardian of the ecological ratios in the "small biosphere" is the immune system. Its normal functioning and constant training demand the interaction with alien substances which come from the "big biosphere," from the external world, in its entire biological variety. Changes in this variety as a result of the vanishing of one species or another or, conversely, oversaturation with certain groups, means a disturbance in the interaction between the two biospheres and a disruption of the work of the immune system, leading to its overstress or the weakening of some links, immunodeficient disturbances and allergies. Ecological immunology is a problem of the immediate future. Changes in the immune system with the pollution or destruction of the environment, or in the case of ecological catastrophes could, in the final account, lead to future disruptions of man's health. Unless we undertake major efforts in the fields of immunology and allergology, and if we ignore the problems which I described as the ecology of the body, we shall be unable to ensure the health of our descendants. This threat will grow by itself, without any malicious intent. All of us must actively work to prevent possible calamities.

Immunologists the world over are now united by the spreading of the new disease—AIDS. We must look farther and wider: we must learn how to prevent and treat all forms of existing and future immunodeficiencies. AIDS is merely the beginning.

Another problem of mankind is immunotherapy for cancer and surmounting the incompatibility of tissues in transplants. I link the two because this implies the solution of the same problem but with alternate objectives. In one case we must specifically destroy certain (cancerous) cells without affecting the healthy ones. In the other, we must specifically protect certain (transplanted) cells from the destructive influence of immune forces. I believe the basic approach here must be the use of antibodies, which are special protective proteins of the immune system possessing the unique capability of recognizing the cells which they are supposed to fight. They must identify and merge with them and with them only. This specific nature of recognition is unique and the antibodies make no mistake. Dozens of scientific collectives throughout the world are developing immunotoxins. In our country major advances have been made in this area by scientists from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Oncology Center and Cardiological Center. Antibodies are being developed against cancerous cells and a variety of toxic substances are being added to them. Such antibodies, introduced in the organism, will find the cancerous cells and will kill them with their toxic substances. The normal cells will not suffer. Of late a major contribution to the solution of this problem was made by researchers at Moscow University, the Institute of Applied Molecular Biology and the USSR Ministry of Health Institute of Immunology, which have developed a special type of immunotoxins—respecrins.

In order to protect the transplant it is necessary to develop immunotoxins against the cells which kill the transplanted organ. Above all, it is necessary to create antibodies which can distinguish between the necessary cells and all other without exception. Hybridomes, which are man-made hybrid cells which synthesize the necessary antibodies in unlimited quantities, are the tool for the creation of antibodies. Today any modern laboratory can perform such biotechnological work.

What is the danger endangering the optimistic and entirely realistic forecasts of the development of immunology? It is the possibility of developing the so-called ethnic weapon. Essentially, once again this applies to the same thing: on the basis of detecting fine biochemical differences among ethnic groups of people, in principle it is possible to design specific compounds which would be toxic to a given population group. Monstrous though this might be, mankind must bear in mind also such a potential threat to civilization from the uncontrolled development of contemporary biology.

#### The Danger of Inaction

In conclusion, let me express the confidence that science and society will justify the optimistic forecasts and prevent possible tragic consequences of scientific achievements in the natural sciences and will be able to avoid underestimating the losses to mankind with which the insufficiency of resources in the development of the

most important sectors is fraught. The alternative of "prosperity or catastrophe" must be resolved strictly in favor of prosperity.

These examples hardly cover the full range of problems in biology, the key to the solution of which could be used by no means exclusively for good purposes. Lack of attention to them on the part of society is in itself an evil and so is the failure to prevent catastrophes. However, the attentive and interested attitude toward science is by no means the least important when it comes to providing adequate financing for the corresponding research.

In our history we have already seen underdevelopment, lagging and obstruction of progress in science. I am referring above all to genetics. The active destruction of cadres and the teaching for 2 decades of monstrous prejudices instead of biology turned Soviet genetics into a semi-desert. The link between scientific generations was broken. I personally trained immediately after the infamous August VASKHNIL Session, from 1948 to 1953. I was in Voronezh and we, like all young people throughout the country, came out of the VUZs confident that no genes whatsoever existed, and that all of this was a fabrication of bourgeois Mendelians-Morganists. I have preserved materials from the 1953 Student Conference. It consisted of papers such as "Stalin is the Corypheus of Biology," and "The Michurin-Lysenko Theory is the Key to Fertility." My own paper on the nature of the effect of antibiotics on the agents of typhoid fever and dysentery had an ideological slant as well. Although the facts were interpreted not according to Lysenko, they were nonetheless based on the idea of the live substance with which Lepeshinskaya tried to replace the genes. My paper was entitled "Ontogenesis of Typhoid Fever and Dysentery Bacteria in the Process of Their Development From the Live Substance." It was thus that a student with a distorted education trustingly trusted the authority of the USSR Academy of Sciences which, at a special 1952 Conference, proclaimed Lepeshinskaya's theory the peak of biological thinking and the foundation of the theory of cells. In 1953 we came out of the VUZs not educated but, precisely, with a maimed biological training. There were 12 such graduating classes, through 1964. This meant hundreds of thousands of biologists, physicians, agronomists, animal husbandry men and educators.

It was in 1964 that, finally, Lysenko was debunked. After Stalin's death we were unable to accomplish this, for Khrushchev believed him and he continued to "run the show," although not all that strictly. Meanwhile we, young biologists, were left to find our own way out of a burning desert in the search of genetic oases. I, Vladimir Korogodin, Zhores Medvedev and many others discovered Nikolay Vladimirovich Timofeyev-Resovskiy. A large group found shelter in the Atomic Energy Institute. Another group worked under the protection of Academicians V.N. Sukachev, B.L. Astaurov and V.A. Engelhardt. With the help of our teachers we found the truth and survived. Having survived, we began to work in the field of genetics, both experimentally and socially.

In 1959, after attending a real genetic university course taught by Timofeyev-Resovskiy at the Bolshoye Miassovo Biological Station, V. Korogodin, A. Neyfakh, Ye. Romantsev, F. Lyass and I wrote the book "*The Contribution of Radiology to the Development of Medical-Biological Disciplines*," in which we spoke of chromosome studies, measuring the size of genes, radiation mutations and the work of the real geneticists. We were unable to publish this book in Moscow, but several years later we managed to do so in Minsk. Meanwhile, I became a member of the first commission which was investigating Lysenko's activities. This commission, sponsored by the Moscow City Party Gorkom, having investigated the work of the Institute of General Genetics and the Gorki Leninskiye Farm, headed by Lysenko, drew a negative conclusion.

We presented our "sentence" to the aktiv of the institute in Lysenko's presence. This was at the end of the week. On Monday we were to gather at the Moscow City Party Committee to sign the retyped text of our conclusion. However, in its Sunday edition PRAVDA published an extensive report on N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the Gorki Leninskiye, where he had approved all the work done by Lysenko and had emphasized that everyone should work that way. There was no further gathering of the commission....

We fought an uneven battle. Zhores Medvedev wrote the book "*The Cult of Personality in Biology*." Naturally, the book was not published. It was classified as ideologically hostile literature. Academician V.N. Sukachev lost the journal he managed. Our work and our seminars were semi-clandestine.

Why am I mentioning all this? Because to this day the situation with genetics in the country has not been brought to normal. A total war was being waged against us by the state. Now we are restoring the truth quietly, by including genetic aspects in a variety of resolutions on the development of science, such as molecular biology, biotechnology or bioengineering. In my view, the government should promulgate a separate decree on the development of genetics. This is necessary also from the political viewpoint, from the viewpoint of our science and world public opinion. The state engaged in destruction, the state should admit its error and correct the situation.

More than 1 year ago the USSR Academy of Sciences held an all-Union conference of geneticists, which was of essential significance. At that conference the question was sharply raised of the fact that in our country genetics, which had greatly suffered during the Lysenko years, had still not healed the wounds in terms of cadres, and on the material and moral levels, and that the USSR Academy of Sciences should pay particular attention to the support of genetics, which is the foundation of all biological disciplines.

The Academy of Sciences Presidium included in its priority program on biological resources a major section

on general genetics and worked hard on a draft special government resolution on the further development of genetics. Today, however, this work has stopped on the level of departmental coordination. There is already talk that it will not be adopted and that genetics, it is claimed, enjoys adequate support. In other words, keep working, the state is not to be blamed for the fact that you have fallen behind.

I consider this situation as a threat of inaction. This is the second limitation to my optimistic view on the future of biology. The first is related to the morality of society, which determines the use of scientific achievements, for better or for worse. The second is the underestimating of the need for the development of individual scientific areas. If we do not acquire the necessary knowledge in genetics or immunology, the evil will come by itself, caused by our insufficiently serious approach to such matters.

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## PAGES FROM HISTORY

### Letters From the Countryside. The Year 1937

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[Text] It is only of late that, for the first time, we have begun to look at the history of the tragic 1930s and what opens in front of our eyes is a bottomless pit of difficulties and pain which afflicted the people with the Stalinist despotism. It has already become obvious today that the bloody terror waged against the so called "enemies of the people" and the "GULAG Archipelago," the forced collectivization, the destruction of the kulak class and the hunger of 1932-1933 took millions of human lives and wrecks those of an even greater number of people. They undermined the strength of the country on the eve of the inevitable conflict with fascism and dealt a most terrible blow at the building of socialism. But this was not all! Stalinism doomed to incalculable suffering the Soviet people as a whole, every person with, perhaps a few exceptions of those who, willy-nilly, became involved in the activities of the command-repressive machinery.

Actually, what do we know today about the real life of our people, particularly that of their predominant "silent" mass—the workers and peasants? Scientific studies of the life of the working class and the peasantry in the 1930s are only now being undertaken and a great deal of time will be needed before we can digest and critically analyze this documentary material to which only now are historians gaining access. Furthermore, it has become clear that by no means were all aspects of reality reflected in the documentation of the Stalinist bureaucratic administration: frequently what was recorded was not what actually happened but that which should have happened, in accordance with the concepts of the "great leader." The most valuable source of information of what really was at that time may be found in the memoirs of contemporaries,

particularly when they discussed exceptional events, such as detentions and executions, ruination and hunger. Ordinary events, which were repeated day after day, particularly those occurring under more or less bearable conditions, were usually forgotten and recollections about them were quite approximate, vague or frequently entirely lacking. Does this not explain the fact that life in our society in the second half of the 1930s is remembered, from the material and cultural viewpoints, through the recollections of the contemporaries as being relatively prosperous and, compared with 1931-1934, simply good.

To the countryside, the "kolkhoz NEP" of 1935-1936, it appeared, was a time when wages, in physical terms, were becoming substantial and when the horrors of the hunger and violence was vanishing into the past. At the second congress of kolkhoz-shock workers in 1935, Stalin proclaimed that "village life has become better and more joyful." A peasant song which incorporated these words, however, added to them an ironic explanation: "The neck became thinner but longer." One way or another, a certain improvement in real life indeed could be noticed, overshadowing in the public's memory the rightlessness of the masses and the tragedy of individuals and families which, as in the past, continued to die of poverty and hunger.

Nonetheless, the researcher has at his disposal a historical source which has preserved the real voices of truth and suffering which were sounded (but not heard!) during the period of official lies which imbued all pores of social life, and when everyone mandatorily had to consider himself "happy." This applies to letters which, for a long time, were ignored by our historiography and to which it is only now, under glasnost, that we have the opportunity to look at the living testimony of eyewitnesses. What comes to mind are Hertzen's words: "Letters are more valuable than memoirs, for imbued in them is the blood of events. They describe what happened as it was, lingering and imperishable." Such are precisely the letters from the countryside, written in 1937, which we submit to the attention of the readers.

Preserved in state and party archives are a tremendous number of petitions, complaints and declarations which came from the countryside in the 1930s. They include letters expressing official enthusiasm and written most frequently on the occasion of holidays, dictated by the raykom instructor or a visiting journalist. Most letters are complaints objecting to unbearable taxes and mandatory procurements of farm produce (kolkhozes as well as the private auxiliary plots of kolkhoz members were subject to such taxes). There were interesting letters whose authors tried to "open the eyes" of the high leadership about the true state of affairs in the collectivized countryside. They account for most of the letters in this selection. These documents are imbued with the conviction that the truth must be told, a truth which, it seemed to the correspondents, was being concealed from the leadership: "Our press is pulling the wool over your eyes;" "I am writing you openly the full truth;" "you would be amazed if you knew everything;" "I am writing you without any prompting, I have nothing against the system," and so on.

These letters were written by both kolkhoz members and private farmers. Life for both was hard although, naturally, the situation of those who had not joined the kolkhozes frequently became simply unbearable. Finally, yet another group of letters (by no means small) contained what was essentially an appeal for help by people who were desperate and who frequently indeed were perishing under the burden of poverty, arbitrary behavior and unbearable labor. Typically, most frequently they were written by children who had still not lost their faith in the honesty and justice of the high leadership and in the indivisibility of its words and its actions. It is no accident that letters about truth and despair were addressed personally to J.V. Stalin as "the leader, teacher and friend," and to M.I. Kalinin as the head of state and offspring of the countryside and, therefore, the spokesman for the interests of the countryside and the "representative of the peasantry."

The documents published here are quite typical not only in terms of their content but also the impression they leave. Virtually all of them were marked "to be filed," which in the more precise language of prerevolutionary offices meant "no follow up," i.e., do nothing.

A demanding reader may note that letters related to the exposure of the "local authorities," sometimes accused of "sabotage" and even of "Trotskyism," not to mention letters containing requests for help, were distinguished by a certain one-sidedness and an overemphasis and even exaggeration of improper phenomena.... We shall not dispute the possible "darkening of colors" in such appeals. However, as to the accuracy of the facts they contain, we can certify to it and, if necessary, we have done so in our commentaries. That is the reason for which the letters by Nina Shvetsova are accompanied in this publication by references, reports, excerpts from minutes of village soviets and rayon executive committees, which confirm the accuracy of every single word written by this girl.

The letters are printed without any editing or significant corrections.

The documents were identified and prepared for publication by V.P. Danilov, doctor of historical sciences, scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History, L.A. Kovaleva, scientific associate, at the Arkhivist Cooperative in Kostroma, and N.V. Muravyeva, senior scientific associate, Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CPSU Central Committee.

I

'Dear Comrade Stalin...'

1.

13 January 1937

Hello dear Comrade Stalin! Our beloved leader, teacher and friend of the entire happy Soviet country. Dear Comrade Stalin! I send you my warm and hearty greetings and wish

you the best of successes in your life and to be always in good health. I would like to describe to you my sad life.

Dear Comrade Stalin! I heard your speech on the radio, in which you said in that in the Soviet Union the life of children is very good. They go to school, and the doors to the schools are wide open to them. Naturally, this is true, dear Comrade Stalin.

Dear Iosif Vissarionovich, both I and my brother Aleksandr are too weak to go to school because, Comrade Stalin, we have no food. The Kurilovo Village Soviet confiscated our cow and horse in 1935. For the second year in a row we live without a cow and horse. Currently we have no cattle whatsoever because the rural soviet taxed us incorrectly. It claimed that my father was a carter but this was wrong. My father was not driving a cart. One tax was 900 rubles and, all together, we were taxed more than 2,000 rubles. We are unable to pay such a high tax.... Comrade Stalin, our family consists of eight people: six children, the oldest of which is a girl of 14, and the youngest who is two:

Dear Iosif Vissarionovich! We did not join the kolkhoz because my father is disabled. He fought in two wars in which he lost his entire health so that he cannot work in the kolkhoz. To live as a private farmer is also not too good. It is even bad. However, we work patiently, doing what we can. We have no land, for we surrendered our land to the kolkhoz in 1936.

Comrade Stalin, I go to school. I am in the fourth grade. My brother also goes to school, he is in the second grade. The others do not go to school for they are still too young. Dear Comrade Stalin, it is quite impossible for us to attend school, for we have no food and, furthermore, we are very anemic.

Dear Comrade Stalin! I would like to describe to you my success in school: in the first quarter my grades for seven subjects were "excellent" and for three, "good." ...However, I shall strive, which is what I want, to achieve the grade "excellent" for all subjects during the third quarter. If we had food, Comrade Stalin, I would have studied even better.

Not one fourth-grade student joined the Pioneers. However, I told the unit leader that I wanted to become a Pioneer and I was enrolled in a team in the sixth grade, named after you, Comrade Stalin.

Dear and beloved leader, Comrade Stalin! I think about and rely on you that you will help us. Please do not ignore my letter.

"To Comrade Stalin: Thank you Comrade Stalin for our happy life! For our happy childhood and for our wonderful days."

So, Comrade Stalin, our beloved leader, I have described to you my life. I rely on you, the beloved leader of a

happy country, that you will not ignore my request. Please answer me, dear Comrade Stalin, I shall wait impatiently.

My address: Makaryev City, Unzhe Ivanov Oblast, Kurilovo Village Soviet, Ileykino Village, Shvetsova Nina Vasilyevna.

N. Shvetsova (I am 12 years old)

2.

Reference

30 May 1937

Issued to citizen Shvetsov Vasiliy Grigoryevich, by the Ileykino Krasny Luch Kolkhoz, to the effect that he has never worked as a carter. Certified by the citizens whose signatures follow.

(Nine Signatures)

Reference

22 July 1937

The present reference is issued to fourth grade student in the Ust-Neyskaya School Shvetsova Nina, to the effect that she has had excellent grades during her school attendance. Shvetsova Nina is the daughter of the private farmer Vasiliy Grigoryevich Shvetsov from Ileykino Village, who has a family of eight members, two of whom are able-bodied. The father is a third group invalid. In 1935 his cow and horse were confiscated for nonpayment of taxes to the farm. While attending school this year, Nina Shvetsova was repeatedly unwell as a result of poor nutrition at home. Nina Shvetsova has not received any aid from anyone. Nina Shvetsova's father has neither cattle nor land. Nina Shvetsova is a model Pioneer. She is the rural correspondent for the newspapers NA LESNOM FRONTE, KOLKHOZNYYE REBYATA and VSEGDA GOTOV.

A. Muravyev, Ust-Neyskaya School Principal

3.

Makaryevskiy Rayon Executive Committee Presidium

In answer to your question on taxation and confiscation of property for failure to pay taxes by Shvetsov Vasiliy Grigoryevich, Ileykino Village, Kurilovo Village Soviet: In 1935 the farm was private. In 1935 Shvetsov had a home, a yard, sheep, and a family of eight members, two of whom were able-bodied. The farm had 1.24 hectares in winter crops and a garden of 0.25 hectares.

In the computation of the rural taxes for 1935, income was assessed as follows: from the farm, 650 rubles; from zhgonki<sup>1</sup> 2,000 rubles on the basis of 20 rubles daily, 100 workdays; from hauling, 250 rubles. The computed rural tax for 1935 was 888 rubles; self-taxation<sup>2</sup>, 417 rubles; insurance, 60 rubles; total tax assessment 1,365 rubles, of which 598 rubles paid in cash and the following was

recorded and confiscated for failure to pay the balance of the tax: horse, 250 rubles; cow, 350 rubles. Therefore, the owed taxes total 167 rubles.

Assessed rural tax for 1936: 117.60 rubles; 19.10 rubles paid; self-taxation, 70.92 rubles. Nothing paid. Thirty-three rubles of insurance paid in full and collection for cultural-consumer construction<sup>3</sup> for 1937, 188.16 rubles—nothing paid.

The present is certified by the Kurilovo Rural Soviet.

Rural Soviet Chairman: (signature illegible)

Confiscated on 28 October 1935, a horse assessed at 350 rubles; on 19 December 1935, a cow assessed at 500 rubles.

(Penciled signature)

4.

Reports to the Presidium of the Rayon Executive Committee

9 June 1937

On the petition by Shvetsova Nina to the rayon executive committee presidium.

I, A.A. Muravyev, head of cadre sector under the chairman of the rayon executive committee, established the following after on-site inspection, based on the petition submitted by Shvetsova Nina to the Kurilovo Rural Soviet:

Shvetsov Vasiliy Grigoryevich, Nina Shvetsova's father, is a private middle farmer who, according to the petition, is classified as third group invalid without, however, having any proof of invalidity at the present time. He has his plot of land totaling 22 hundredths of a hectare and a family of seven, five of which are children ages from three to 13.

In 1935 the taxation commission of the rural soviet assessed rural taxes at 888 rubles, 66.36 rubles in insurance, 417.17 rubles self-taxation or a total of 1,371.81 rubles, of which Shvetsov paid to the rural soviet 127.61 rubles. The balance was not paid and Shvetsov refused to pay it, claiming that the taxation was improper. On the basis of the inventory taken, a cow worth 500 rubles was confiscated from V.G. Shvetsov by the rural soviet; the cow was sold by the rural soviet to kolkhoz member I.I. Zhirnov, from Andreyevskiy Kolkhoz, for 500 rubles, from which 250 rubles were withheld in payment of the agricultural tax, and 250 rubles for self-taxation; in 1937 the agricultural tax assessment for Shvetsov was 153.80 rubles; self-taxation 94.08 rubles; insurance payments, 23.96 rubles and culture tax, 188.16 rubles. By 9 June 1937 Shvetsov had made no insurance payment.

In 1935 Shvetsov was sentenced by the Makaryev People's Court to 8 months of forced labor for failure to meet his grain procurement<sup>4</sup>, meat procurement<sup>5</sup>, and

milk procurement<sup>6</sup> obligations, of which he served 6 months and was released for the other two because of disability.

At the present time he is unemployed. He worked a few days stripping bark. I consider the action of the rural soviet right and entirely legal.

A. Muravyev

5.

Excerpt from Minutes No 34 of the Session of the Presidium of the Makarayevskiy Rayon Executive Committee

13 July 1937

11. Heard: complaint by Nina Shvetsova a resident of the Kurilovo Rural Soviet.

Decree: The actions of the Kurilovo Rural Soviet are considered proper and no action to be taken on Shvetsova's complaint. Dokina, chairman of the Kurilovo Rural Soviet, and Muravyev, principal of the Ust-Neyskaya School, are instructed to investigate the living conditions of Nina Shvetsova and to report to the presidium by 17 July of this year. Comrade Dokina is ordered to provide material aid to Shvetsova in the amount of 60 rubles from school funds.

6.

18 July 1937

Dear Comrade Zhiveynov! (F.I. Zhiveynov was chairman of the Makarayevskiy Rayon Executive Committee)

First of all, Fedor Ivanovich, let me report to you that on 13 July I visited your rayon executive committee presidium. My complaint was being discussed and, for some reason, the discussion was not completed. You instructed village soviet chairman M.I. Dokina and A. Muravyev, principal of the Ust-Neyskaya School, to conduct an investigation. Fedor Ivanovich, you said that this was to be done within 3 days and reported to you at the rayon executive committee. However, 4 days have already passed and nothing has been settled and no investigation has been conducted. I went to see A.P. Muravyev and inquired.... However, I was told by Aleksey Petrovich that "no one has told me anything about it." This is absolutely accurate. To this day M.I. Dokina has not reported anything to A.P. Muravyev as to what had been resolved by the presidium. I beg of you, Fedor Ivanovich, please consider my complaint faster. Inform M.I. Dokina once again and also A.P. Muravyev, that they too should conduct the investigation sooner. Meanwhile, Fedor Ivanovich, we are dying of hunger. There is no bread and no money. We have no cow, for which reason we have no milk and we have nothing to eat. Fedor Ivanovich, you should see what our food consists of. Throughout the winter we eat plants and mushrooms and anything green, without bread, for we have no bread. In that case you, Fedor Ivanovich, would have said: yes, this family is indeed dying of hunger. Our family consists of eight people, six of them children, the

oldest 14, and the youngest two. Our father has gone to look for work, but where is he? We do not know. We receive neither money nor letters from him. He may not even be alive. At present mother is wasting away from sorrow and I too am sick. All of us are severely anemic. Apparently we, the young ones, will die of hunger. I beg of you, Fedor Ivanovich, once again I beg of you to help us, to give us back our cow for our family is about to die of hunger. I believe, Fedor Ivanovich and I hope that you will not reject my petition. Please, I beg of you, Fedor Ivanovich, to help us, give us back the cow. So long, Fedor Ivanovich. That is all I wanted to write you. I am writing you without being able to see anything, I am sick.

Respectfully, N. Shvetsova.

Resolution: "To Comrade Muravyev. I request that help be given and that Comrade Dokina be instructed of this. Zhiveynov. 20 July 1937."

II

'...A Totally Sad Picture'

19 April 1937

To Comrade Kalinin, Central Executive Committee chairman

Moscow, The Kremlin

Comrade Kalinin and Comrade Stalin:

You are the smartest leaders of our government and Soviet policy but, probably, you too are profoundly mistaken. Today we claim that kolkhozes and kolkhoz members are becoming more prosperous and that life has become happier and more joyful. It is worth determining the extent to which this is true and is this what is indeed taking place in the life of the kolkhoz countryside?

Dear leaders, you are quite blind. You can only hear at various congresses and conferences some people who are pleased with everything, the delegates, and our entire press is pulling the wool over your eyes about the kolkhoz countryside. Actually, the situation in the kolkhozes is most sad, particularly compared to the period of the NEP, i.e., when there was private farming, from 1925 to 1930, when agriculture substantially increased and was enriched with the appearance of all sorts of agricultural machinery. The people were interested in living and working as farmers and no chiefs whatsoever were needed (unlike the situation today, with a mass of people who do not work, such as chairmen, accountants, brigade leaders, etc.). At that time the countryside, every village and settlement was being built, there were plenty of horses, cattle and poultry, and all sorts of agricultural produce was reaching the cities. In the markets everything for the worker was inexpensive. Indeed, at that time everyone was becoming more prosperous and satisfied, while private property was not accepted and was being eliminated with the help of the farmhand's trade union committees<sup>7</sup>.

We now hear a number of references concerning life during that time, voiced even by people who are loyal to party policy. With the collectivization of 1930 the entire wealth has collapsed as though disappearing into the ground. What we notice now in the kolkhoz countryside is the entirely opposite picture: construction has frozen and, particularly kolkhoz property. It is only in pictures that one could see that allegedly everything is being built communally, such as homes, hostels, baths, etc. Is this in fact the case? The people are working under coercion. Most of them are leaving the kolkhozes for the city, totally uninterested in living in a kolkhoz, settling down with their families and becoming needy. Under those circumstances many people are interested in working only for themselves, i.e., they do not want children. The people are going to the city for industry, allegedly there the system is better.

Here is the best possible proof: a Red Army man who completes his service in the Worker and Peasant Red Army very rarely joins a kolkhoz. Most of them investigate what is wrong with the kolkhoz and seek jobs in industry in the towns.

Many kolkhozes or, rather, kolkhoz members, live a semi-hungry or hungry life in rags, with pitiful nutrition (no bread or potatoes), no meat, for it is very difficult to raise and feed cattle. Life is hard for (ordinary) kolkhoz members with five to six children. This situation may be noted in a number of kolkhozes in our East Siberian Oblast and, in particular, in our Cheremkhovskiy Rayon.

I cannot give you my conclusion in this letter but I suggest that an investigation be made in the kolkhozes, perhaps in our oblast or rayon.

Have I accurately described and expressed my opinion based on the generally noted situation which prevails in the kolkhoz countryside today? We hear, particularly from the kolkhoz members, that today is no time to build anything or even to put a roof on a hut or a shed, since the rest is rotting and being destroyed and burned for firewood, for there are no horses (to haul wood from the forest). With every passing year things are getting worse and not better. Compensation per labor day is diminishing with every passing year.

East Siberian Oblast, Cheremkhovskiy Rayon, A.Ye. Kirpichnikov.

Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, l. 16, autograph

### III

'If We Were to Describe Everything, You Would Be Amazed...'

28 April 1937

Dear Comrade Mikhail Ivanovich!

How are we to come out of this situation? We think that you and Comrade Stalin do not know how badly the

kolkhoz members live. We believe that you are being misled by our village communists. Perhaps they are writing you that the kolkhozes have a very good life. There are many such communists who have nothing else to show but their cards and these cards are doing harm. There have been cases in our kolkhoz which took it to the point of collapse by the fault of the kolkhoz managers themselves. I am writing this to you openly and with no falsehood. For quite some time I have tried to write to you but have now decided to do it. However, not everything is clear. If I were to describe everything you would be amazed unless you really know what is taking place here. If you do not trust my letter investigate yourselves what is taking place with us, dear comrades. Please answer my letter at which point I shall describe everything in detail.

To dear Comrade Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin:

This is to report that we, the kolkhoz members of the Kolkhoz imeni Comrade Blyukher, Novo-Nikolayevskiy Rayon, Stalingrad Kray, Krasnostenovskiy Village Soviet, went to the field to sow the wheat on 8 April. All kolkhoz members went conscientiously to work and were willing to work and plant on time and harvest on time the crops from the field. However, dear M.I., what is torturing us, and I am telling you this frankly, we are dying of hunger. We are totally without bread. For the first half of the year we received 500 grams per labor day and no more. The bins are empty and rarely is some being brought from the outside but it is expensive, at 2.80 rubles per kilogram and the rayon keeps promising to our kolkhoz a food loan and, in the final account, has not given it. Dear Mikhail Ivanovich, pass on my letter to your close comrade, for I have told you the entire truth, that we are dying of hunger. Here the rayon consumer cooperative is charging 65 rubles per quintal of bran and even that is in short supply.

Please take steps. My address: Novo-Nikolayevskiy Rayon, Stalingrad Kray, Krasnostenovskiy Village Soviet, Bodikov Settlement.

Kozyrev Dmitriy Yakovlevich

Resolution: "File. M. Kalinin. 3 June 1937."

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, l. 36, autograph

### IV

'Naturally, There is No Difficulty Which Bolsheviks Cannot Surmount'

14 May 1937

Comrade Kalinin, let me hasten to identify myself: my name is Aleksey Mikhailovich Lopata, a fifth grade student at the Konstantinograd Incomplete Secondary School. I thought of writing a letter to you, Comrade Kalinin, as chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, to tell you that in our cooperative there are no manufactured products or leather goods and I must

stop going to school because I have neither boots nor shoes, trousers or shirts. Please answer me, Comrade Kalinin, is it that our salesmen are to be blamed or is there a shortage of cotton or have the factories collapsed. Naturally, there is no difficulty which the bolsheviks cannot surmount and I am a future bolshevik. Nonetheless, our difficulties are great. Not everyone is in such a bad position in the village. Some have fathers who support them. I have no father, for he died as early as 1922 and mother raised us that way. We work in the kolkhoz and there is bread but the situation with manufactured goods is bad. Please answer me, will there be a sufficient amount of goods? I feel bad about stopping to go to school. I would like to complete at least the fifth grade for it is bad to live like an illiterate. I end with this. I am writing this without being prompted. I have nothing against the system, please answer to the following address:

Omsk Oblast, Pavlogradskiy Rayon, Bozhedorovskiy Village Soviet, Konstantinogradka Village, Lopata Aleksey Mikhailovich.

Resolution: "File. M.I. Kalinin, 10 July 1937."

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, l. 164, autograph

V

'Great Deal of Unemployment, Poverty and Hunger'

15 May 1937

To Comrade Kalinin, VKP(b) Central Committee:

Dear leaders of the Central Committee. I would like to ask you why is it that on your instructions the press writes that there is no unemployment in the USSR, yet there is a great deal of unemployed and poverty and hunger in the USSR.... (editor's note: here and subsequently several dots indicate erased or illegible words). I am currently unemployed, I was laid off and I am unable to find work anywhere. There are many such people here, more than a thousand are unemployed.... The Soviet system is unfair. Although you drafted the constitution, you are not obeying this constitution. You are saying that all citizens of the USSR are equal. We are writing the truth, we have nothing. Take the peasants, who have been stripped down to their shirts. The peasants as well have had to go to Moscow to earn a piece of bread but in Moscow as well it is very difficult for if someone comes to you from abroad, the USSR and all leaders immediately give him a job and an apartment but when one of us comes he is sent to hell, not to interfere and is forced to die of hunger. Our workers and peasants are ignored as well and are being kicked out of everywhere, like dogs. If you would look at how many unemployed there are in the USSR... but you are writing to us that in foreign countries there is an even greater number of people unemployed, poor and hungry but then... this is not the case abroad but in the USSR.

Answer us in PRAVDA.

1,000 signatures (editorial note: there are no "1,000 signatures" added to this letter. Obviously, they are mentioned not with a view to mislead but are based on the author's naive conviction that the thoughts and wishes he expresses are shared by very many people, which should draw the attention of the authorities).

We demand of the Central Executive Committee that it take all of this into consideration and that there be no such high unemployment in the USSR. You should not pull the wool over our eyes. We beg for an answer in PRAVDA.

Zhukovskiy, 1,000 signatures.

Resolution: "File. No other signatures and address. M. Kalinin, 4 June 1937."

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 592, ll. 9.9, reverse, autograph

VI

'Looking Inside...'

18 May 1937

Mikhail Ivanovich! Lacking any other possibility, I have decided to address myself to you, as the leader of the proletariat and as someone familiar with agriculture. M.I. I am presently in a kolkhoz. As the right way for the peasantry, (indicated) by Comrade Lenin, this is the best way for the peasantry. At the present time I read a great deal of newspapers and books. The newspapers write that there is construction everywhere, that the kolkhozes are beginning to live a prosperous life. However, not all of this is true. I read... about achievements by kolkhozes, but all of this is superficial. If one looks inside the kolkhozes one would probably see the opposite. However, also looking within the kolkhoz members, one would see something entirely different and this is a fact. The situation is confirmed by the fact of the kolkhoz members leaving the kolkhozes. At the present time what is left in the kolkhozes, including the old population which lived there before kolkhozes were formed, no more than 50 percent of the people remain. This fact characterizes the unwillingness to live in a kolkhoz. Today the drain of kolkhoz members from the kolkhozes is continuing in quite substantial numbers. It is true that complex machinery has come to our fields to replace the kolkhoz members who have left the kolkhozes, but machines as well need manpower. How to explain the fact that the kolkhoz members are leaving the kolkhozes? I believe that kolkhozes and kolkhoz members were hurt by the government which has compared them to workers in factories. The latter live much better than kolkhoz members. As proof of this fact, there are kolkhoz members who left the kolkhozes 2 years ago and have found jobs at plants and enterprises and write that presently life in a plant or factory has become better than in kolkhozes. They know every passing day how much they earn and they write that one could earn 15 rubles or more and that at the plant one can buy everything, both manufactured

and other goods as much as one likes. They write that they live there much better than in the kolkhozes.

Let a kolkhoz member try to buy something in his own area: there are no manufactured goods and the kolkhoz members are poorly dressed.

If we try to assess how to justify the labor of the kolkhoz members, there is nothing we can say: there is the fact that in 1936 the kolkhoz members received no more than 1 ruble per labor day and 500 grams of bread. Such was the pay for kolkhoz labor. Here is an example: the worker works a specific number of hours while the kolkhoz member works from early morning to late night. There is no equality in the labor between workers and kolkhoz members and if a worker is forced to work the way the kolkhoz member does and earn per labor day, the worker will not do it as does the kolkhoz member. Why is labor paid so low in the kolkhozes? The kolkhozes and kolkhoz members make all their payments as mandated by the state: grain, meat, milk, wool, potatoes and other products, receiving in exchange the lowest possible wage. For example, the state purchases rye at 6.5 rubles per quintal; oats, 5.5 rubles; meat, 27 kopeks per kilogram; milk, 10 kopeks per liter; potatoes no more than 3 rubles per quintal. Therefore, these are firm prices. As to buying any goods, firm prices no longer exist. For example, sugar costs between 4.5 and 4.7 rubles per kilo; manufactured goods, from 2 rubles and up and even then they are lacking; rye bread costs 85 kopeks per kilo whereas the state purchases rye at 6.5 kopeks per kilo. Adding the grain and the baking and all overhead, the state has a net profit of a minimum of 80 rubles per quintal. Compared to 1926, at that time the state purchased grain at 80 kopeks per pood which meant that sugar cost 38 kopeks per kilo and the peasant was able to buy 2 kilos of sugar per pood of rye whereas today if he is to buy 1 kilo of sugar he must sell 5 poods of rye. Therefore, compared to the produce sold by the peasants, prices of commodities have increased by slightly over a factor of 12. If we consider other goods such as, for example, kerosene, it was 7 kopeks per kilo whereas it is now 80 kopeks. Today the kolkhoz member says that the state is taking all the products for free and that the payments he gets are miserable. Such is the cost of the peasant produce. Speaking of money, however, you may say that a kolkhoz member could earn more on the outside and could sell his surplus produce. I already wrote to you that few kolkhoz members are left, and they can barely cope with their own farms and where could they go for extra earnings? Such is the situation in the kolkhozes as far as money is concerned.

However, as to supplies of other goods, they are totally lacking. For example, there is no iron to repair carts, wheels, etc. Furthermore, the kolkhoz member must work 6 days in road construction for free<sup>8</sup> whereas no such duties are imposed on workers and employees. Therefore, the pressure put on the kolkhoz has worn out our patience.

I already wrote that the draining of kolkhoz members from kolkhozes is continuing and about what is taking place. The kolkhoz member is willing to sell everything and leave for parts unknown for the sake of living a better life.

Mikhail Ivanovich! I believe that this manpower should be retained so that it would not abandon the kolkhozes. What is needed to achieve this? I believe that the prices of farm goods should be amended and that the labor of the kolkhoz members be conscientiously assessed or else that the prices of goods be lowered. If the labor of the kolkhoz member is fairly paid, he will work more assiduously, increase yields and develop animal husbandry which has greatly declined. The kolkhoz members and the kolkhozes must be supplied with goods on a planned basis. What we have now are lines in which the kolkhoz members cannot wait for they cannot leave the countryside.

Let me now take the example of our own kolkhoz. Our kolkhoz is in a distant part of the rayon and our Shurminskiy Rayon, Kirovskiy Kray, pays for grain procurements on the basis of first zone rates.<sup>9</sup> The average rate is 2.39 for the second zone for the rayon. The neighboring Kilmezskiy Rayon, however, pays 1.7 quintals per hectare, considering their sandy soil. In our kolkhoz, however, the land is equally sandy but we pay 2.39 per quintal. Therefore, after paying for all procurements, there is not enough fodder and we have to purchase oats; in 1936 we purchased oats worth 8,000 rubles. The result is the ancient saying with a new twist: "Do not grieve, oats, for the fact that per 1 ruble of increase I shall pay 10 and fall further behind."

Mikhail Ivanovich! A great deal more could be written and, as it were, I have already written a great deal. I believe, however, that the tactic in the countryside should be changed and only then could we implement Comrade Stalin's slogan of making all kolkhozes bolshhevik and the kolkhoz members prosperous.

Please answer my remarks at the following address: Kirov Oblast, Shurminskiy Rayon, N. Shurminskiy Village Soviet, Chelyuskinets Kolkhoz, Vetruzhskiy Nikolay Petrovich.

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, ll. 21, 21 reverse, 22, 22 reverse, autograph

## VII

'The Race is Getting Faster, Faster and Faster'

2 June 1937

I am writing this letter to the Central Executive Committee only for the sake of determining whether it knows or does not know what is taking place in our Krasnobakovskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast, the shortcomings and distortions which exist here and what is preventing us from living well in the kolkhozes, as well as the way the

mass of the people feel in our kolkhozes and what is it that makes them feel that way.

1. The shortcomings in the rayon I named are of that nature: there is a lack of mass explanatory work in the area of agriculture; instead, we are racing faster, faster and faster. The question is the following: What does faster mean, for this word is causing a great deal of damage being caused by the rayon leadership and the village soviet, driving the kolkhoz members on from one project to another, allowing no respite, for said leadership is being more harmful to the state than it is useful because of its idleness. This idleness is manifested in the fact that every year we lose 30 percent of the rye, 50 percent of the oats and other crops. All such losses are the result of urging on the kolkhoz members, to the point that the latter can no longer tolerate working without rest and leave. The sowing is also done quickly and as long as the volume has been reached no one takes care of the crops later. We are not allowed to work well in order to show profit for ourselves and the state. Everything is being done in haste—the rye, oats, flax and other crops. The entire rayon leadership is urging the kolkhoz members: pull the flax, bundle the flax, spread the flax. Meanwhile, the rye, oats and other crops are crumbling. The reason for all this is for the rayon's leadership to lift their snouts and see that the acorns are growing on the oak tree (Krylov's fable "A Pig Under an Oak Tree"), while all that is left to the kolkhoz member is the roots—1 kilogram or less per labor day. I beg that the experienced peasant not be instructed but that his advice be sought as to how better to cultivate the soil, when to sow the various crops and how to sow them. It is only in that case that the kolkhozes will become bolshevik and the kolkhoz members prosperous. If what is going on today were to be continued, for a long time the kolkhoz members will not be prosperous. Let me also add something about the way the kolkhoz chairmen manage the kolkhozes. Let me preface this with the saying that "if the master of the home engages in debauchery the entire family will collapse." Such is the case in our kolkhoz, where they engage every day in drunkenness and loose behavior and lack of accountability, while the chairmen of the village soviet and the rayon only laugh and claim that everything is in order. The kolkhoz chairmen say that if they entertain the chairman of the soviet and the chairman of the rayon, they will always be right. It is true, for in our kolkhoz at the general kolkhoz meeting the members wanted to elect another kolkhoz chairman, for the previous one was a drunk and had let himself go but then immediately came Govorev, the rayon chairman, and Velikanov, the chairman of the village soviet. They said that they will not allow us to change the chairman, let the old chairman remain, and they did not allow any member of the kolkhoz to speak but, conversely, they suppressed all criticism and self-criticism. I have given you a short description of what is taking place in our dark little corner.

Address: Krasnye Baki, Gorkiy Oblast, Krasnobakovskiy Rayon, Kozlovo Village Soviet, Duplikha Village, Kotlov Ivan Grigoryevich.

Please answer my letter soon.

Written in the evening, without light.

M.I. Kalinin's resolution: "Copy to Comrade Tumanov, 13 July 1937."

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, ll. 72, 72 reverse, autograph

## VIII

'Where Are Equality and Fraternity'

17 July 1937

To our respected native son and manager of the entire USSR Comrade Kalinin Mikhail Ivanovich, we send greetings from all of us, your compatriots—the muzhiks kolkhoz peasants and workers of all factories and plants of the city of Tver-Kalinin and all areas adjacent to Selizharovsk and other. We are very pleased that we have in our country such a strong native son as you, Mikhail Ivanovich, the manager of the entire USSR. We sometimes visit Smolensk guberniya and Novgorod, Leningrad, Siberia and Samara and Penza guberniyas and Crimea, in the Caucasus.

Everywhere peasants and workers (kolkhoz members—working people) are envious of us that we have in Moscow, in the center of administration of the USSR, such a wise and strong person, a native son, who is the manager of the entire USSR. All the newspapers write about you (our native son) with all your pictures as the chief commissar and chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the entire USSR. We read your decrees on reducing the prices of some goods.... All of this is good.... Above all, however, Mikhail Ivanovich, with the 1937 crop try to reduce all the prices of bread, ordinary wine, beer, manufactured goods, meat products, pork of all varieties and industrial goods and then everything will be good and beneficial and there will be no grumbling among the people about the cost of living.... The most important thing for you... is that you are not being told the truth about all this and we will describe to you everything that is taking place... and that we, the workers in all factories and plants and the kolkhoz members and the working people in the entire USSR are being hurt from such an increase in the cost of living.... Our wages are miserable, according to the trade union rates, 90, 100, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 180 and 200, that is the maximum, i.e., the highest salary per month... and it is not on the basis of piece-rate work or by agreement with the working people... for which reason we, the working people, with our miserable wages, are walking around the stores with food products and industrial goods and general merchandise stores licking our chops... but buying nothing, for one could spend all the miserable salary on food and one could never buy any piece of clothing and shoes... for there is nothing to buy it with.... Who is buying all the goods in those general stores and food stores? Doctors and engineers with their huge salaries. Parasite actors earn well, 3,0000 to 4,000 rubles

monthly, and have all the good products such as meat, cheese, butter and canned goods, and so on, and they have servants and keep dogs and have entire apartments with pianos and dancing and do not go hungry. Where are here equality and fraternity....

Take a look at all the low wages and you will see that all this is the truth and not a lie. We wrote this letter to you and to all commissars for all of us are your friends. Look at the wages of mailmen, conductors and other working people with low earnings. We have put everything in hock, all of our possessions are in the pawn shops along with all state loan bonds, we are losing everything and we have nothing with which to redeem it.

Mikhail Ivanovich, you do not see this truth, for all of us well know that you are being prevented from seeing the truth about the life of the people and you are not being told about the voice and moaning of the people from such price increases, from the high cost of food and industrial goods....

Look also at all the withholdings from the salaries of all working people in the USSR. Everyone is saying that the state banks have no money. What is this? What does this mean? We, workers and muzhiks, understand it as follows: it is simply being deliberately done by saboteurs with a view to promoting discontent with the Soviet system in the USSR and Comrade Kalinin and our other commissars. Look at all the withholdings from the monthly salaries by various offices, affecting the working people throughout the USSR. In other words, every month, without our knowledge or agreement, they keep deducting and withholding: 1. For culture, 5.6 rubles monthly, from such miserable earnings of ours (this is plunder); 2. Income tax, 5 rubles, and another 3 rubles for something else, without our knowledge and agreement and there is no one to whom we can complain.

They should give us back the money withheld and deducted from us, the workers and working people throughout the USSR, the so-called "cooperative" share funds, for all these "papers" that we have are useless. We could tell you a great deal more of the truth, Mikhail Ivanovich, but we fear that you will not receive this letter to your office so that you can read it personally.

Transcribed in the city of Tver-Kalinin for mailing it to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin in Moscow-The Kremlin, USSR All-Union Central Executive Committee, for urgent consideration.

Resolution: "File. 20 July 1937."

Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 78, op. 1, d. 593, ll. 97-98, autograph

#### Footnotes

1. Zhgonki—regional word for felt-lined shoe industry.
2. The self-taxation law, as one of the forms of voluntary collection of population funds to finance economic and cultural construction in the countryside was passed on

29 August 1924. By decree of the Central Executive Committee and USSR Sovnarkom, dated 11 September 1937, the self-taxation annual rate per kolkhoz member was not to exceed 20 rubles; it was to be 75 rubles for the private farms.

3. Cultural collection: a collection of funds for cultural-consumer construction in the countryside, introduced in 1931. According to the law of 5 January 1936, the sum of 5 to 40 rubles annually was charged per kolkhoz member family; for "private farmers" the payment ranged from 75 rubles to 200 percent of the farm tax.

4. Grain procurements: these were mandatory deliveries of agricultural commodities to the state, considered a tax. They were introduced in January 1933. By USSR Sovnarkom 5 March 1935 Decree, the rates of grain deliveries per hectare of land were from 1.1 to 2.5 quintals per kolkhoz and from 1.1 to 3.5 quintals for the private farms.

5. Meat procurements, like procurements of other agricultural commodities, were in the nature of a tax. By 20 April 1936 USSR Sovnarkom Decree, for 1936, 1937 and 1938 the following rates of mandatory meat procurements were set: for kolkhozes, from 10 to 32 kilograms per unit of cattle and the same rate per kolkhoz family; for the private farms the average norm for the country was 60 kilograms per unit of cattle.

6. Milk procurements were introduced by USSR Sovnarkom 15 November 1933 Decree. The rates for 1935, 1936 and 1937 in liters per cow and per year were 580 liters for kolkhozes, from 180 to 220 liters per kolkhoz families and 280 liters for private farms.

7. The farm committees were trade union committees which were part of the system of the Union of Agricultural and Forestry Workers of the USSR.

8. The compulsory duty of the peasants was one of the traditional duties retained in the postrevolutionary period as well. By decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom, dated 29 February 1936, it was set as the labor participation of the rural population in building roads and, in terms of kolkhoz members and private farmers, involved direct and free labor of 6 days annually, during which they were also to contribute their pack animals, and their cartage and inventory.

9. The agricultural areas in the country were classified into four zones based on farming condition. The first zone included the Northern area, West Siberia, and the Ural and Ivanovo Oblasts.

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## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Who Are They, Our Allies?

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[Text] The fast process of renovation which has spread over most of the socialist countries is introducing new elements in the foreign policy area of these countries as well. In this connection, the question frequently asked in public circles is the following: Is the USSR not losing its positions? Is the area of its direct influence on international affairs not shrinking, and is the number of countries friendly to us not diminishing? Will they change the nature of their relations as allies of the Soviet Union? On the other hand today, when a process of radical restructuring of relations among socialist countries has begun on a more democratic basis, and when the variety of relations with countries with a different social system is being enhanced, the question of the type of forms of alliance that one should try to establish is a key problem in Soviet foreign policy as well. Let us immediately stipulate that what we mean by relations among allies are not exclusively relations based on respective international treaties.

To this day, both in our theory and foreign policy practices the opinion has prevailed that the actual and the potential allies of the USSR, if we consider this concept in the broadest possible terms, are just about all countries which have officially proclaimed as their ideology various interpretations of Marxism-Leninism or some of its individual stipulations. In this connection, in the 1970s a tendency arbitrarily to include as allies of the USSR, in addition to the socialist countries, a number of developing countries became clearly obvious, although there were no proper grounds to this effect either from the international-legal or the actual viewpoint.

As in the past, class solidarity, based on the ideological polarization of socialism and capitalism, is considered as the objective and universal foundation for the commonality of interests shared by socialist countries. It is as though its existence predetermines by itself the nature of allied relations among them. With such an approach an "alliance" is viewed not as a "unification for the sake of achieving a specific joint objective" but as "close unity and ties" and, obviously, it is by no means accidental that in defining relations of alliance we virtually always use the word "ties." The alliance with socialist countries is conceived as almost direct analogous to "class alliance among workers and peasants."

Nonetheless, in this case essential differences exist. In the latter case cooperation takes place within the framework of a single structure—countries which, as a whole, are subjects of international intercourse. The class alliance within the framework of a single society is a category of social development. It does not presume an absolutely clear demarcation of positions or, even less so, their juridical interpretation. Furthermore, a gradual merger among allied classes within a more or less socially homogeneous conglomerate is presumed to take place in the future.

Conversely, an alliance among governments does not presume such a merger and is merely one of the major types of unification of efforts aimed at achieving specific objectives. By subconsciously applying the categories of social progress to relations with socialist countries, we unwittingly ignored the existence of individual states within the socialist camp. It was "global socialism" which became the subject of international relations rather than individual countries. By inertia, this could lead to false concepts concerning reciprocal obligations and rights and justify the aspiration of stronger partners to interfere in the affair of weaker ones.

It is entirely obvious today that such were precisely the ideas which guided Stalin and his circle toward the end of the 1940s, when they undertook to organize a socialist camp, essentially as a multilateral military-political alliance. Initially, Stalin's concept of a "big socialist family" led to the legitimizing, so to say, of internal family inequality. The use of the patriarchal phraseology of elder and younger brothers was aimed, albeit partially, at concealing this fact without, however, changing its essence in the least. The question of who was assigned a specific role under such conditions could be only rhetorical and was not to be discussed: Soviet troops were stationed in the Eastern European capitals. Strictly speaking, the term "satellite" could be applied in interpreting the word "ally" in terms of the socialist countries at that time, particularly from the Western viewpoint.

In our view, the correlation between these two concepts is approximately the same as the one between "governmental system" and "political regime." An alliance presumes not only the legal but also the actual possibility and capability of any member of the association to have his own view of the world and act independently in foreign policy in anything which does not affect an entirely specific area of reciprocal obligations. The extent of this independence, naturally, may be greater or lesser. However, it must not be altogether lacking. It is only in theory or in the sick imagination of specific leaders that a 100 percent coincidence of foreign political priorities could exist between two sovereign countries.

A satellite is nothing other than an ally who is in fact totally deprived of such independence. This could occur both by virtue of the objective inability to pursue an independent foreign policy (extreme weakness of the political positions of the leadership, adverse domestic

circumstances, dislocation, natural catastrophes, open war with superior enemy forces, etc.), as well as a result of an erroneous or circumstantial total identification of one's national interests with the aspirations of the stronger partner.

Obviously, we must once and for all establish the basic difference between an alliance and other types of non-conflict relations among countries. Obviously, the actions of one of the allies, despite certain differences must, as a whole, be consistent with the actions of the other. The key feature here is the juridical and moral readiness of the individual sides to engage in joint actions, and not simply, let us say, to take coordinated or parallel steps. Quite frequently we come across political situations in which the actions of one of the subjects essentially coincide with the actions of the other although, for a variety of reasons, the individual sides avoid joint actions. In that case it would be more pertinent to speak of partnership.

Naturally, it is not always easy to identify, in their pure aspect, such types of relations in the course of the daily practice of relations among governments. The history of Soviet foreign policy or of any other country throughout the world offers numerous examples of Soviet or American allies acting on some matters more as partners of other countries. For that reason, the general conclusion concerning the nature of relations with a given country is based on the dominant trend of either engaging in joint actions or avoiding them.

To a certain extent, this demarcation could be illustrated if we look more closely at the contractual-legal relations between the USSR and foreign countries. For example, let us bear in mind the existence of a quite limited group of states related to the USSR through obligations to provide military aid in emergencies. This applies to Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

There is another larger group of countries which have reciprocal obligations with the Soviet Union, such as, first of all, abstaining from engaging in any hostile actions, including support of such actions by third countries; second, holding regular consultations or in the case that either party is under attack or threatened by attack. Among the socialist countries, this group includes Vietnam and, since 1989, Cuba. Among the developing countries, this applies to Angola, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Conga, Mozambique, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. Among the industrialized capitalist countries, due to certain historical and geographic circumstances, this applies to Finland.

The USSR has no governmental agreements at all with socialist countries such as Albania, the PRC and Yugoslavia, or with Libya and Cambodia, stipulating specific

political obligations by the individual parties concerning actions under unforeseen circumstances.

In terms of the international community as a whole, we should probably acknowledge that the bulk of its members are pursuing a line which is not consistent with the course followed by the USSR but which does not oppose it either. This applies, for example, to the majority of developing countries. In this case it would be pertinent to raise the question of the existence of prerequisites for the establishment of partnership relations, above all on vitally important problems of global significance which do not have to be juridically legitimized in the least. Should it turn out that a situation is not sufficiently suitable for establishing a partnership and that there is no reciprocal desire to this effect, the state of our relations with the respective country should be probably described as one of "distancing" ourselves in terms of the policies of the respective country. In a descending line in the study of relations between the USSR and foreign countries, other concepts would also apply. Unfortunately, however, the suggested classification is not universally accepted and the development of a system of categories within our foreign policy science is by no means completed. Therefore, neither theoretical nor practical workers always have a clear idea of the precise meaning of seemingly habitual concepts. The perception which we have to this day concerning the socialist countries is a sad confirmation of this fact.

For example, we have not surmounted the extremely ideologized attitude concerning our alliance with the Eastern European countries. The foundations of this alliance are frequently considered essentially in terms of ideological categories, something which has many adverse consequences. First, this intensifies the confrontation between the two opposite military-political alliances which developed after World War II—NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Second, it makes meaningless the concept of the strictly class factor in international relations. The alienation of the working people from the means of production, and the substitution of nationwide ownership with state ownership, which took place in the socialist countries under specific situations, made the concept of "class solidarity" in relations among them very relative. What kind of solidarity could there be a question of, for instance, during the Polish internal political crisis of 1980? Based on the classical concepts of proletarian internationalism, there should have been solidarity with Solidarnost, the trade union which rallied the majority of the Polish working class. Based on the real situation, one could confidently speak only of a coincidence of interests between the Soviet and Polish bureaucratic upper echelon. The only true meaning of the traditional understanding of "class solidarity" meant solidarity with countries which had socialized most means of production, something which in itself was neither good nor bad and which, in any case, did not bring us any closer to the ideal socialist society. On this basis, we should have considered as our allies—not in the legal but in the practical sense—third world countries

which, motivated by revolutionary romanticism or circumstantial considerations, proclaimed the building of socialism as their objective.

The result of all this was that from an international-political and legal category, the alliance changed into an ideological category. International relations were conceived as an arena of the class struggle between the two alliances, as though it was a question of seizing the power in a society (workers and peasants against the bourgeoisie and the landowners). Reality, however, turned out to be more varied and more complex. The border conflicts between the USSR and the PRC, the limited war between the PRC and Vietnam or else the tension which developed in relations between Yugoslavia and Albania and between Romania and Hungary, as well as economic friction among some CEMA members were all indications of the fact that intergovernmental relations within the socialist system develop in accordance with laws valid throughout the world. For many long years we followed the course of deleting from the list of the "socialist community" countries whose course seemed "incompatible." It would have been more logical to change the term itself, by acknowledging that which, strictly speaking, does not require our acknowledgment: that quite serious contradictions may arise within the socialist community (or the community of socialist countries).

Ideological solidarity is, naturally, something which exists in relations among Western countries as well. However, whenever they assumed a dominant status to such an extent as to become an insurmountable obstacle in the objective analysis of experience and practices, crises broke out which, in the West, however, were surmounted more easily, for the pragmatic basis of their alliances was, as a rule, much stronger than the ideological.

The aspiration to support countries which shared our concepts about fundamental values was natural. In each specific situation, however, one must be firmly convinced that there is a commonality of basic concepts not in words (so to say in principle, in theory) but in reality. One must not ignore the development of one's own philosophical approaches. In other words, we need a sober analysis of the practical policies of potential aid recipients. Furthermore, the purposes of such aid, whatever the circumstances, should be correlated with potential costs. This means that the choice of specific forms and scale of assistance should be compared with the long-term national-governmental interests of the USSR. Obviously, giving aid should not conflict with universal human objectives (preservation and strengthening the peace, etc.), for those have priority also in terms of the governmental interests of the Soviet Union.

For example, it would be hardly suitable to ascribe a new qualitative content to cooperation between the USSR and any developing country which may have proclaimed a socialist orientation, should this be almost certain to provoke an escalation of international tension. It is one

thing to block attempts at interference in its affairs on the part of third countries and another to assume, on a permanent basis, obligations to provide direct military or military-economic aid which could encourage efforts to skip legitimate stages of socioeconomic and political development.

The essential possibility of changing the structure of the socialist community is based on the effect of the objective laws of development and not on the foreign policies of individual countries. Unquestionably, the USSR is interested in establishing a friendly circle on the perimeter of its national borders. However, is the fact that one neighbor or another is affiliated with a specific socioeconomic system determining in this case? The proof of this lies in the history of our relations with capitalist Finland, on the one hand and, on the other, with socialist China or Afghanistan, whose leadership tried to take a noncapitalist course of development. The Afghan example is indicative in yet another respect: partnership relations could be incomparably more advantageous for the USSR than quasiallied relations with a country which, by virtue of some circumstances, finds itself in the position of a satellite. It is entirely obvious that the stable, friendly and, at the same time, quite burdensome relations which existed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan under Zahir Shah were most consistent with the correlation of the levels of socioeconomic and political development of the two countries, the firm traditions of their relations and, as it later became clear, in the final account, the basic interests of the broad popular masses on either side of the border. Something else must be pointed out as well, however: after Daud's 1973 coup d'etat, the view that Afghanistan was a kind of natural sphere of influence and yet another potential state with a socialist orientation was adopted among a specific group within the Soviet leadership. This was used as a psychological motivation for expanding Soviet military obligations in this area.

The approach to alliances based on an ideological absolute ignores many of the realities of the contemporary world, including the specific features of development of the socialist countries. After acknowledging today the variety of national forms for the development of socialism, nonetheless, based on the ideological inviolability of allied relations, we refused to criticize phenomena in the socialist countries which clashed not only with our own understanding of socialism but also with common sense. This was by no means a question of interfering in the internal affairs of a given country but of objectively interpreting and expressing our attitude toward events.

Relations among socialist countries clearly prove not only the individual nature of the models of socialism. Situations may arise in which during certain historical time the interests of formally allied countries may differ. This creates the objective need to reassess the tasks and ways of implementation of such an alliance. Assessing or reassessing the role of an alliance should be based on clear criteria of effectiveness compared to cost. The main

criterion of effectiveness of an alliance is the extent to which the results of the alliance are consistent with those of the individual participants and the alliance as a whole, bearing in mind that such interests are in a state of constant development. In turn, the cost of an alliance is based on the fact that being part of superior governmental priorities, it demands of the members of the alliance compromises in their approach to securing national and group interests of lesser priority. Shifts within the system of governmental priorities are the main factors of unstable allied relations.

In defining the term alliance we could probably say that an official agreement on forging an alliance, which stipulates reciprocal obligations or deals with a society which has an ideological platform similar to ours is insufficient if we are to have truly allied relations. An ally is a country or a group of countries united by the common need to attain objectives which are a priority for all of them. It is presumed that such countries are linked with treaties which stipulate precisely the type of level of obligations of the individual sides, dictated by the sought targets.

To a large extent, the term "ally" is a military-political category, for the division of the world into different groups preserves the existence of various forms of confrontation. It is precisely by virtue of this fact that the abundance of allies means exceptional concern about the threat of war rather than the firmness of foreign policy positions.

In addition to juridical obligations, the actual functioning of an alliance presumes the readiness of each of the parties to observe them, guided not by the letter alone but also by the spirit of the agreements reached. It is precisely such readiness that actually defines the interpretation of juridical obligations in specific circumstances and the scale and intensiveness of the practical interaction among the parties. In turn, readiness to fulfill obligations depends on the extent to which it is possible to coordinate actions based on the treaty and the foreign policy task which, at that time, is considered by the state as having first priority. At the present time, from our viewpoint, the readiness to observe allied obligations must depend to a decisive extent on the degree to which this helps or hinders the building of a safe world and the resolution of global contemporary problems.

Theoretically we may assume that in a specific situation giving unconditional support to a country linked with the USSR through legal allied obligations could clash with the interests of easing international tension in one area or another. It would be quite difficult to provide an absolute simple recommendation as to how to act in such a situation. Obviously, however, we must try to resolve such contradictions on the basis of the need to solve priority and strategic problems. In this case it may be a question of minimizing the participation of the Soviet Union in a conflict, and its efforts to localize, to freeze it, and to ensure the fastest possible resolution of the problem on the basis of a compromise. Whatever the

circumstances, we must limit the possibility of the development of a situation in which the USSR would find itself automatically a party to a conflict involving a socialist country.

Particularly important in this sense are formulations pertaining to joint actions by the Soviet Union and other countries. For example, seven out of the eight alliance treaties signed by the USSR stipulate obligations on the part of the individual sides to help one another should any one of them be attacked. Furthermore, in one case, if we add to this formulation another one which is considered equally important, the USSR may find itself in a state of war (see SBORNIK DEYSTVUYUSHCHIKH DOGOVOROV, SOGLASHENIY I KONVENTSIY, ZAKLYUCHENNYKH SSSR S INOSTRANNYMI GOSUDARSTVAMI, No 22, Moscow, 1967, pp 24-26). In our view, there is a nuance in this case, which could assume essential significance in critical situations.

Nor should we ignore another circumstance. Not one of these treaties makes any reference to the need to follow the procedures stipulated in the Soviet Constitution, related to the decision to send armed forces abroad. Understandably, such documents were drafted in another time, when such procedures simply did not exist. Today, however, our country has reached a new level of government building, which requires a higher level of responsibility on the part of its representative authorities. Obviously, under such circumstances, it would be more relevant than ever to have the Supreme Soviet comprehensively discuss the effectiveness of the currently practiced forms of relations with our allies and their contractual-legal foundations, in order to consider and, if necessary, make certain corrections.

It may be worthwhile to sum up the experience gained in relations among governments, in the specific nature of relations with each individual country, and the international situation as a whole. We should avoid using a single pattern in relations with all socialist countries and focus our efforts on the search for new and more adequate forms of such relations, which would take into consideration their qualitative changes and likely long-term development.

It is important to note that the presumption of the desirability of having the largest possible number of allies hardly agrees with the realities of the present. The fact that anyone of our yesterday's allies may lose this status does not automatically lead to a weakening of the international positions of the USSR. It is much more important, without trying to preserve the appearance of allied relations with a partner who is no longer sufficiently trusted, to find an acceptable form of shifting such relations to a different level while retaining as a whole their constructive nature and avoiding unnecessary polemics.

In the past, efforts on the part of individual socialist countries to reject our idea of the a priori unity of basic interests of socialist countries triggered an excessively

painful reaction on the part of the Soviet leadership. To a certain extent this determined the gravity of the conflict with Yugoslavia and the PRC. Yet the fact that these countries lost the status of Soviet allies did not result in fatal consequences and our recognition, although belated, of this fact made it possible to make our relations with them more flexible and constructive.

It may be assumed that, taking into consideration the uneven socioeconomic and political development of the individual socialist countries, to an increasing extent peaceful coexistence, combined with the free mutually profitable development of all forms of economic and cultural relations, will be adopted as the foundation of intergovernmental relations among them, in addition to the principle of socialist internationalism. Correspondingly, within the framework of the global socialist system as well, in addition to relations among allies partnership relations will be applied much more extensively. The latter are distinguished from the former by their greater flexibility and the absence of strict legal norms governing joint actions, although they do not exclude them under favorable circumstances. In terms of partnership relations it is important not to have the status of ally but the existence, albeit temporary, of a sufficiently broad area of common or similar interests. Such relations are no less preferable than, shall we say, a formal alliance which is not supported by the moral readiness of one or both sides to act jointly. On the other hand, such interaction is viewed with lesser suspicion and is unlikely to provoke any type of counteralliance in the guise of confronting alliances or blocs.

The effort to develop, under USSR leadership, of a new, broader and more closely united association of socialist countries would be inconsistent with the tasks of the present day by virtue of a number of circumstances. Above all, the reason would be the emerging differences among potential partners in such an alliance and the exceptionally great fear which it would trigger not only in capitalist but also in the overwhelming majority of developing countries. It is entirely obvious that the development of a broad international consensus on the basis of acknowledging the priority of securing peace and ensuring the survival of civilization is impossible without reducing the suspicion felt toward the USSR, which remains in many parts of the planet. Any effort on our part to broaden the old alliances, not to mention the creation of new ones, would erect in this sense additional obstacles to the implementation of our long-term objective. In the final account, retaining allies in the world and strengthening ties with our allies are not self-seeking aims but a means of advancing toward the creation of a safe world and, therefore, should be subordinated precisely to this task.

A spontaneous belief that the task of preserving, in their inviolable aspect, relations among all countries within the socialist community, considered as Soviet allies, is a priority, continues to dominate Soviet political literature. In practical terms, this leads to the concept of the possibility and even necessity of granting unilateral

concessions by the USSR to its partners for the sake of preserving an albeit fictitious unity. Clearly, such views may be traced to the classification of countries throughout the world on the basis of their affiliation with one or another socioeconomic system, as is found in the party documents drafted in the 1960s and 1970s.

We deem it necessary to mention also another problem which is not traditional in our publications. To this day the practice remains of totally identifying the priorities of the party with those of the state in the realm of global politics. The CPSU has an extensive foreign political program while the Soviet government has no corresponding platform. Yet the line of deideologization of intergovernmental relations should legitimately lead to a certain demarcation between priorities in relations among parties and among governments. Deideologization will remain meaningless as long as governmental policy is the exact copy of party policy. It is worth recalling that until the 18th VKP(b) Congress (1939) the positions of the government and the party were different, albeit formally, in the sense that two separate reports were presented on the international situation at congresses: one from the Central Committee (which, nonetheless, represented the government) and another from a delegation of the VKP(b) to the Comintern (which dealt specifically with the world revolutionary movement and ideological solidarity).

We would like to hope that in the immediate future the USSR Supreme Soviet will include in its agenda a debate not only of a report but also a special long-term and immediate program of activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Clearly, the new government, as an agent of the state, cannot do without a theoretical platform of action for Soviet diplomacy, aimed at the more active assertion of the principles of the new political thinking and international-political securing of the real interests of the Soviet people.

Naturally, in the future as well a great deal could be added to this program. In addition to everything else, it would make sense in this connection to draw a clearer distinction between the concepts of alliance and partnership, bearing in mind the still remaining military-political priority ascribed to the former.

Naturally, such a perception may prove to be historically transient. As we surmount the vision of the world looked at through the lens of the power game, the military component of an alliance could assume second priority. Coinciding economic and political interests, rather than defense, would become determining. The similarity between the two concepts could increase somewhat. Such an evolution would be both progressive and desirable, particularly in the case of Europe, where it would both psychologically and politically prepare a consensus on the creation of a European home, the door to which would be opened to all socialist countries. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that all of this could be tied to a transformation of allied relations

between the USSR and individual countries into allied-partnership or simply partnership relations. Such a prospect should not be ignored. It would be equally wrong to dramatize its possible consequences.

In our view, there is a very solid objective basis for the desire of Eastern European countries for a rapprochement between them and the Soviet Union. The fact that such a foundation was perceived, for many years, as based on common ideological concepts, although in reality it was something else, is a different matter. It is a question of a lower level of economic development, compared to Western Europe, and a common postwar development which we cannot ignore, however critical we may be in assessing the past. The Warsaw Pact members face a great deal of common tasks in the area of foreign policy, including the question of becoming part of the European home. Also common is the priority of ensuring European security.

As to the role of ideology as an integrating force in Eastern Europe, to begin with, its binding role, in recent decades in particular, has been largely fictitious. Secondly, the rejection of "ideological determinism" makes it possible to shed better light on the entirely real action of traditional and always present, although latent, geopolitical factors. In the final account, on the eve of World War II Poland and Czechoslovakia were objectively leaning toward a dialogue with the USSR on security problems, although under those circumstances that dialogue would not have brought about the desired results.

We believe that, as a whole, in the foreseeable future relations between the Soviet Union and the present members of the Warsaw Pact will essentially retain their present nature as allies, although in a number of cases they will increasingly become transitional.

Essentially, the same could be said about relations between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic, particularly if we bear in mind the long tradition of our relations with that country and the changes which are taking place in it, as well as the noticeably energized foreign policy of Mongolia, legitimately related to the increased autonomy of its course, manifested in particular by that country's joining the nonaligned movement. In this sense, a great deal depends on the extent to which both sides will display flexibility and consistency in correcting errors made in the past in terms of shaping the economic specialization of Mongolia and the structure of its relations with the Soviet Union.

Despite certain difficulties in various areas, friendly partnership relations have developed and are quite successfully developing between the USSR and virtually all other socialist countries with the exception of Albania, with which country we are trying to improve reciprocal understanding. However, any effort at accelerating a rapprochement, regardless of who may make it, should be treated quite cautiously. Even greater restraint is necessary in assessing the prospects of converting to a

higher allied category our relations with the developing countries. This path, as reality teaches us, involves excessive moral and political costs and economic and human losses.

Let us point out, in conclusion, that relations among socialist countries, whether classified as allies or partners, preserve their objective solidarity explained by the joint efforts to find a solution to the crisis and ways for building true socialism. However, such solidarity implies total freedom of views. Without freedom of views solidarity turns into a semblance of unity of thought which, in the course of time, leads to a variety of crises in relations. Hence it is understandable that objective constructive reciprocal criticism is a mandatory attribute of such socialist solidarity.

Alliance was and remains one of the most important instruments of Soviet foreign policy, as is the case of the policy of any developed country. This fact could hardly be questioned without the risk of falling into hopeless idealism and utopia. Our task, however, is to upgrade the efficiency of this instrument and its effectiveness in promoting the interests of the Soviet people, which are increasingly oriented toward universal human values.

It would be expedient to solve this problem not through an unjustified increase in the volume of assumed foreign obligations but on an essentially different basis: by upgrading the quality parameters of cooperation with countries whose interests and aspirations objectively coincide with ours and by increasing the actual and not merely proclaimed reciprocal economic interest and mutual respect. This legitimately presumes increasing the autonomy of our allies, including that of the Soviet Union itself, in the foreign policy area. The main thing here is to remain within the limits of the natural self-restrictions which determine the commonality of objectives in ensuring international stability and the prosperity of each individual ally and of all of them together.

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#### Soviet Perestroyka as Seen by Cypriot Communists

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[Article by Dimitrios Christofias, secretary general of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus Central Committee (AKEL)]

[Text] AKEL, the party of workers and working people of Cyprus, welcomed perestroika from its very start. In their statements the then party secretary general Ezebias Papaioannou and other leaders expressed in 1985 and in the Central Committee resolution adopted at the start of 1986 as well as at the 16th Party Congress, which was held in November of that same year, their unconditional support of perestroika and a warm wish for its successful implementation for the good of the Soviet people, for

socialism as a whole, and for all mankind. We proceeded from the fact that socialism, as a social system with tremendous inner potential for further development, should be rid of the negative phenomena and distortions which restrained its dynamic development. It was necessary to surmount stagnation and dogmatism in thoughts and practical actions and to condemn and correct distortions of socialist legality and communist morality, to condemn the errors of the past and, naturally, to condemn the crimes which, regrettably, had been committed in the name of socialism and which had blackened its name. All of this is being done in the course of perestroyka. However, I am deeply convinced that it would be wrong to believe that perestroyka is merely a critical view of the past. Perestroyka, armed with democracy, glasnost and humanism, is turned above all to the future. Its objective is to answer the question of how should socialism must develop in order successfully to deal with the problems of the 21st century.

When perestroyka is analyzed in the capitalist countries, including Cyprus, it is frequently interpreted as though it is, first of all, proof of the failure of socialism and, second, something in the nature of a return to capitalism. We do not agree in the least with such assessments. If perestroyka proves anything, it obviously is not the bankruptcy of socialism but its inherent ability for self-renovation. Naturally, perestroyka has nothing in common with a return to capitalism. The main slogan of perestroyka is "**more democracy, more socialism.**" The main feature in the ideology of perestroyka is a return to Lenin, the restoration of the Leninist concept of socialism. There is yet another important aspect: perestroyka was initiated by the CPSU. Consequently, if we wish to provide an accurate and meaningful definition of perestroyka, we must agree with Mikhail Gorbachev, who emphasizes that it is a revolution which confirms the choice made in October 1917 and which is renovating socialism. That is why we believe that perestroyka is not only a purely Soviet phenomenon. Its significance and impact are not limited to the socialist world. Above all, it is having a beneficial influence on the international communist and worker movements, of which our party is an inseparable part. Therefore, while expressing our support of perestroyka we, at the same time, learn from the new revolutionary experience.

#### Creative Assimilation

Before citing a few examples which prove the way AKEL is in fact applying the new approaches, let me emphasize one feature. We are applying the new experience of perestroyka in our party creatively, taking into consideration the needs and possibilities of our party, the specific conditions under which it exists, acts and struggles, and the requirements of the antiimperialist, anticolonial and liberation struggle waged by our people.

AKEL is not a ruling party and our state is not socialist. Cyprus is a country which has reached an average level of capitalist development. One of its most important specific features is the fact that part of our territory is

occupied by a foreign state. Understandably, therefore, when we speak of the creative application of the new approaches, we have in mind not exclusively the economic and political system of our country. We have in mind essentially party life and, particularly, internal party democracy. It is precisely in that direction that our efforts are concentrated. Although in recent decades there has not been any sharp reduction in internal party democracy here, we cannot claim that we have not felt any kind of influence from the specific way of thinking and specific work style which developed at different times and which prevailed in the international communist movement for decades. This way of thinking and work style greatly contributed to a certain weakening of the belief that the rank-and-file communists and the primary party organizations are the masters of the party. Today we are working on strengthening and broadening internal party democracy and upgrading the activeness and responsibility of every communist.

To this effect the Central Committee encourages the free democratic dialogue within the primary party groups. We support criticism and glasnost. Before making decisions on problems of major importance to the party, the Central Committee engages in a dialogue with the primary organizations. This practice was applied in the matter of the candidates which the party was to support for the February 1988 presidential elections. We shall continue to apply this practice also in connection with the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 1991. In the municipal elections, for example, without prompting, on the basis of total independence, the local AKEL organizations pass resolutions concerning candidates and the drafting of joint slates, sometimes also concerning cooperation with local leaders of other democratic parties.

Currently, the party groups are considering at their meetings the question of further improving the work of our central organ, the newspaper HARAVGI. The Central Committee will take the results of their discussions into consideration.

Secret balloting is being applied more extensively in the election of party authorities and leading personnel. The procedure for choosing candidates for promotion to higher positions is becoming more democratic. Candidates for positions in regional committees and for the Central Committee are being opened on the lower levels, at meetings of the primary party groups or cluster organizations. It is at such meetings that delegates are being nominated for congresses or regional party conferences.

The number of candidates substantially exceeds the number of delegates at conferences and at the congress, which ensures broader opportunities for making choices. There were several candidates for the position of a new Central Committee secretary general, and the April 1988 elections were held with secret balloting. In implementing the new approaches, we engaged in a fast

renovation of the central and regional leading party structures. The lower authorities are also being renovated.

With a view to modernizing the work of the party and dealing more successfully with the variety of problems raised by life, we set up new departments under the Central Committee: socioeconomic research, local self-management, and culture and sports.

Let me frankly point out that the process of broadening internal party democracy is not proceeding entirely smoothly. On the one hand, we are not always able to surmount the old work style without any opposition. On the other, in the course of broadening internal party democracy views conflicting with democratic socialism are being expressed. Unfortunately, this is encouraged by bourgeois liberalism which intensifies erroneous concepts about perestroika. We believe that these examples prove our wish to learn from perestroika and follow a new path.

#### **The Problem of Cyprus and New Thinking**

Soviet foreign policy is being structured on the basis of new humanistic approaches to the solution of a difficult global political problems. We believe that the new thinking is the further development of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence among countries with different socioeconomic systems as applied to the present circumstances of our nuclear age. The new thinking proceeds from the dialectical conclusion that despite the entire contradictoriness of the contemporary world and the basic differences among countries, the world is interconnected, interdependent and integral.

In supporting the principles of the new thinking, the Soviet Union aims at establishing a peace based on a system of universal security. We are convinced that no single communist or person of good will exists on our planet who would not welcome and share these ideas. Our party—AKEL—warmly supports the CPSU initiatives. Naturally, the essence of the new thinking is found in the efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Within the framework of these efforts our country ascribes great importance to the peaceful settling of local and regional conflicts and to enhancing the effectiveness and authority of the United Nations.

For several decades, causing pain to our people and constituting a source of constant threat to peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, the problem of Cyprus remains one of the sensitive spots on our planet. As the offspring of external imperialist forces, which are trying to turn Cyprus into their unsinkable nuclear missile base in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has actually divided our country and is a threat to the existence of the Republic of Cyprus.

In its current phase, the Cyprus problem became a hotbed of tension starting with the summer of 1974, when the junta officers, who were in power in Greece,

made a military coup d'état against the democratic government headed by the then president Makarios. This pretext was used by the ruling Turkish circles who, relying on the full support of NATO forces, launched a military invasion of Cyprus under the pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, 37 percent of Cypriot territory was occupied by Turkey, and one-third of the population on the island became refugees. Ignoring the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, Turkey set up in the part of the island it occupied a puppet government, the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

We are struggling for an independent, sovereign and territorially integral nonaligned, demilitarized and federated Cyprus, in which human rights of all citizens will be respected and observed.

Since 1960 the Soviet Union has followed a firm, consistently principled policy in terms of the Cyprus problem, supporting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of the Republic of Cyprus, insisting on solving all differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a dialogue between the two, without any outside interference. In August 1974, in the aftermath of the familiar events, it called for convening an international conference within the framework of the United Nations as the most acceptable procedure for settling the international aspects of the problem. In January 1986, once again the Soviet Union drew attention to its proposal. However, taking into consideration the development of the Cyprus problem, it deemed necessary to concretize its views in the document "On the Principles for the Cyprus Settlement and Ways of Achieving It."

We do not intend to discuss in detail the content of this document, which provides an overall basis for a just, peaceful and comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. Let us note, however, the following: this document and subsequent Soviet diplomatic steps met with the approval of our entire people. The Soviet proposals are the most important move in the problem of Cyprus on the international level since the Turkish invasion. They stimulated efforts to solve the problem of Cyprus rightly and gave the people hope for a fast and just resolution.

Today the Soviet proposals related to the Cyprus problem are the axis around which the struggle of our people is being waged. We consider them and the subsequent steps taken by the Soviet government as the most serious manifestations of international solidarity with our people and our party.

Naturally, the proposals of January 1986 and the steps which followed them do not account for the entire positive impact which the new thinking has had on the efforts to settle the problem of Cyprus. The new thinking created an entirely new climate in international relations, the main features of which are the strengthening of

detente, the specific steps taken in the area of disarmament and progress in solving a variety of regional problems.

Our party believes that one of the most important factors which led to the resumption of talks on the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem in October 1988 was precisely the new climate of detente and dialogue which is becoming established in international relations. Naturally, a simple resumption of the dialogue is not enough. Equally necessary is achieving specific progress in the matter of the talks to be held between the two communities. Only in that case could we hope for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Both in terms of making progress in the dialogue between the communities and of creating conditions for holding an international conference, once again we are benefiting from the aid and support of Soviet foreign policy, manifested in two other of its initiatives: the first is the firm stance adopted by the Soviet government, according to which the Cyprus problem must be classified as regional and, as such, included in the agenda for discussions which take place in meetings between the USSR and the United States on all levels, including the summit. The second is the Soviet initiative submitted to the United Nations, calling for a more active involvement of the Security Council in the search of ways to solve the problem of Cyprus.

Aware of the significance of these Soviet steps in solving the problem of Cyprus, AKEL supports them unconditionally. The importance of such Soviet initiatives is further confirmed by the fact that they are acknowledged and considered as the objective not only of AKEL but also of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the majority of political forces in both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

We believe that the people of Cyprus could tremendously benefit from another trend included in the new thinking, i.e., the consistent efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations. Let me point out that the UN General Assembly and the Security Council have already passed several resolutions calling for respecting the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and accepting its nonaligned status, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory and guaranteeing human rights to its population. To our deep regret, however, the United Nations has been unable to implement even a single one of them.

By saying this, we do not belittle the importance of UN resolutions on Cyprus. Conversely, we believe that in the case of the Republic of Cyprus they are efficient protection and a way of blocking the path of those who are trying to eliminate it. Furthermore, it is precisely on the basis of such resolutions that we demand the just and permanent solution of our problem. The UN resolutions and decisions are, therefore, of tremendous importance to us. However, all of these documents, both concerning

the Cypriot and the other regional problems, have not been acted upon. That is precisely why we welcome with great satisfaction the efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at upgrading the authority and effectiveness of this international organization.

We deem it our international duty to extend and, to the limit of our possibilities, to promote the new thinking among the Cypriot people and in our international contacts.

#### Bourgeois Falsifications

The terms "perestroika" and "glasnost" have become a permanent part of Cypriot political vocabulary. The changes which are taking place in the USSR are the invariable topic of our mass information media. However, both the right-wing press and the television, which use materials supplied by Western news agencies, frequently provide a distorted picture of perestroika. For example, the new thinking is interpreted as the rejection of the Leninist theory of imperialism, for which reason any mention by AKEL of imperialism and its responsibility for the Cyprus problem are presented as dogmatism and Stalinism.

Here is a second example: our people are fighting the occupation. Theirs is a struggle of liberation, an anti-imperialist struggle. A necessary prerequisite for its success is the unification of the patriotic and democratic forces of our people. Naturally, within such unity there can be no place for any extreme right-wing or fascist elements, those who, in 1974, overthrew with a coup d'etat the legitimate Makarios government and gave NATO's Turkey a pretext for intervention and for seizing part of our territory. When AKEL speaks of the unity of patriotic and democratic forces, it is accused of dogmatism. Such attacks by the reactionary ideologues, mounted against us, are based on a gross distortion of the spirit and letter of the new thinking. "If," they say, "Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan or Bush meet, discuss and establish a common denominator, why is it that no such common denominator could be found in Cyprus for all forces, including the extreme right?" In this case, based on deideologizing intergovernmental relations, arbitrarily a classless concept is being derived applicable to Cypriot society and the political relations within it.

Here is yet another example also based on the wrong understanding of deideologization of international relations: the relationship between Cyprus and the EEC. For many years there have been discussions about our joining this organization. The government has already concluded a customs alliance with it and increasingly loud voices are being heard from the bourgeois camp by the supporters of full EEC membership. We do not wish to include the country in the European community not only for ideological considerations, although we are not opposed to the development of the best possible relations with the community, as much as this is possible. We say, however, that a customs alliance or joining the EEC would be unprofitable for Cyprus economically as well as

politically. From the economic point of view the reason is that this will harm local industry and have adverse consequences for the working people; from the political, because it will undermine the status of the Republic of Cyprus as a nonaligned country, which is our main weapon in the struggle we are waging. We believe that for Cyprus to remain outside political-economic blocs (the EEC is precisely one such bloc) while maintaining the best possible relations both with the EEC and the socialist community would be consistent with the interests of our people and could play an important role in building a European home.

When they hear AKEL defending such views, supporters of the Atlantic Pact among us accuse it of dogmatism and present the following arguments: the USSR is speaking of a European home and together with the other socialist countries is promoting the development of relations with the EEC, whereas AKEL opposed the joining of the EEC by Cyprus.

It is true that Soviet diplomats and political personalities speak of a European home, emphasizing the need to develop cooperation and relations among European countries on the basis of their common interests and insisting that ideological differences should not be a barrier to such cooperation. At the same time, however, they note that one should respect the right of any country to follow the path chosen by its people. Therefore, when we say that joining the EEC is inconsistent with the interests of our people and when we demand that this radical problem be solved by the people themselves through a referendum, we totally fail to comprehend how our views can conflict with the new thinking and why we should change our positions in order to become more "contemporary" and respond to someone else's accusations.

#### **New Thinking is the Foundation of New Relations of Equality Among Communist Parties**

In our view, perestroika and new thinking are exerting and will continue to exert increasing influence on the communist movement. Unquestionably, the main standard in relations among communist parties should be equality, respect for independence and noninterference in domestic affairs. Each communist party is answerable to the working class and the people of its country for the path which it intends to follow.

Naturally, this does not mean that we favor the national isolation of communist parties. Nothing of the sort. We believe that we are united and linked through the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, which to us remain alive and relevant. We are united by the common objectives of the struggle for peace, for solving the global problems of our time, for a world free from national and social oppression and exploitation and a world which will concentrate on man and his happiness.

All of this creates conditions for enhancing and strengthening relations among communist and worker parties.

Meanwhile, when even the parties of conservative right-wing forces, despite all their differences are working on expanding relations among them, it would be inadmissible for the communist parties maintain a condition of national isolation. This would conflict with the nature of our ideology, which is based on internationalism. Unity is all the more important today, when the priority of universal human interests over class interests demands a dialogue and consensus among a great variety of political forces.

Naturally, speaking of strengthening relations and ties among communist parties, in no case we do suggest a return to obsolete relations among us. This would be anachronistic and, in the final account, unrealistic. Nonetheless, we believe that contacts and dialogue on the bilateral, regional and global levels could and should develop. Providing that the principles we mentioned are observed, the development of such relations would be of great help to the individual communist parties and to our movement as a whole as well as, in general, to the cause of peace and the liberation of mankind.

We believe that within the framework of an equal democratic dialogue we could discuss many problems, exchange experience and contribute, not only separately but also collectively, to the intensification of socialist thinking and to enriching the strategy and tactics of our parties. Naturally, this would help us to coordinate steps in matters of common interest, such as the struggle for peace and the solution of other global contemporary problems.

We know that along with the need to discuss problems affecting the ways of development of socialism and the solution of global problems, it is becoming necessary to engage in a broader exchange of views and in the theoretical development of problems such as the class struggle in the developed countries under contemporary conditions, the interconnection between the class and universal human struggle, the concept of intergovernmental and international relations under the conditions of the new thinking, internationalism and its manifestation today, the contemporary stage of development of imperialism, and the place of the national liberation struggle and its interconnection with the struggle for peace and the preservation of life. We do not seek ready-made universal prescriptions. We do not demand the signing of binding declarations. However, we acutely feel the need to strengthen the communist movement through dialogue. We are convinced that this would become the most important contribution to the search for our answer to the challenge of the 21st century. We are confident that the new thinking opens broad horizons for thought and for practical activities in this direction.

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## CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

### Islam in an Interdependent World

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[Review by I. Zvyagelskaya, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, and V. Naumkin, doctor of historical sciences, professor, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, of the book "Islam na Porege XXI Veka" [Islam on the Threshold of the 21st Century] by N.V. Zhdanov and A.A. Ignatenko. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 352 pp]

[Text] In the contemporary global community, characterized by an amazing variety of ideological and political movements and complex social processes which influence events far beyond the borders of the countries and areas in which they were born and in which they developed, Islam plays an important role. This relatively young religion performs the function of a conceptual and sociocultural system adopted by hundreds of millions of people and different social strata and groups. Leaving its Arab cradle, Islam spread historically quickly to virtually all continents, including the United States and Europe, where Muslim communities exist today. The reasons for this phenomenon and the sources and ways of influence of Islam on sociopolitical and economic life in the individual countries and on the international situation and the degree of its adaptation to changing conditions, while preserving its dogmata, rituals and ceremonies, are all major topics of the debate which has developed on the role of religion in the history of civilization, the development of national self-awareness, and the shaping of moral values and their use for political purposes.

Although the various aspects of Islam and its influence have been quite extensively discussed in specialized publications in the last decade, many "blank spots" and controversial problems still face the scientists. There also is an obvious shortage of studies, such as to satisfy the increased interest of the readers in this topic.

Particularly significant in this context is the book by N.V. Zhdanov and A.A. Ignatenko published by Politizdat in a large edition. This is a sort of opening to the broad readership with a work which aptly combines serious academic analysis with simplicity and accessibility of presentation of the material.

What makes this work even more important is the fact that in our country until relatively recently Islamic studies were a topic for selected authors and readers only. In analyzing the complex and many-faceted processes which are occurring in the Afro-Asian world, both Soviet and foreign authors frequently considered Islam as something archaic, vanishing into the past, with no direct impact on steadily renovated life. As Hegel himself claimed "for quite some time Islam has left the

universal historical arena and, once again, has become Eastern tranquillity and immobility."

The events of the end of the 1970s and, particularly, the anti-shah revolution in Iran made revising this view necessary. The initiated "Islamic boom" not only encouraged people to take a new look at this religion, as a permanent character in the political arena of the Afro-Asian world, but also led to another extreme, according to which some researchers began to consider the influence of the "Islamic factor" even where it was totally absent, darkening the colors of the danger of the clericalizing of a tremendous segment of the contemporary world. Starting with the mid-1980s, however, passions have somewhat abated on the subject of Islam. It became clear that we were dealing not with any kind of mystical phenomenon of a revival of a religion which had never died to begin with but, above all, with numerous attempts to put it on the service of specific political interests.

This conclusion was of essential significance. On the one hand, it made it possible to look calmly at Islam as a religion which has its own specific features which, nonetheless, had an impact on society and, in general, was similar to other world religions. On the other hand, the study of the mechanism through which it was used by various sociopolitical forces made it possible to determine the reasons for the somewhat destabilizing influence of Islamism (i.e., politicized Islam) on the international situation, reflecting not any kind of alleged aggressiveness of this religion but the clash among different political objectives and ambitions.

The book under review, which analyzing Islam as a permanent factor in our time, successfully fits all of these new approaches. Its authors, as they themselves admit, "tried not only to register the events occurring in the sociopolitical and cultural-ideological areas in Muslim countries, but also to identify the main trends in Islamic life—this many-faceted and quite complex phenomenon" (p 2). Assessing the role of the "Islamic factor" thoroughly and thoughtfully, they proceed from the fact that Islam is meeting the 21st century "as one of the trends in human civilization, and as a system of views and political practices and as a material and spiritual culture" (p 350).

Indeed, Islam today is one of the most influential world religions. In terms of the number of researchers, it is first after Christianity. Today the total number of Muslims in the world already exceeds 1 billion. Islam is spread throughout the world, and Islamic communities may be found in more than 120 countries. The biggest among them are in Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In several dozen Afro-Asian countries, Islam is accepted as the official or state religion. Let us add to this that the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), which was founded in 1969, today includes 46 countries (and the PLO), which account for nearly one-half of the members of the nonaligned movement and for about 25 percent of the members of the United Nations.

Therefore, Islam plays a very essential role in global politics and although it appears most likely that the "Islamic boom" has ended, in recent years the trend of the increased role of religion in sociopolitical life in the countries in which Islam has spread and in international relations has remained. The reasons for this are related both to the specific nature of socioeconomic and political development of Eastern societies as well as the characteristics of Islam itself.

The delayed development of capitalism and the multiple systems operating in those societies, where precapitalist relations are still extant and are reproducing themselves, are contributing to the stability of traditional institutions and of mass awareness stereotypes. It is no accident that in the countries where Islam is widespread no complete separation between religion and politics has taken place, as has been the case in the West; a characteristic interpenetration, a kind of synthesis, remains in those countries.

The growth of "Islamic moods" in a number of Muslim countries, affecting foreign policy, is a reaction on the part of the broad strata to the conflict with the standards of the contemporary bourgeois "consumer society," which intensified social inequality and deprived many people of their confidence in the future, and to the invasion of a psychologically alien Western culture. Under those circumstances, the perception of religion as a foundation of spiritual rebirth and social stability intensified. This was helped by idealized views of the past, of the "golden age of justice," which, allegedly, existed during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. This is not astounding, for in the course of its 13 and a half centuries of existence, for a long period of time Islam governed virtually all aspects of life of its faithful: it regulated social relations, economic activities, and family-marital and personal relations. It largely preserved ceremonies which are the main element in ancient Oriental religions. In our century as well, a large number of people, who are not even believers, observe Islamic traditions. This includes fasting, a special way of dressing and praying. On the one hand, this is unquestionably a manifestation of the unwillingness to go against existing universally accepted standards and, on the other, a desire to preserve their originality and the spiritual and cultural legacy of their ancestors. These processes have their specific features in the different countries, for the Muslim world is exceptionally varied as is Islam itself.

The authors have entitled the first part of their book "The Varieties of Islam," justifiably drawing the readers' attention to the fact that Islam is not monolithic, i.e., that it does not follow the same religious precepts or have an identical interpretation of dogmas everywhere. The main trends in Islam are Sunni and Shia, within which there are many different sects and trends. In addition to these two, there is a third and less widespread trend: Haridjism. The various trends within Islam and their characteristic features are discussed in detail in the book and the topic is by no means academic. It helps us

better to understand the reasons for the numerous conflicts within the Islamic world caused, in addition to socioeconomic, ethnic, social and cultural differences, by the fact that Islam, metaphorically speaking, is a mosaic "composed of a variety of little stones" (p 9). There are more than 140 parties, fronts and movements under the religious banners of Islam, involved in sharp rivalries among themselves. In frequent cases, matters have reached the level of armed clashes.

The sharp growth of the political role of Islam and the increased international influence of Islamic movements have nonetheless not calmed political life in Muslim countries. We have seen in recent years increased tension in relations both between Muslim and Christian communities and among Muslim communities of different varieties and even political groups within the same community. The most outstanding examples of internal Islamic hostility, on the intergovernmental level, was the Iran-Iraq War and, on the national level, the conflict in Lebanon, where the line of confrontation runs not only between Christians and Muslims but also among the various Islamic forces. It was precisely Lebanon which proved how far could the alienation reach among members of different religious communities if their political leaders profess extreme views and there is no desire to compromise. As a result of the lengthy 15-year old confrontation previously compact communities have disintegrated and the way of life of each community is becoming increasingly isolated and conflicting with the way of life of other communities; traditional tolerance has been replaced by hostility. It is difficult to imagine today that all Lebanese religious communities would be able once again freely to coexist, even if outside intervention is ended and the blood-shedding conflict stops. It is no accident that the various sociopolitical circles in the country have called for a radical restructuring of the Lebanese governmental-political system, which would make it possible to restore and maintain the country's integrity.

Although there is no truly united Islamic community, the existence within Islam of an ideological axis—the concept of pan-Islamic unity—encourages the formulation of various doctrines (Panislamism); the implementation of some joint projects contributed to the appearance of the ICO in the international arena. N.V. Zhdanov and A.A. Ignatenko convincingly prove that in fact "the religious aspects in the activities of ICO are being increasingly replaced by the shaping of political positions on the most important problems of our time, including that of war and peace" (p 201). The entire conflicting nature, complexity and many-facetedness of the "Islamic solidarity" movement were manifested to the utmost in the Middle Eastern crisis. It is hardly possible to claim that Islamic solidarity within the ICO seriously contributed to the unification of the ranks of Arab states in the Middle-Eastern conflict. As a rule, everything was limited to statements, frequently of an extremist nature, which did not create conditions for finding political compromises. Furthermore, as the

Islamists strengthened their positions in the Arab world, centrifugal trends intensified. This hindered the unification of Arab countries and the PLO on the basis of a single political platform, although, unquestionably, efforts to find ways for consolidation were made.

One of the most outstanding manifestations of the "Islamic factor" in the Oriental countries was the revolution in Iran. It is no accident that researchers continue to study its lessons and experience. As Arab historian S. Zubeida has pointed out, to this day many Islamic political circles "draw strength from the example and success of the Iranian Revolution, in the same way that the European socialist movements, in their time, found inspiration in the successes of the Bolsheviks." The revolution in Iran took place at a time when both Marxism and laic nationalism in the Muslim countries had largely lost their former positions and when the inevitable turn of the masses toward traditional values was becoming increasingly obvious.

A number of authors of recently published works on the experience of the Iranian anti-shah revolution have tried to see in Shia a certain inherent democratic nature. A feature such as expressing the interests of the oppressed social strata has been attributed to an entire trend in Islam (which is, to this day, the error of some authors). However, no religion by itself could be strictly linked to specific social interests. It could be used for political purposes by a variety of social forces, some of which clash with each other. Although universal in terms of nature, in that sense any religious doctrine usually encompasses a rather broad selection of various and frequently mutually exclusive commandments and concepts.

Let us particularly note that the book under review reflects a viewpoint which characterizes Islam as a noninstitutionalized religion, without a strict organization of the clergy and leading authorities or mandatory rules for all believers. We believe that this is partially explained by the ability of this religion to adapt to changing realities.

Today appeals are being heard from different parts of the Muslim world to follow an Islamic model of government. In their extensive study of this topic, the authors also note that "an understanding of the unpromising nature of appeals for establishing an 'Islamic system' is becoming increasingly widespread among Muslims in the non-Soviet East" (p 180). However, it also seems that the chance of Islamists, even of the most extreme variety, coming to power in some countries does exist. This is basically acknowledged by the researchers themselves in their analysis of contemporary Islamic movements of the moderate and radical varieties. They apply the nontraditional concept of nongovernmental religious-political organizations, emphasizing that "such associations reject control over their activities and are, as a rule, secret" (p 154). However, we cannot agree with such an

interpretation of the term "nongovernmental," for, as it is usually understood, it applies to entirely legally functioning organizations.

In describing such organizations, the authors analyze in detail their ideological-political platforms, social structure and methods of struggle. As a whole, they accurately note that "outbreaks of Islamic extremism are... a reaction on the part of a traditional society to the mass dislocation and breakdown of precapitalist relations in the absence of ripe conditions for involving the population in contemporary forms of economic activities" (p 155). Fear of the future, and lack of prospects for jobs push into the ranks of Muslim organizations secondary school and university students. It is no accident that it is precisely to the youth that both extremists and moderate movements are appealing.

As a whole, the question of the social base of Islamists in Soviet Islamic studies remains insufficiently studied. One frequently comes across a vulgar-class approach which automatically includes among the supporters of the Islamists members of the obsolete classes or else lumpens. The fact that they are indeed the bearers of traditional awareness is unquestionable. However, neither students nor intellectuals, who also include many supporters of Islamism, can be classified as socially and politically backward strata. Nonetheless, to a no lesser or, perhaps, to an even greater extent they remain dissatisfied with the reality around them. This means that the Islamic movements have adequate reserves in the Muslim world and that any expectation that they may decline cannot be substantiated at the present time.

An essentially important chapter in the book is the one discussing the problem of so-called Islamic economy. The authors discuss in substantial detail the activities of "Islamic" banks but merely sketch the other forms, particularly important among which are Islamic investment companies which use the screen of religion for the sole purpose of attracting depositors and securing the most favorable conditions for their operations in the international market. Most indicative in this respect is Egypt in which there are three Islamic banks and, according to the newspaper AL-WAFD, 154 Islamic investment companies. According to the press, they are able to provide financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most sizable of all Islamic movements. It is estimated that the sum total of their deposits is \$20 billion.

Generally speaking, the "Islamic boom" was largely triggered by the extremely conservative regimes which were established in a number of Muslim states starting with the 1970s (Saudi Arabia, the Shah's Iran, and the Persian Gulf countries), whose many billions of petrodollars breathed a new life into the idea of "Islamic solidarity" and an "Islamic world order."

This book also makes us think of the problem of "Islam and Soviet foreign policy," the more so since the southern part of our country borders a wide strip of

Muslim states. Our relations with them require both to take thoroughly into consideration their national features and display a high degree of competence, tactfulness and restraint.

Of late there has been extensive confirmation of the fact that by no means do all our actions in the international arena trigger enthusiasm even among our friends and partners in Muslim countries. Suffice it to recall the sharply negative reaction caused by the dispatching of Soviet forces to Afghanistan. Conversely, the withdrawal of our forces brought unanimous approval. Some Arab countries were quite concerned by the normalizing and development of good neighborly relations between the USSR and Iran. The reason was not sought in Western imperialist propaganda intrigues but, above all, in the sharp rivalry between Iran and some of these countries. Not everyone is also pleased by increased Soviet diplomatic activities in settling the Middle Eastern conflict: some political leaders would prefer for us to continue to act as in the past, rejecting contacts with forces not allied with our traditional partners.

Reality proves that affiliation with the anti-imperialist movement does not in itself mean the existence of a total unity of views and interests among all involved countries and political forces. All of this, like many other factors, is taken into consideration in the implementation of our country's foreign policy course.

Of late Western political experts have repeatedly expressed the view that the opposition (or hostility) shown by Islam to "atheistic communism" is an insurmountable barrier in establishing good neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Muslim countries. We believe that this matter could be viewed differently: Is it possible, despite all ideological differences, to open with such countries a dialogue as equals and to develop mutually profitable cooperation, guided by the principles of respect for their sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs? Our answer is uniformly positive.

The restructuring of our foreign policy, consistent with the new political thinking, is contributing to the expansion and intensification of relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic world. The new political thinking has been expressed in a substantially different understanding of international realities and, above all, the acknowledgment of a similarity between the basic vital interests of the different societies in the nuclear space age, when their development is increasingly characterized by reciprocal ties and interdependence and encourages deideologization of relations among governments and the search for a way to balance interests.

In addressing the 43rd UN General Assembly, in December 1988, noting the usefulness of reciprocal exchanges of all original features created by the individual nations, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that "in the course of this exchange, let everyone prove the advantages of his system, way of life and values but not only with words and propaganda but through real action. This

is what an honest ideological struggle means. However, this should not be applied to relations among countries, for otherwise we would be simply unable to solve even a single global problem...."

Understandably, in order to maintain and develop relations with the countries in the Muslim world we need highly skilled cadres. To this day however, frankly speaking, it is difficult to come across experts in the area of Islam even among our diplomats who work in those countries. Nor do the specialized schools provide the required training in this field.

Finally, there is yet another aspect to which the authors of this book, which deals above all with foreign affairs, have not paid attention: the changes in the official approach in our country to religion in general and, in particular, to the position of Muslim believers in society. The age-old argument between atheists and believers seems, finally, to have shifted to the area where it should have been—that of ideological-theoretical disputes about the world and life. The clergy and all believers are actively becoming involved in the cleansing and constructive process of perestroyka occurring in society.

At the same time we are surmounting the difficult legacy of the past when insufficient attention paid to the traditions and way of life of the peoples of Central Asia made relations among nationalities in our country highly explosive. The aspiration to consider Islam uniformly as reactionary, incompetence in such very delicate matters, lack of understanding of the fact that Islam is closely linked to many aspects of the life of such nations and the impossibility of separating the precepts of Islam and those of tradition, had an extremely negative effect which can be felt to this day.

Aggressive and ignorant atheism is gradually although with difficulty becoming part of the past, and freedom of conscience is no longer merely a proclamation. Yet until very recently we could hear, for example, doubts as to whether it was necessary to build a mosque in the capital of Turkmenia, where no mosque has existed since the 1948 earthquake. Yet the lack of a mosque did not strengthen atheism but only insulted and denigrated the feelings of the believers, forcing them to practice their religion secretly, in unsuitable premises, and thus embittering them. Now, although with some delay, we have begun to eliminate the excesses toward Islam. We believe that the topic of Islam will be adequately interpreted in our country.

In this useful book, which contains a large number of factual data and original approaches, N.V. Zhdanov and A.A. Ignatenko could not, naturally, cover all aspects of such a complex phenomenon such as Islam, the more so since it is in a state of constant development. The ranks of its supporters are growing and the forms through which it affects politics are changing. For example, they

have insufficiently analyzed the attitude of contemporary Islam toward humanitarian problems and its influence on culture. Further studies in this area will be required.

Islam and Islamic culture are part of human civilization. They are a substantial element in the spiritual potential of millions of people in our country and abroad. The direction which will be followed in the development of the Muslim world will largely determine the future of the global community and, naturally, of Islam itself.

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### Chronicle

*905B0014Q Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 126-127*

[Text] KOMMUNIST representatives participated in roundtable meetings in the cities of Pushkino, Lyubertsy and Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, held as part of seminars for propagandists. A meeting was also held with students at the Moscow City Marxism-Leninism University. Topical problems of the theory and practice of the socioeconomic and political changes occurring in the USSR and the Eastern European socialist countries were discussed.

At a meeting with KOMMUNIST editors, L. Krasucki, deputy editor-in-chief of the PZPR Central Committee journal NOWE DROGI spoke of the situation in Poland and the preparations taking place within the party organizations for the 11th PZPR Congress.

KOMMUNIST was visited by a delegation of the Australian Communist Party, headed by B. Aaronsom, its national organizer. During their talk theoretical problems of the development of socialism and the course and future of economic changes in the USSR and problems of cooperation among communist parties under contemporary conditions were discussed.

The editors were visited by the noted political expert, Zdenek Mlynarz, professor at Innsbruck University. The discussion covered a wide range of problems of coverage by mass information media of the complex social processes taking place throughout the world. Particular attention was paid to KOMMUNIST publications of materials based on topical problems of the theory of world socialism.

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### Regular Enrollment of Students and Graduate Students at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences

*905B0014R Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) p 127*

[Text] The regular enrollment of students and graduate students in the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences is hereby announced.

Enrollment will be based on recommendations issued by the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, and party kraykoms and obkoms. The personnel of the central organizations and ideological establishments will be processed by the party committees (collegiums) of these organizations and establishments, via the Moscow CPSU Gorkom.

Personnel will be accepted for correspondence or full-time training as cadre reserves for leading work on the republic, kray and oblast levels and within the apparatus of the central organizations and ideological establishments. The correspondence-full-time form of training will be for a 3-year term. The correspondence cycle will not exceed 2 years, and the full-time cycle will not exceed 1 year on-the-job training.

Postgraduate studies will be offered in the following departments: CPSU history, philosophy, political economy, scientific communism, USSR history, party building, Soviet state building and law, ideological work, socialist culture, national economy, management of socioeconomic processes, world politics and international CPSU activities, mass information media, applied sociology and psychology, and at the Scientific Atheism Institute and the Center of Sociological Research.

Applications for postgraduate studies, based on competition, will be accepted for personnel of party, soviet, Komsomol and ideological agencies, teachers and scientific associates in party training and scientific institutions with higher education, not older than 35, and with party membership of no less than 3 years. Applicants for graduate studies will take competitive entrance examinations in Marxism-Leninism, their chosen subject and a foreign language and will submit a paper on a topical subject as well as a list of their publications, including articles in newspapers and journals.

The central committees of communists parties of Union republics and the party kraykoms and obkoms will send to the rectorate of the academy the documents of those recommended for postgraduate studies by no later than 1 March and for those accepted for correspondence-full-time studies, by no later than 1 April 1990.

Applicants for the correspondence-full-time department of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences will be summoned for a talk in April-May; those recommended for postgraduate studies will be summoned for their entrance examinations in May-June 1990.

Paid leave not to exceed 30 calendar days will be granted for preparations and taking entrance examinations for postgraduate studies.

Classes at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences will begin on 1 September. Those accepted for training will be offered hostel accommodations (without their families).

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### **Regular Enrollment of Students in Higher Party Schools**

*905B0014S Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 22 Dec 89) pp 127-128*

[Text] The regular student enrollment in higher party schools is hereby announced.

Enrollment will be based on recommendations issued by the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, party kraykoms and obkoms and the Moscow City Party Committee. Personnel of the central organizations and ideological institutions will have their documents processed by the party committees (collegiums) of these organizations and establishments, by the Moscow CPSU Gorkom. Selection for the higher party schools will be made publicly, on a competitive basis, taking into consideration the views of the primary party organizations and labor collectives. The higher party schools will accept CPSU members with a party membership of no less than 3 years among released secretaries of primary party organizations, personnel of soviet and Komsomol agencies and ideological establishments and organizations, workers, kolkhoz members, specialists who are members of party committees, members of soviets of people's deputies and personnel of the party committee apparatus, as follows:

Individuals with higher training, for 2-year full-time and 3-year correspondence departments.

Individuals with secondary education, for 4-year full-time departments.

The full-time departments of the higher party schools will accept personnel under the age of 35.

By no later than 1 April 1990 the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, party kraykoms and obkoms and the Moscow Party Gorkom will submit to the higher party schools the following documents for the recommended personnel: personal enrollment application, excerpt from the party committee bureau resolution, cadre membership reference, health certificate and character reference.

Individuals recommended for 4-year departments will take examinations on social science, Russian language and literature (composition) at the higher party schools in May-June. They will be granted paid leave not to exceed 15 calendar days to prepare themselves for the examinations.

Candidates for the 2-year full-time and 3-year correspondence departments will be summoned to the higher party schools for a talk in April-May.

Classes in the higher party schools will begin on 1 September. Students will be provided with hostel accommodations (excluding their families).

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